

Richard K. Donahue Oral History Interview – JFK #2, 3/8/1967
Administrative Information

Creators: Richard K. Donahue
Interviewer: John F. Stewart
Date of Interview: March 8, 1967
Place of Interview: Lowell, Massachusetts
Length: 115 pages

Biographical Note

Donahue, Staff Assistant to the President for Congressional Liaison (1961-1963), discusses recruiting talent for the John F. Kennedy (JFK) administration, working with the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration, and JFK's treatment of his staff and cabinet, among other issues.

Access

Open.

Usage Restrictions

According to the deed of gift signed March 1, 2000, copyright of these materials has been assigned to the United States Government. Users of these materials are advised to determine the copyright status of any document from which they wish to publish.

Copyright

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the photocopy or reproduction is not to be "used for any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research." If a user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or reproduction for purposes in excesses of "fair use," that user may be liable for copyright infringement. This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a copying order if, in its judgment, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of copyright law. The copyright law extends its protection to unpublished works from the moment of creation in a tangible form. Direct your questions concerning copyright to the reference staff.

Transcript of Oral History Interview

These electronic documents were created from transcripts available in the research room of the John F. Kennedy Library. The transcripts were scanned using optical character recognition and the resulting text files were proofread against the original transcripts. Some formatting changes were made. Page numbers are noted where they would have occurred at the bottoms of the pages of the original transcripts. If researchers have any concerns about accuracy, they are encouraged to visit the Library and consult the transcripts and the interview recordings.

Suggested Citation

Richard K. Donahue, recorded interview by John F. Stewart, March 8, 1967, (page number), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION (NARA)
JOHN F. KENNEDY LIBRARY

Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interviews of
RICHARD K. DONAHUE

In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Richard K. Donahue, of Lowell, Massachusetts, do hereby give, donate, and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title, and interest in the tape recording and transcript of personal interviews conducted in November 1966, March 8, 1967, and February 2, 1977, and prepared for deposit in the John F. Kennedy Library. This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions:

(1) The transcript shall be made available for use by researchers as soon as it has been deposited in the John F. Kennedy Library.

(2) The tape recording shall be made available to those researchers who have access to the transcript.

(3) I hereby assign to the United States Government all copyright I may have in the interview transcript and tape.

(4) Copies of the transcript and the tape recording may be provided by the Library to researchers upon request.

(5) Copies of the transcript and tape recording may be deposited in or loaned to institutions other than the John F. Kennedy Library.

Richard K. Donahue
Donor

10-12-99
Date

John W. Paul
Archivist of the United States

3-1-00
Date

Richard K. Donahue – JFK#2

Table of Contents

<u>Page</u>	<u>Topic</u>
1, 33, 44	Recruiting talent for the John F. Kennedy (JFK) administration during the transition period
30	Contacts and cooperation with the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration
35	Donahue's job in the Kennedy administration
37	1961 House Rules Committee fight
40	Democratic National Committee in 1960
46	Dan H. Fenn's White House operation
49	Summer jobs for college students
50	J. Edward Day, H.W. "Bill" Brawley, and the Office of Postmaster General
56	Firing people from government jobs
59	Veterans' Administration
64	General Services Administration-funded projects around the country
70	Congressional liaison people for government departments
72	Post Office patronage
73	Civil Service Commission
76	White House leaks and protocols for dealing with the press
79	Edward M. Kennedy's 1963 Senate campaign
81	JFK's involvement in getting legislation passed
85	JFK's relationship with John William McCormack
88	JFK's relationship with other congressional leaders
90	Lyndon B. Johnson's role in getting legislation passed
94	New York State politics
97	Richard J. Daley
100	JFK on state politics
101	Appointing people to honorary positions
106	JFK's treatment of his staff and cabinet
113	Donahue's feelings about the administration when he left

Second of Four Oral History Interviews

with

Richard K. Donahue

March 8, 1967
Lowell, Massachusetts

By John F. Stewart

For the John F. Kennedy Library

STEWART: Today is March 8. This is John Stewart, the interviewer. It is an interview with Mr. Richard Donahue. In our last interview we got up to election day, and we're starting now on the transition period. Let me ask you, how did you get involved in the recruitment business during the transition?

DONAHUE: The day after election, as you know, the President [John F. Kennedy] went to bed very late that night, and he got up at, oh, sometime in the morning. He went to the Armory in Hyannis [Massachusetts] at noon, and he there made

[-1-]

his acceptance of the election to the country at large. Then as he walked down from the platform, which was at one end of the hall, he spoke to Kenny O'Donnell [Kenneth P. O'Donnell] and Larry [Lawrence F. O'Brien] and myself, and I think Ted Sorensen [Theodore C. Sorensen] was there at that time, and said that he wanted to see us over in his house later, later that day or the next day—my memory is, it was later that day. So sometime later we gathered, not at his house, really, but at Bobby's [Robert F. Kennedy] house, and there was Sarge [R. Sargent Shriver, Jr.], Bobby, Ted Sorensen, Pierre [Pierre E.G. Salinger], Kenny, Larry, myself, and as I remember it, Lem Billings [Kirk LeMoyne Billins] was there.

That was interesting for us because it was the first time.... I had done work with the Secret Service, oh, two weeks before the election. They had come into the office and wanted to know where he was going to spend election day. And other than that we had had no conversation with them. I think that two or three of us

[-2-]

went over together, and the thing that surprised me was, first, that they recognized us by name—and I don't know whether anybody had ever provided them pictures of us, or anything like that; and secondly, was the fact that, of course, they were all moved into all kinds of positions, although we expected that they would be.

Then we sat around Bobby's living room for a short time. It was a rainy kind of a miserable day. All of a sudden, the President walked in, and it was the first time, I remember, we all stood up, and I don't think we had ever stood up for him ever before. He had on a kind of, it looked like a wild Australian hat, you know, one of those.... What do you call them?

He got right down to business and started talking about the transition. The first thing that he asked Lem to do was to get Allen Dulles [Allen W. Dulles] on the phone and to ask him if he would stay on.

[-3-]

Then he followed up with J. Edgar Hoover. And poor Lem would be just as I was, he wouldn't know how to get Allen Dulles on the phone, any more than how to get J. Edgar Hoover on the phone. But that was done.

Then he started talking about the problems of the transition, and putting the government together. There were, at that time, two studies. There was the Neustadt [Richard E. Neustadt] thing, and there was Clark Clifford [Clark M. Clifford] and the Brookings [Brookings Institution] pieces. And there was one brown and one green, and they were passed around. I don't think that.... Other people obviously had seen them. I, for one, had never seen them before. He talked about the two problems: the problems of getting quality people involved in government, and the second thing, of making sure that we had political reliability among the people that were going to take positions of responsibility in government. His direct orders were pretty

[-4-]

much that Sarge was to look for people that we didn't know, and that Larry was to look for people that we did know, and I was to work with him. [Interruption]

STEWART: You were mentioning the two operations that....

DONHUE: Yes. It was for the first time there that things started to fall into some sort of a formal breakdown of authority, I suppose, as it were. It was the first time that everybody took on functions, really, although Kenny O'Donnell had been acting effectively as appointment secretary, he then became his appointment secretary.

We had some things that we had prepared for. Bill Brawley [H.W. Brawley] was executive director of the Senate Civil Service Committee [Post Office and Civil Service Committee], and they had prepared what I guess became called the “green book.” But what we had at that time were the galley proofs which were.... The green book was about as large as a telephone book, but the galley proofs of that were enormous, they were great big, big things.

[-5-]

And that was a list of all the presidential appointments, their current status, their salary, and it became known as the “wish book.” You know, people looked at it and wished they could have a job. I remember Sarge’s comment was, “Do you mean people like Luther Hodges [Luther H. Hodges] for secretary of commerce?” because Sarge had been working very closely with him in the Businessmen for Kennedy. And then the President went, “Yes, I mean that, too.” And then he became very specific and he said, “There must be some place in government we can put a secretary,” and he mentioned a particular girl’s name, because, God, she “gives him an awful pain in the neck.” In other words, he was saying in substance that we had to put away some people, too. That was about the extent of the meeting although it went into some other details about where people were going to operate from.

He was going immediately then to Palm Beach [Florida]. That day, or the next day, we left for Washington. We stopped at Washington; Vice President Johnson [Lyndon B. Johnson] flew in. There was a meeting at

[-6-]

the airport; he went on. I went back to the National Committee [Democratic National Committee], and there we set up a rather limited organization, and we set up with the National Committee. Sarge basically broke down with Harris Wofford [Harris L. Wofford, Jr.] and Adam Yarmolinsky, and there was Ralph Dungan [Ralph A. Dungan] and Larry and myself. There were really six people.

We had all kinds of difficulty getting started. The first difficulty was to determine some kind of order of priorities and that things didn’t fall into normal priorities. My memory of the specific filling of Cabinet posts, for instance, is not particularly good, but the normal one that you would think of, of course, would be secretary of state first, then secretary of defense, and on and on and on. It didn’t fall in that way, because the contacts came in various ways.

The first problem was, how do you get information, who is available. It was very obvious that we had not utilized in any portion of the campaign a lot people that the President thought were good

[-7-]

secretaries of state. We had used a lot of people on foreign policy position papers and for all of those things who could feel names in, and indeed they did. We had, oh, no end of help in suggestions from the members of Congress. They became just absolutely unwieldy. Our problem became both physical and mental; physically, to handle the requests that came by

letter and by phone call to him that were referred to us, and then trying to get some kind of a lineup on who they were recommending. And of course, most of them turned out to be someone's brother-in-law. And then Arthur Schlesinger [Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.] and Ken Galbraith [John Kenneth Galbraith] must know more people than anyone in the world because they were the greatest fountain of people.

In addition to the direct contacts that were made to us, of course, there were contacts made to the President. There was a question of utilizing them. His priorities changed from time to time. The first thing that we discovered,

[-8-]

because, of course, we had never done it before, is that every news service in the country had the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigations] staked out, which is not a very hard thing to do. So that if a name was suggested and we would want to do a full field [investigation] on him, and they had more leaks in the Washington office of the FBI, and of course the name would appear in the paper, which would make the President furious. So one day Larry and I devised a marvelous scheme, which we thought marvelous at the time, we took about a hundred and fifty names of people who had been very prominent in the campaign, all throughout the country, at various levels; they weren't all obviously cabinet types; and we gave them all to the FBI at once. And we learned a long, long time later, NBC [National Broadcasting Company, Inc.] I think it was Sandy Vanocur [Sander Vanocur] said gee, that we don't know how much money we cost them chasing down people that had obvious Kennedy ties, but nobody knew what they were being considered for.

Well, it went back and forth, some of the

[-9-]

appointments were rather routine, like Hodges. Byron White [Byron R. White] was less than routine. He went out to O Street with the intention of coming away as attorney general, and he rather reluctantly came out as deputy attorney general. There were other people who went out there merely for the walk. Hy Raskin [Hyman B. Raskin] went out there for the frank basis that he just wanted his pictures taken coming out of there; he was going to practice law.

I remember particularly on Arthur Goldberg [Arthur J. Goldberg], his office was right down the hall from us; he had been very helpful during the campaign, and most of us were very anxious for him to... [Interruption] We were very interested in him because he had been very friendly, and we got involved then in a feud between the AFL-CIO [American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations] and the old line union groups. It was finally resolved in his favor. That came through very well.

There were others not so well. It is my memory, and this may be wrong, but that Robert McNamara [Robert S. McNamara] came out of *Time* magazine. Leads came out of

[-10-]

the darnedest places, but there was an article about that time saying what a marvelous job he was doing. Sarge pursued him, and he did it.

STEWART: How, basically, was the work broken up within the two groups?

DONAHUE: Well, it wasn't, although it naturally fell into patterns. Adam Yarmolinsky and Harris Wofford and Sarge had, through working through the Businessmen for Kennedy, the civil rights group, and their natural academic [backgrounds] had all kinds of lines. They would more or less be leaning toward the nonpolitical types. Ralph and Larry and I were very much concerned with those people who were politically active. But it wasn't really broken up that way because we had standards. We had standards of excellence, toughness, willingness to work and political loyalty. And you can't really distinguish between them without doing quite a bit of checking back and forth.

It also got to be kind of very well known that we were there, and what we were doing. That we were working.

[-11-]

And then came the problem, you can't avoid candidates who want to come and see you. And that was a terribly exhausting thing.

If I think it's almost impossible to describe it, but there were very few cubicles. There were papers stacked up in rafts all over. People were coming in with everything from biographies that had been professionally done, to letters of introduction, form 57's, everything like that. It's rather amazing that, although not as many came out of the operation as some people have given it credit for, that as many did. The President obviously didn't rely on this group for the total source of his recommendations. But he did refer back; he did draw on his own much vaster knowledge of people and things; he did make calls. I'd learned afterwards of check-outs he did on a lot of people.

There were emergencies by the day. One time the emergency might be, as I well remember, "We haven't done anything for anybody from Ohio." And our answer might be rather abrupt, "But why the hell should we do anything for Ohio when it's

[-12-]

done so little for us?" But that was a concern. There was an application in from a fellow who was in the Department of Commerce of DiSalle [Michael V. DiSalle]. His name was Jack Bush [John W. Bush], and he had been, I guess, a commissioner of industry and commerce, or something like that. We were looking around for federal power commissioner. Because the President's anxiety of the moment was to get someone from there, I called him and asked him to come down. He's a fine man, a nice man. The power commission was probably too exposed a position. He walked out of there a member of the Interstate Commerce Commission [ICC] and you know, it was announced. [Interruption] I'm sorry I forget where we were.

STEWART: Well, you just mentioned the guy that walked out....

DONAHUE: Oh, that was Jack Bush. Really the priority of that moment happened to be

that we needed someone from Ohio. Sometimes the priority would be the complaint because there are not enough Italians, and some would write a column that there were

[-13-]

all Easterners, there's not someone from the far West.

Really, in a way, the funniest member of the cabinet would be the one that you'd think would be easiest to pick, and that would be the postmaster general. It has traditionally been, both in Republican and Democratic years, someone who has been politically oriented. There had been no one appointed from California. Teddy [Edward M. Kennedy] made a suggestion that Hugo Fisher [Hugo M. Fisher], who was senator from San Diego be appointed. Hugo didn't sound... Everybody knew Hugo. He didn't seem to be particularly heavy, and certainly not in comparison with people who had been postmaster general before. So Larry put in a call to Jesse Unruh [Jesse M. Unruh] and said, "What do you think of things? What have you got?" He said, "Well, let me think. There's a guy out here that works for a life insurance company, he's a vice president. He was a delegate, he was loyal, and he looks good on paper. He's alright. How about him?" This

[-14-]

whole thing took place between, say, six or seven o'clock at night. Very early the next morning, Ed Day [J. Edward Day] became postmaster general. He was absolutely delighted. I'm positive he'd never met the President, saw him seldom thereafter. You know, just unbelievable how he got appointed. He was the last man in the world who figured he was being considered for the Cabinet, and he *was* the last man in the world to be considered. But he made it.

As you went down the line, you come into what really is politics. If you take someone like Arthur Goldberg, who was secretary of labor, and you've had some problems with the UAW [United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America] and the AFL-CIO, then the question then comes: How do you balance your under secretaries and assistant secretaries, and how do you balance them between the old-craft unions? Do you try and give it a business tinge? How can you get someone that's acceptable? So that the process,

[-15-]

instead of becoming easier, as you go down the line, becomes much more complicated. Plus the fact that once you name a cabinet officer, no matter what he says, he then starts his own talent hunt because he's convinced that he's going to get the job in the world so he's going to get the best people. So even if the President determines that they are still his jobs—and he used that expression, that they were his jobs. He had five thousand jobs. Sometimes he didn't win, and the classic example was man's name I can't think of. That's a shame. When McNamara was named, one of the assistant secretaries of defense, the name had been changed a couple of times, but it's basically for personnel, Manpower [Manpower

Administration], or.... Oh, what's his name, from the union? Been a great and loyal friend. The President recommended him to McNamara, even though McNamara himself was not the appointing authority. And McNamara checked him out and rejected him. Well, at the time that McNamara was chosen,

[-16-]

the fact that he was going to give up so much money to come into government and it was such a really very, very high class appointment, made him sort of the target for all of the newspaper people who were looking around. And when McNamara not only turned him down but then turned down Frank Roosevelt [Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr.] for secretary of the navy, well, then it all of a sudden became the thing to do.

If you were in the Cabinet and the President or, as it later got on, some member of the staff rejected, you would reject some nominee that they would have. And it was amazing to me to see the pattern develop. They wanted to demonstrate that they were both strong and independent.

So this got to be more complex, and from time to time the President would just have to lower the boom on them. The guys just didn't always react as well as they did.

Although again an anecdote that was true, one day I was talking to the President about the Post Office Department, and the Post Office Department has a

[-17-]

deputy postmaster general whom he had named at the same time, and then it had at that time, I think, four or five assistant postmaster generals. A fellow had been in the office who was a very, very high type fellow, he had been head of an advertising agency in New York, had a lot of dough, and had known Day, but he had been basically on the finance side. And there was a job, assistant postmaster general for financial management [Bureau of Finance and Administration]. So I was talking to the President about appointing him. He said to me, "Who's he a friend of?" I said, "Well, he's a friend of Ed Day's." He said, "I thought Ed was happy with his job," which was strange enough. Ralph [Ralph W. Nicholson] happens to be one of the finest, most able guys in government. Everybody's trying to steal him away from the Post Office. But he felt that way about these things, and from time to time he would intervene.

Also we all learned during this period, including the President, the frustrations of being president in that these five thousand jobs weren't all his,

[-18-]

he couldn't do with them exactly as he wanted; he had to lobby among the people that he had appointed to have people he wanted appointed. He couldn't take a little girl that had always been very loyal and all of a sudden give her a grade twelve. He couldn't all of a sudden make a fellow whom he knew to be very well qualified, qualify under civil service regulations. He couldn't always get rid of people that he thought he should be able to get rid of. And it was

probably the longest and most exhausting period, including all the campaigns that I'd personally put in.

STEWART: Did you have much of a problem in getting a hold on the qualifications of a particular job? I suppose they were spelled out to a certain extent in this book of the....

DONAHUE: No, actually the book itself wasn't a great deal of help. I think that what you had.... We had an awful lot of advisors; we had an awful lot of people in whom we had confidence,

[-19-]

people who had served on the Hill [Capitol Hill] and who had done business with the departments and agencies, and who had seen them run, and had some ideas—sometimes their ideas were good and bad—but in any event they could explain to you what were the needs for a particular thing.

For instance, John Carver [John A. Carver, Jr.], who would later become assistant secretary of interior, then under secretary, who's now in the Federal Power Commission, John's a really intellectual student of government—Ralph Dungan is another—that really know the background of what types of people you're looking for. And, as I say, you try to make these blends all the time, and the blends became a real tough problem. Sometimes you could work out something wonderfully on paper, and then it just wouldn't work, for all kinds of reasons. You could get interference.

In the Interior Department, for instance, you get all of the fights between the conservationists and between the oil and gas interests and the lumber interests. Then you

[-20-]

find very quickly, and the President found, that the Congress had a proprietary interest in all departments of government, and that a subcommittee chairman on appropriations or a substantive committee chairman feels that he is the be all and the end all, and that he has some right to be consulted. And the right to be consulted is just a very nice way of saying the right to have the veto. That's a delicate balance. Do you consult legitimately, or do you merely inform before you announce to the world? We had foul-ups galore in that area.

STEWART: You mentioned the physical problems of keeping track of, for example, the evaluations that you were getting different people. I recall seeing mention of an enormous card file that was set up at....

DONAHUE: We had an enormous card file, and I'm sure that it's somewhere, and I'm sure that at some points it was useful. But really what it was useful for was sometimes to thumb through it. Because we weren't

[-21-]

so well organized that we could run over and stay, "We've got a nice young bright lawyer, thirty-five, who's a generalist who can fit within this area." We just didn't have it. Frequently, for instance, someone would call on the President. They would leave the biography of some great man. It would get to us. Frequently it got lost. And he would say, "Alex Rose was down from New York and says he's got a great man for the U.N. [United Nations] delegation. I don't remember his name, but the guy's got a good background." So everybody would say, "What happened to the paper that came from Alex Rose?" And you'd end up by saying, "Alex, we made a mistake, we lost the paper." That is, of course, the last recourse, because then Alex.... You see, Alex would be like anyone else, they would all broker information. Everybody wanted to appear to be the kingmaker, which is something I learned. So that there were all kinds of false rumors.

There was a fellow by the name of

[-22-]

Bob Hill [Robert C. Hill] who at that time under Eisenhower [Dwight D. Eisenhower] was Ambassador to Mexico. One of the toughest jobs we had to fill was assistant secretary of state for Latin-American affairs [Inter-American Affairs]. Arthur Schlesinger heard the name Hill. There was also in New Hampshire Professor Herbert Hill, who was Democratic national committeeman from New Hampshire. He called Professor Hill and told him he was under consideration for assistant secretary. He happened to be a professor of mine when I was at Dartmouth [Dartmouth College]. He called me, and I had to tell him that, to the best of my knowledge, he wasn't being considered for anything, which was the fact. But you had situations like that. Terrible.

STEWART: Were you personally swamped with requests from friends and college classmates?

DONAHUE: Not too, too much. For instance, I didn't during that period of time take calls from friends. I concerned myself basically with the business I never recommended anybody during that period

[-23-]

that I'd known personally apart from any Kennedy association, but it was very difficult. We were at 1001 Connecticut [Avenue]; we were living in the Mayflower Hotel; there was nothing to do; we were there at eight-thirty in the morning, left there at nine, nine-thirty, ten o'clock at night. Back at the hotel there was no one to screen your calls, you got lots of calls. And then you had people waiting in the corridors. It was kind of wild.

STEWART: Did you get more involved than anyone else in Massachusetts people? Was there an unusual flock to these?

DONAHUE: No. There were quite a few from Massachusetts, but it was fairly easy. In

terms of Massachusetts both Larry and myself could separate them, and Kenny O'Donnell, who spent a lot of time at this. Although he was not officially doing it, he was doing a tremendous amount of it. Between the three of us, we could run down who they were and where they came from and whether or not they were any good. The people that did come to government

[-24-]

from Massachusetts were more by accident in the sense that they were people that the President had known for a long, long time, and that they were recommended. It was easier to shoot someone down from Massachusetts because we could get a faster run-down on them than from any place else. We would have flurries. Again, I remember, one fellow on the ICC put on a fantastic campaign. In three phone calls, I found out exactly where he came from, what his background was, whether or not he'd be the type—he, in this instance, didn't happen to be. But I have a clear recollection of flying back to Massachusetts one weekend and getting off the plane and finding him there ready to drive me to Lowell [Massachusetts].

STEWART: What did you generally consider your most reliable source, or your most reliable conduit, so to speak, for information on people?

DONAHUE: Well, I suppose the people that I generally relied upon were the political people, political leaders in the state. And you can almost go

[-25-]

state by state and name different guys who, although they are political, are also smart in other ways and will get an independent evaluation of the man's professional qualifications; if they don't know him; background, and then will give you a short political history, and were very cooperative in doing it. But if you had somebody who had no contact with politics, you'd have to use other people to get some kind of a reading from them, and it might be somebody who had worked with us on any one of a lot of task forces. A lot of people were in government, and you could use other people in government who had known them and get some judgment on them there.

STEWART: There was no conscious attempt to hold out on any of these three thousand jobs?

DONAHUE: Oh, no. No, the real problem is a philosophical one, as far as I can see. It is a question of how much control is a president going to have over his government. I am certain of this, that John F. Kennedy had, during his presidency, more control

[-26-]

over the government than Lyndon Johnson has today. And I'm satisfied that that was done absolutely conscientiously and directly. We were interested that everyone in the government understood that they were the product of John F. Kennedy, they got their job from him, and they owed their allegiance to him. And the danger of getting the most qualified man in the world is, he honestly thinks that he won the election. And there are decisions which the president has to make, and he should not have to reason with someone who works for him that it's the best course, because he is the only one in government who has an overlook. Well, the way the civil service structure has cut in over a period of time, and there are valid arguments why it should, but it has taken more and more control of the government away from the president. So that it isn't the Democrats or the Republicans who win, it's a question of which civil servant advances the best. It

[-27-]

honestly at times seemed to us like a great big joke, a national election, because you just could not move the great immovable mass.

STEWART: I've heard it said—and I can't tell you the source, but possibly this applies to your work later—but anyway the quote is, "Donahue was always so sympathetic towards a Republican." This was in a transcript I was reading the other day.

DONAHUE: No. It really has got to be a...

STEWART: No, it wasn't said jokingly; at least it didn't seem to be.

DONAHUE: It would have to be. I don't think anyone has ever accused me of that before or since. No, I have a very, very strong feeling that goes back to this loyalty thing, that thirty-three million people voted for us, thirty-three million people voted for the other guy, let's get one of our thirty-three million, and made no bones about it.

STEWART: That's interesting. Something else that I also came across of a conversation you had with Walter Lippmann.

[-28-]

DONAHUE: Now, that is totally apocryphal, but I don't know what they're saying. I've heard the story a million times.

STEWART: The story was that Walter Lippmann told someone he wanted to meet a true representative of the New Frontier, and they brought you up and introduced you, and you told him that cabinet appointments didn't really matter much, the important things were the marshals and the postmaster. He said he was shocked at this.

DONAHUE: Well, I've heard another story. I've heard a story that I told him he didn't know anything about foreign policy, that was the story. The truth of the matter is, I never talked to the man, period. I've been to his house once.

STEWART: I think this was at a party at someone else's house but I can't remember who it was.

DONAHUE: No, the only time I ever remember meeting him was, during the interregnum there was a party at his house, I went over there because we could only spend a very few minutes. I think

[-29-]

we were in the house ten minutes. I saw him across the room. I don't even remember shaking hands with him. And I'm going to a party for him next week. But I've heard, oh, all kinds of attributions of that.

STEWART: Did you have any contacts at all with people in the Eisenhower administration, either in the White House or elsewhere?

DONAHUE: Yes, we had a lot with the people in the White House. People in the White were great; they were really very, very excellent. Their staff functioned entirely differently than ours, but they were most cooperative in showing exactly what they did, how they did it, and why they did it. Bruce Harlow, for one, on the congressional side was very, very good. A lot of them, of course, had sort of drifted off, and there wasn't much going on over there. But all of those people were very, very helpful, and not only to telling us what they're doing, but warning us against traps that you can fall into. For instance,

[-30-]

one fellow Bob Hampton [Robert E. Hampton], who is now the Republican member of the Service Commission, Bob worked for me, we went over to the White House, he was doing a job with personnel. Hopkins [William J. Hopkins] is the only institution that is the White House. So we used to say to Bill, "Who used to do this job?" And he said, "Bob Hampton." Well, I called him up and asked him to come in and talk to me. He did. He wasn't working at the time; he was looking over some offers. But I asked if he could come in and help, and he stayed with us for three or four months.

I think the shock came at that point because when you get to the White House, you figure, well, most of it's over now. Then all of a sudden Hopkins says, "The International Boundary Commissioners have to be nominated before so and so." Well, who does that?" "Well, someone has to do it." "What's the background of it?" Then it turns but that there's a fantastic number of things. I think the first

[-31-]

one that shook me was a fellow from the State Department somehow came charging in to me on an international fisheries convention. I had no idea where we started, and I what we did, so I said, "Well, we'll just wait." And the next day I got a memorandum of conversation which went on for three pages saying that I said "We'll just wait." So Bob was terrific and filled us in. And it's interesting—you don't get this inside this often—but some of the same people who campaigned for appointments for civic boards and commissions with us, had campaigned with him. And his secretary stayed with me and became my secretary. She had been in the White House since 1946. She frequently could tell me something about a caller. She'd say "Well, we used to have him when Mr. Eisenhower was here."

STEWART: Did you have any role at all in selecting Smith [Benjamin A. Smith II] to fill the Senate seat?

DONAHUE: No, the President made that selection.

[-32-]

STEWART: There was nothing at all?

DONAHUE: There was an awful lot of byplay as to.... We did have a discussion as to whether you could trust Furcolo [Foster Furcolo]—you know the question of the resignation, "Would Furcolo do it?" and all that. I honestly don't know. My judgment is that that is the type of.... I've always been extremely high on Ben. He's a fantastic guy. He did so doggone much, so well. I think all of us were really delighted about it.

STEWART: In addition to filling these three thousand, when did you start really getting concerned with all of the other more patronage type jobs...

DONAHUE: This started right from the very first mix. You go from the sublime to the ridiculous. All of a sudden, you're worrying about, for instance, who is going to be head of an independent agency, GSA [General Services Administration], VA [Veterans Administration] or something like that. The next thing you know, some congressman or leader is talking about,

[-33-]

"When are you going to nominate the marshal?" or "There's a vacancy in the collector's office." We didn't really concern ourselves with the Post Office, as such, until we actually were physically in the White House. But these other things kept popping up all of the time. And we really didn't have any machinery for handling it, and we didn't make an appointment on any one of those things until, oh, I would guess, sometime after we were in the White House.

STEWART: Was there ever any doubt that you would wind up in the White House? Was anything else considered, or did you consider anything else?

DONAHUE: Well, yes. I considered coming back here because, quite frankly, I didn't ever really want to.... I had never considered going into government at all. I had never considered anything beyond election day. My only concern had been for election day. I think the biggest shock I ever got was when, the day after the election, the President assumed that I was

[-34-]

going to work. Because, quite frankly, my job, I thought, was over when he was elected. I had and have a whole bunch of things to do here, which I like to do. So I was really rather a reluctant dragon for a long time, and I was really sort of a temporary intermittent employee all the time I was there, because my only desire was always to do this, and I really just drifted into doing things rather than doing what I wanted to do, which was really to practice law.

STEWART: Well, as of, say, inauguration day, what kind of a definition did you have as to what your job was going to be?

DONAHUE: Well, you see, the thing started to shift and it went through a constant change, I had worked most closely with Kenny and Larry for, oh, all these years. We were bothered by all of these jobs and this and that. Then during this period, of course, the President was preparing not only his inaugural [address] but his state of the union and taking a look

[-35-]

at the budget staff and preparing the legislative program. And then the first issue that came up to us was the question of change of the rules.

Somewhere, my opinion is between Christmas and inauguration day, the President had said in a rather offhand way that Larry was to take care of the congressional matters. But he also then said he was to take care of the personnel matters, which was kind of unique, because this was against all the advice that we had ever had. And so there were just the two of us, at that point, doing that because other people had been winnowed away. Sarge was still doing a lot of this, but he was getting involved in all kinds of things, you know, like the start of the Peace Corps. Harris Wofford had decided he wanted to devote his interests to civil rights, and he was gone. Adam Yarmolinsky had jumped on with McNamara right off the bat. They were working on all of that problem. Ralph Dungan always carried, I would say, the

[-36-]

greatest day-to-day load of the responsibility of this, and he was there and I was there, and Larry was concerned with Congress.

Well, we were getting close to the Rules Committee [House of Representatives Rules Committee] fight, and I don't think I had ever had more than a tour of the Capitol. Larry had spent two years there with Furcolo. We didn't know anything about it, but it didn't seem to us to be any different than anything else we'd ever done. So we started then trying to figure out what makes Congress tick. One night in the middle of this—because no job was ever defined; you were switching from one thing to the other, but this was long before we went to the White House—we sat down with I think, Carl Elliot [Carl A. Elliot], Dick Bolling [Richard W. Bolling], or maybe it was Bob Jones [Robert E. Jones, Jr.], I don't know, Frank Thompson [Frank Thompson, Jr.], and ran over the House, just to go over the members. Who are they? Who's a good guy? Who's a bad guy? And, literally, this is about as much as we knew about them.

[-37-]

You know, is he is a good guy? Is he a bad guy? What moves him? How do you move him? What does he want? So then, from that period on, we started to put in balance recommendations, because the flood of congressional endorsements at that time was staggering. We tried to put them in some kind of a balance. Well, can we get any good out of them? And if we get some good, do we create some credit and can we use the credit up? When we got down actually to the rules fight itself, it was just Larry and myself who were really doing it all the time. Almost, at that time, within a matter of days, we'd taken Henry Wilson [Henry Hall Wilson] on board. Mike Manatos [Mike N. Manatos] I don't think had come aboard then, I'm sure he hadn't. And Claude Desautels [Claude J. Desautels] was switching between Congressman Aspinall's [Wayne N. Aspinall] office. So were trying to work by ear.

STEWART: You mentioned, it's sort of interesting, your lack of experience with the congressional

[-38-]

processes in general. Could you say a little more about how you personally familiarized yourself with the whole situation, in addition to knowing the members, and the....

DONAHUE: Well, I suppose, a little bit by osmosis. But politics isn't really complex. It's a question of power, and it's a question of the structure of power. And politics is no different than, really, life. It's a question of what motivates a particular guy, and which way will he go, and who leads him, and who does he follow. So you can make some broad assumptions with Congress, as you did then, that you have a certain number of friends. And then you have a certain number of implacable enemies, and then you have a certain number in the middle. So you take what they call the possibles, and you start to winnow them away. And you don't do it in groups, you do it one by one. On one

fellow it may be getting someone else to call him; on someone else you may have to trade off your support for a committee assignment for him.

[-39-]

And I suppose this is the way we kind of limped through it. You know, you just learn. Some of it's not hard if you're a lawyer, anyway; I mean, what the committee functions are, what the rules and those things, that's not difficult. It's the bodies that are kind of tough.

STEWART: You spent probably the first few weeks anyway strictly on the rules fight.

DONAHUE: Well, yes, we did, except that we'd have the problem of.... You know, the personnel things were popping up all the time, and at that time they were very much intertwined with what you could do with people. You could, I suppose, in the crudest sense, trade a job for a vote. I can't remember a specific instance where we traded a job for a vote, but I can say that you can create a lot of.... [BEGIN SIDE 2] ...favorable reaction.

STEWART: How was your operation, or your function, approached in relation to the National Committee after the inauguration?

[-40-]

DONAHUE: At that time the National Committee was just moribund. I mean, it had been stripped. I don't think there were four or five people over there that were on the payroll. The National Committee at the first recognized very clearly that all types of patronage things, and all of those, were absolutely necessary for the President's program. So we did a typically scandalous thing, but you have to do it. We treated congressional requests as number one, and we treated requests from state leaders who were really political forces as number two. It's a wrong thing to do, but we did it in the exigencies of the moment. But then they started to really scream and yell. So at one point we had a rather formal committee that theoretically met—I guess it did meet for a long time—every day to go over all of the appointments that were coming up. Who was available—at this time we didn't have a fairly formal structure—what were the priorities in terms

[-41-]

of who was squawking about what, and try and work out some kind of a balance between the National Committee and our needs. [Interruption]

STEWART: You mentioned the National Committee.

DONAHUE: Yes, they really started to hurt. I think that anybody who's at all candid has to say that the National Committee was pretty well denuded and

downgraded and given a very unpleasant role for them to fulfill during almost all the time of the President's presidency—except for the fundraising, we gave them all of that. And they got doggone little for it.

STEWART: Who was mainly involved in personnel matters over there?

DONAHUE: Chuck Roche [Charles Roche] and Louis Martin [Louis E. Martin]. Now Louis was a great scout for us, because one of the things that we desperately wanted to do was to get some really highly qualified Negroes into the government, and Louis is probably the best source through his connections.

[-40-]

He did very well for us. But as the administration started to harden and gel, it became difficult for anyone to get a job because, again, it's just not just a cabinet officer who conducts a talent search, then an assistant secretary conducts a talent search, then the bureau head conducts a talent search. So you have all these conflicting.... There's no way that anyone can stay on top. I just think that we did a good job in staying on top of it to be certain that we were keeping control of it. When I mean control, I mean that these were people who have basic loyalty to John F. Kennedy. There were a lot of people who would be on the surface loyal Democrats, but a lot of them, for instance, had primary loyalties to Lyndon Johnson, primary loyalties to Hubert Humphrey [Hubert H. Humphrey], or to "Scoop" Jackson [Henry M. Jackson], or to Clinton Anderson [Clinton P. Anderson] or to anyone of several things. None of which anybody ever objected to, but we hoped we wouldn't give up a section of HEW [Department of Health, Education and Welfare] to John Fogarty [John E. Fogarty],

[-43-]

that maybe they would answer the President's call before John called.

STEWART: Did you run into many security problems either in the period before the inauguration or after, and what were the most common of them?

DONAHUE: Well, I think the only, you know, really marked security problem that you run into were with Negroes of a certain age, early forties. If they were at all leaders and if they were at all militant at some point during the thirties or early forties, they were probably involved in something that had been listed by J. Edgar Hoover—not serious. The others would be on local appointments. When you come into collectors of customs, and farmers home administrators and stuff like that, you're liable to come up with someone who was playing hanky-panky. But they were mostly.... Well, I guess we did have one guy that was a homosexual, I remember.

STEWART: In the Department of Commerce?

DONAHUE: Yes. But most of them were oversexed.

STEWART: Who did Dorothy Davies' work? Was she in the White

[-44-]

House?

DONAHUE: She was in the Executive Office Building.

STEWART: What was her function?

DONAHUE: Well, it's a question of what her function was and what she did. Her job was to take charge of the paper, to keep track of what expirations on commissions and stuff like that were to come up; to keep a file of people who were available and stuff like that, to keep everybody alerted and to hope that we could submit some names. And her second and other function was, when anybody in a schedule C position, or a presidential appointment was nominated, to circulate his name between Kenny O'Donnell, Larry O'Brien, Dick McGuire [Richard V. McGuire] and myself for our approval. Ralph Dungan, also. So that if anyone of us knew of some particular reason why a man should not be appointed, we would indicate it. And until that approval was given, the man was not appointed.

[-45-]

STEWART: Were you involved in setting up Dan Fenn's [Dan H. Fenn, Jr.] operation and how effectively was it?

DONAHUE: Well, Dan was an old scout, a friend of mine. Dan worked with Ralph Dungan most directly. One of the biggest, biggest problems in government is just filling the doggone [unclear] of the turnovers—it's terrific—and to keep your quality up. The natural instinct of a fellow who's in charge of a thing is to appoint from within because he knows somebody, and he's too lazy to really go out and do it and to keep feeding up fresh names, fresh bodies, exposing them, seeing if you can work it in. I suppose that there's nobody who ever got in the personnel business who was ever happy or satisfied that what he was doing was entirely successful. I suppose we all have our great joys and great sorrows. I would guess we were certainly conscientious, I'm sure. For instance, one of the jobs they took on, and I

[-46-]

never had a great deal to do with, was AID [Agency for International Development]. My gosh, you know, AID has frustrated administrations since time runneth not to the contrary. And to really get good people, and to get them going, boy, it's murder. But they worked at it.

STEWART: Did you have much contact with them?

DONAHUE: Yes, almost daily contact with them. [Interruption]

STEWART: Over what, their coming up with bodies and recommending them?

DONAHUE: Sometimes. Then you might get it in reverse. A congressman would say, "I've got a guy that would be a marvelous deputy assistant secretary of something or other. I'd like to have him interviewed." And Dan would interview him and grade him, and then it's a long cumbersome process. Sometimes you might be just checking, "What's happened to Joe Schmaltz?" Other times you might have occasion to have known somebody. For instance, a fellow might write to Larry or to Kenny or to me. If it came to Kenny or Larry,

[-47-]

they were more apt to say to me, "Does the guy qualify?" Somebody that we'd known, or they knew, or something like that. I would generally send them over to Dan and say, "Here's what I know of his background. See where he fits."

STEWART: Did this coordinating business between you and O'Brien, O'Donnell and Fenn's office become a real problem?

DONAHUE: Oh, sure, from time to time. I mean, everybody can't be president, and everybody can't be in control of everything that's going on. There are times when Dan, in all honesty, might be blithely following a course when no one had told him to quit, or where we were happy in the fact that we had cleared the name with the President and holding it to ourselves; Dan didn't know about it, you know, and he'd be going on some talent hunt and talking to some guy about a job that we were convinced was already filled. Yes, there's no question there

[-48-]

was some conflict from time to time.

STEWART: Were you at all involved in the ruckus—I think it was in 1962—over summer jobs for college students?

DONAHUE: No, '62 wasn't a bad one. Well, '62 was a kind of a bad one. Yes, we had a little flap about it. No, that basically was done by Dorothy Davies' operation where they just started on it. Was that the one where they called the Hill and were auctioning them off, or something?

STEWART: They generally let it be known that the way for these kids to get jobs would be through their congressman. Macy [John W. Macy, Jr.] got caught in the

middle, I think.

DONAHUE: Yes. I think the trouble with that was that that was sort of a direction that was taken too explicitly. We had hoped that those people who had summer employment had been referred to us by someone. But it got to be like a Prussian dictate.

STEWART: How would you describe your relationship with J. Edward Day, both at the beginning and then

[-49-]

later? Didn't you handle most of his contact with the White House?

DONAHUE: Yes. Then after his blowup, I handled all of them. I always got along very well with him. See, he was never really the postmaster general, which was, I suppose, the mistake that everybody made. I told you how he got the job, and Bill Brawley was, for all intents and purposes, the postmaster general. And I think Ed was, at least at the outset, very happy with that. You know, he likes to go to parties, run around and all that. He didn't really get too involved with it. I would guess every White House contact was made with Bill Brawley, if it wasn't made with somebody under Bill Brawley. In retrospect I recognized that, sooner or later, that's an awfully big office to be pacing around, and the phone never rings. And I'm sure that the frustration's built in.

Now, I don't pretend to know all the reasons why he blew up. I will say this, that he was, oh, sometimes on a daily basis, sometimes on

[-50-]

a weekly basis, if he had something that he thought required attention, he'd call me. It was something where he wanted a yes or no. I never had an argument from him. If you told him to do something, I never had him say, "No, I want to speak to the President." And I really should have been the most knowledgeable of the difficulties that were brewing there, and I wasn't. I was away when they happened. I just happened to be in Massachusetts.

But it happened over a weekend. And when I got back, everybody filled me in, you know, that he exploded, and that he was quitting, and he was going to accuse everybody of everything, and that only finally, on Bobby's persuasion, would he stay, and then his recommendation was that he would only talk to either the President, or to me. Which meant that he

[-51-]

only talked to me because the President didn't talk to him anyway. Even after that, I think he gurgled a few time, and in a way, he said something about Brawley to me. Brawley had left. But we had no unpleasantness. I didn't read his book, but he's accused Bobby of fooling around in post office patronage, which just is absurd. Just, really, the most absurd thing—not

that Bobby wasn't interested in patronage, but that postal patronage. I think the only thing that Bobby ever might have gotten too involved in would be some people in Mississippi or Louisiana, and there would be some question as to whether or not some Negroes were being put upon. I really think that the only reason he used the line was to flatter himself that somehow Bobby used to call him, because I'm sure Bobby never did. [Interruption]

STEWART: How did you get to be the post office man in the beginning?

[-52-]

DONAHUE: I don't really understand it. I suppose when he was named, I had been talking with Bill Brawley because I had worked with him during the campaign and I became somewhat familiar with him. Somehow I got on a three-way hookup with Day and the President and myself. We had some conversation, and I just had to learn about it, that's all. There was no.... And then, well, when it came to the rate bills and stuff like that, I handled them because I was in such contact, and I got to know the difference between the first class and second class. And then we had a whole series of things thereafter, but there was no formal designation or anything like that. I just did it. It wasn't that difficult.

STEWART: You were talking to him about substantive internal post office management problems?

DONAHUE: Oh, yes. Most of the problems that we talked.... Well, a lot of them dealt with the rate bill because we had rate bills. The rate bills are very technical, and there's a question of

[-53-]

tactics, and whether we want to do this or that or the other thing, and how we marshal whatever strength we have, and what to do in the committee, and what to do in the Senate committee and all that. Then from time to time, I'd call him about something in the Post Office. I suppose I did talk to him as much as anybody, but I really didn't talk to him too much until the blowup.

By then Brawley left, and I talked to him all the time. He was, you know, mad at Brawley. Then when he left, then he went crazy, he really went crazy. Then he went to the FBI, and he had a great and elaborate story. As a matter of fact, he really did a job on Bill Brawley. It's a story about a fellow who gave ten thousand dollars.... Sometimes he tells it ten thousand, sometimes he tells it twenty thousand. But in any event, it was money that was given to Brawley, and it was either kept by Brawley in some stories, split by Brawley and me and Larry O'Brien, or split

[-54-]

by me and Brawley and Kenny O'Donnell, or sometimes the four of us. But there's been all kinds of stories, and we've had—oh, this was very early—the FBI rip the place up.

But he comes up with the story—he still does it about once a year—not directed now against Larry or Kenny or myself, but always directed against Brawley. The background of it, as I remember, is that a fellow at the gala—at the time of the inaugural there was a gala—and there was a box—a box had ten seats and sold for ten thousand dollars—it was right in Frank Sinatra's lap or something. Some fellow who was a postal user bought a box for ten thousand dollars. He bought it through Brawley, and the money was at the National Committee. And he had a receipt and everything else. And that was the ten thousand bucks. But, gee, he really went silly. He's still today a little silly.

STEWART: Was there ever any real consideration of firing him?

[-55-]

DONAHUE: No, see the President, in my opinion, was not the kind that would ever fire someone. He might let him wither on the vine a little, and until the guy would fire himself, but he was not....

Oh, we did have to fire a couple of people. We had to fire one guy. I think for the second time in my life, when I was down there, I went to the races over in Maryland with some people, and I saw a fellow there that I knew to be in government. I saw him in the club house; I asked someone about him, and they said he was very much a regular there. And I asked about who the people there were, and the people were lobbyists in his particular agency—he was the head of an agency. So we put an FBI check on him, and we asked him to get out. There was another guy, he was obviously either in debt, or he was making too much money, but he wasn't....

There was another fellow who was rather a close friend of ours who was in a fairly sensitive position, and several

[-56-]

of us within a very short period of time had seen him at various places we didn't think were.... Well, we didn't like his company. Bobby asked about it one time. I think Kenny spoke to Bobby about him, and Bobby put some people on him. He was about to get us into trouble. But those are the only people I know.

STEWART: He was in the White House?

DONAHUE: No. Other than that.... That was something we were very, very careful about. Better to root them out early than to find out something. There are some people the President just didn't personally like, and there were some people that he did not want to get a job in government. There was one guy that I chased out of three different jobs because as soon as I would find out that he had a job, I would tell the President that he was there.

STEWART: That's not the guy you mentioned in the last interview, Luckey [A.B. "Bud" Luckey], was it?

DONAHUE: No, not Bud Luckey. It was a guy by the name of Tuck [Richard G. Tuck].

[-57-]

And I chased him out of three or four jobs. He'd always pop up. I do know the background to him. Apparently early in the campaign—this goes way back, in California—he was in his company, and the fellow happened to share the room with Dave Powers [Dave F. Powers] that night. He proceeded to tell Dave Powers how the President didn't have chance, and he wasn't much of a candidate anyway and you know. Whatever was said—I wasn't there—Dave obviously repeated it to the President, and it stuck in his head. Jesus Christ, if that guy's name appeared: "Out!" That's all I knew of the background, but I knew that one of the things that I had be sure was that he didn't pop up on any job any place.

STEWART: At the beginning did you anticipate much making of factions or disputes among the White House staff, and were you surprised at the amount of friction or the lack of friction that actually occurred among the White House staff?

[-58-]

DONAHUE: Oh, no. You know the leagues pretty well. And you know also the strengths, too—you know, where the muscle lies.

STEWART: There were no surprises as far as you were concerned?

DONAHUE: No.

STEWART: Were the factions or the disputes ever serious enough to really upset anything or seriously harm anything?

DONAHUE: No. They're more prerogative disputes. You can always resolve those. No, there would be sometimes conflict on things like tactics. And, you know, the President made the final decision. Sometimes you could disagree pretty strongly. And they might grow out of some type of factionalism. But it never got in my way. I was never bothered by it.

STEWART: You also got involved with the VA didn't you?

DONAHUE: Oh, heavens, yes.

STEWART: To a considerable extent? Placing of hospitals

[-59-]

and things?

DONAHUE: I don't think we placed but probably five or six hospitals the whole time.

STEWART: How did you get....

DONAHUE: Well, it's again, because the Veterans Administration, or Jack Gleason [John S. Gleason], had worked for me during the campaign. He was the head of the veterans group. I suppose that he knew me as well as anyone within the White House. So I got familiar with that. We didn't really have that much of a problem about placing hospitals, although we did maybe. Over a period of time, there would be some difficulty. I suppose the one in Chicago and the one in Florida.

There was the famous cemetery in Houston, Texas. I think I may have told you about Albert Thomas, who was the member of Congress. Albert Thomas was without any shadow of a doubt one of the five or six most powerful men in Congress, and probably the least known, a courtly gentleman. But one of his jobs was he was head of the Independent

[-60-]

Offices Appropriations Committee, which meant he controlled VA. And Gleason called me up one day and said that he'd been talking to his chairman, and his chairman said that he thought it was mighty necessary that they have a veterans burying ground right down there in Houston. You know, they'd put NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration] in Houston; you'd double-decked the city. Everything was in Houston. Jack said, "What do you think?" I said, "Doesn't bother me." "Well," he said, "it's a problem. You know, there's a federal law that you can only have one veterans' cemetery in a state." "Well," I said, "How insistent is he?" "Sixth time." I said, "Well, he doesn't say anything six times. Well, put it off, Jack, keep it up in the air, and maybe if he comes up...." And Jack called again, "He's after me again." I said, "Well, listen, you've got to live with him, we've got to live with him. He's been very good to us, So we have another cemetery in Houston." "Well," he

[-61-]

said, "Okay, I guess I can stall him off with that a couple of weeks." And he called me back and says, "He's got another problem." "What is it?" "He's got a pretty good idea of where it wants to go." "Oh, gee," I said, "I know the next thing it's going to be, he's got the exact piece of land." "Well," he said, "he hasn't said he's got the exact piece of land, but when he does, I'll call you." So he sure enough had the exact piece of land. It was a question of something like paying three hundred and fifty dollars an acre as opposed to fifty dollars an acre. And Jack said, "What are we going to do?" I said, "We just bought this horse. I think we're going to pay three hundred and fifty dollars an acre from Albert Thomas' brother-in-law. But we are going to do it because you've got to survive and so do we." For that, the next

Appropriations Committee [House Appropriations Committee] Mr. Thomas made inquiry as to how old Mr. Gleason's limousine was. It was two years

[-62-]

old, and although there was no request in the appropriation, Mr. Thomas thought that it was mighty necessary that our great administrator Jim—his name was Jack, he always called him Jim—should have a new car.

But other than that, there were a lot of problems with personnel—a lot of regional directors, district offices, things like that. But Gleason was very politically knowledgeable, and most of the times he'd talk to me to me would be with reference to.... He would provide all the alternatives of who was for what, what the situation was, how the men stood up, who was the best, what he would like to do. The only question I ever asked him was, "If you had free reign, and you didn't have any.... Which man do you want to do? Then we'll come as close to what you want to do as we can." But that wasn't too though.

STEWART: What general criteria, if any, did you use in bringing problems either to O'Brien or directly to the President? Or did you talk directly to the President?

[-63-]

DONAHUE: Oh, sure. With Larry or with Kenny, he would talk as many as, oh, thirty times a day, anyway. We would know what was going on. We were generally pooling information. Most of the information that we wanted to go to the President went to Kenny if it was just really a potpourri of things to let him know what was going on. If there was something that you got directly involved in, got deep, I would just tell Kenny what the situation was and that I thought I should see the President. Depending upon the exigencies, normally I would see him at the end of the day, and frequently we'd kick things around. Larry, of course, we'd talk—well, I spent almost a third of my time in his office.

STEWART: Did you get involved with GSA [General Services Administration] on federal buildings at all?

DONAHUE: Well, I knew a lot about GSA. The first administrator was my find. Whew, what a stiff!

[-64-]

STEWART: He was?

DONAHUE: Yes, it was amazing.

STEWART: Boutin [Bernard L. Boutin]?

DONAHUE: No, he wasn't the first administrator, he was the deputy administrator. The first administrator was—oh, he came from Philadelphia [John L. Moore]. But here was a perfect example of a guy who looked fantastic on paper. He had been with a predecessor agency. He had gone up, and he had been vice president of Syracuse University; he was financial vice president of the University of Pennsylvania. He checked out. Everything was fine. I called the President, gave him the guy's background. Terrific. He named him. Now the question came as a deputy. We desperately wanted to place Bernie in government. A lot of us would like to take credit for him [Boutin] today, but I don't think any of us would say.... Well, we really felt what we had was a strong administrator and that hopefully that we could get a deputy administrator; you know, Bernie could learn the job. This guy's name was...

[-65-]

STEWART: Floete [Franklin G. Floete].

DONAHUE: No, Floete was the last Republican. Oh, what was his name? But in any event he was just...

STEWART: I should know that, too, because I worked there for a time. But I can't think of it either.

DONAHUE: Franklin.... No. A very, very nice guy, and apparently shortly after that Bernie would come over and talk to me and say that, "This fellow is having a lot of problems. People are hounding him for contracts, political contacts. They've got him all upset. He's worried. He's out sick. He's started to hit the booze." It turned out, as a matter of fact, that the whole time.... I think he served nine months, officially; I think his actual time there was probably not sixty or seventy days. And Bernie was, in fact, the administrator

[-66-]

from the start. You know, thereafter, it was just fantastic' just unbelievable. And he is today. As a matter of fact he'll be bigger before he leaves town.

STEWART: He went out and came back a couple of times.

DONAHUE: Yes. Well, he went out and came back deputy head of the poverty program [Office of Economic Opportunity] head of the SBA [Small Business Administration].

STEWART: Of what value, congressionally, were public buildings?

DONAHUE: Oh in certain programs they're very valuable. They're valuable, not in the

sense of, you do it, or you don't. They're valuable in the sense of changing the priorities of them. If a fellow can have a ground breaking before a certain period in his political career, it's a heck of a lot more important to him than having a dedication two years afterwards. It isn't as flexible as a lot of people think. The use of projects, as such, aren't anywhere near as flexible.

[-67-]

I don't care, if a dam has got to be built, and it's right in the middle of Charlie Halleck's [Charles A. Halleck] district, there's no way in the world you can avoid building it. I mean you just can't do that. You can attach different priorities to projects and hope they're going to go through, but you're fighting against the pattern all the time. A lot of people like to use projects. It depends what part of a country you come from. In the Far West reclamation, forestation, dam projects, rural electrification, are just the lifeblood of a guy. You know, if you come from Staten Island, there aren't too many rural electrification problems going to help you.

One of the things that we did that we unique is that all of these agencies have fantastic numbers of congressional contact, and if their people would feed to us who was chasing what, and you could find a pattern, then you would know where the sore spot

[-68-]

was. Mostly in politics what you require is information. Once you have information, you can make a judgment. But if you haven't got right the right information, you can be the smartest man in the world and you can make a bum judgment. So that what we were always trying to do was get these people to feed us the information.

Then also we have a very strict rule which got us into trouble very early because Herb Klotz [Hubert W. Klotz] is a Prussian; he took it too literally. When the President gives out good news, everybody else gives out bad news. And it went all the way through; that if bad news had to come, it wasn't to come from the White House; and if good news was to come, it wasn't to come from the department or agency. Pretty tough for a fellow to learn that. Then it's also another test of loyalty as to whether or not, when a fellow is really taking some heat and you've told him that he can't do it, whether or not

[-69-]

he passes the buck and says "Well, I'd do it if I could, but they told me at the White House I can't." Well, that's almost an excuse to get fired.

STEWART: Did it happen much at all?

DONAHUE: Oh, until they learn. I think one guy, we didn't fire him, but we just suspended his visitation rights to the White House so, in effect, he was of no use to his head.

STEWART: Did you hold any regular meetings with the congressional liaison people in various departments and agencies?

DONAHUE: Yes, they were held at least once a month. We also did something that was slightly unique. What we tried to do was to harness everybody who had some ability in congressional liaison on a particular bill. So that if we were working on a farm bill—and that's just like trying to

[-70-]

retail cancer. I mean, a farm bill is awful—we would pull in people from defense, treasury, VA, everywhere and turn them loose because we conceived of it as being the President's program and not an individual agency's program. That worked much, much better, I think, than anything else that we did.

STEWART: Did you ever run into conflicts dealing with these congressional liaison people, conflicts between them and their bosses?

DONAHUE: On rare occasions. Every now and then someone would crop up with something that their boss might not be in sympathy with, but I don't think there was ever anything that we couldn't resolve. And the President did a lot of things at cabinet meetings, whenever they were held, to explain the importance of working on a total program. Because it isn't a question of whether one cabinet secretary makes a victory, it's a question of.... You know, it's no real gain; we

[-71-]

all lost if an administration program went down.

STEWART: How valuable overall is post office patronage?

DONAHUE: Again, it depends. It depends on the area, and it depends what you're talking about in postal patronage. There are very stylized rules that relate to it. First, if it's a Democratic congressman, he calls the turn; if there's no Democratic congressman, a Democratic senator calls the turn; if there's no Democratic senator, then somebody you designate calls the turn, and it varies from state to state. We did do something as a result of the rules fight. We suspended Democratic congressmen's patronage in Mississippi, some districts in Louisiana, some districts in Alabama. They all said it didn't hurt, but they shouldn't have talked about it so much if it didn't hurt. Because in those areas, a rural route carrier....

[-72-]

Well, you take a community where the average income is probably three thousand bucks in terms of cash, and a rural route carrier is a very good job, and he's also in contact with a lot

of people. If the congressman can't name him, you're not going to lick him, but you're going to give him a little taste.

STEWART: Do you have much contact with John Macy, and the Civil Service Commission?

DONAHUE: Yes, quite a bit.

STEWART: How effective did you feel they were with the problems that...

DONAHUE: Well, I used to have the Hatch Act problems, among others. They'd come up every now and then. John's biggest problem was that he fancies himself a bit of a politician. He would in a political sense, approve a fellow who probably shouldn't have been approved and say he was qualified for a job, and then be caught by his own approval of him when someone else would come

[-73-]

up with it. Quite frankly, if they had been a little stronger, they would have been more help, because you don't help anybody putting an unqualified guy in a job. First it's a dumb politician who proposes it. The only good politics is to put good people in a position. Now hopefully, you should know some good people who can fill the job. But if you put what we colloquially refer to as a stiff, he's always going to be a stiff. He's going to cause more trouble, he's not going to do the job, and you're just going to regret that you ever put him in there. And it was really the naïve politicians who come up with the stiff.

STEWART: I've heard it said that this was a problem with agencies, that they'd get very routine referrals, either from the White House or someplace else, and they'd overreact and say, "We have to hire him, period."

[-74-]

DONAHUE: There would be some overreaction some under reaction. Again, there's nothing static in government, and the fact that a new man who just took over a job would be so doggoned anxious to show that he was really one of the President's boys that just some bucks slip and you have some fellow getting employed. And other people have become so enamored with their own importance that the President's brother-in-law might not be able to get on the payroll. And you know, this is rather natural. I think it was more natural during that administration than this because, again, we have more control, I think.

STEWART: I came across a little disputed—you may or may not have been involved in it—in the Office of Education of a deputy, I guess to Keppel [Francis Keppel] by the name of Nesbitt [John W. Nesbitt] who was involved in a dispute with Mayor Daley [Richard J. Daley].

DONAHUE: I don't know which dispute it would be. I don't know of it.

[-75-]

STEWART: Well, all right. I don't think it was that important. The whole problem of leaks in the White House, was this always a major problem, or was it something that people laughed about or what?

DONAHUE: It depends. No, if you got the President the morning after a leak, it wasn't a major problem—I mean if he didn't like it. It would go on. Again, it varied on the nature. We had certain notorious leaks in the White House. There's a halfway decent system of tracking them down, and the President did track them down. Kenny can tell you. I remember specific examples of how they were tracked down, but it might be, on a specific situation.... After all, when you speak of "within the White House" or those people with capacity to make the leaks, you're not talking about an enormously large number of people despite the size of the people there. And after you work with them long enough, you do know who's

[-76-]

friendly with which reporter, and you do know the source. And Pierre was fantastic at knowing that. You do know other things that can develop, and you can run them down, I mean, within limits. I admit there are some that are trackless trolleys. There weren't too, too many that you couldn't almost.... And sometimes what you'd think would be a leak would turn out to be a doggone good guess. In the sense that a guy would put together something that might be well established around town as a position paper, and he might have seen a fellow coming and going from the White House, and he might sense a flurry, and if he was knowledgeable enough about it, he might go off on a limb and say they're going to go for his baby. Or then you get just people who are currying favor with the press.

STEWART: This was very normal?

DONAHUE: Well, I think it's a fairly natural instinct.

[-77-]

STEWART: What general guidelines did you personally observe as far as talking to the Press?

DONAHUE: We talked to them fairly freely, but we had a rule that you'd never lie to them. But if they didn't ask the specific, proper question, you could answer them no, because he didn't ask it the right way. And if it was in an area where you weren't going to comment, you'd just say, "I'm sorry I can't talk to you about it." To a large extent, you could use them. I mean, you could mislead them in a way by not lying

to them, but by letting them go off on something. Or you could plant something with them that you wanted done, you'd be happy to have done. But we had old Fred Holborn [Frederick L. Holborn] and Arthur Schlesinger; between the two of them, you can't put them in a room with a press man and they won't tell everything that they know and something that they don't know.

STEWART: What exactly did Fred Holborn do?

[-78-]

DONAHUE: Well, he was supposed to be in charge of the President's correspondence—by that meaning letters to heads of state, and, oh, private correspondence to authors, and all of this stuff. But Fred is a.... I'll tell you, one man in the world who hates him is Sorensen. Sorensen literally claims that he's caught him going through his desk. But he's the kind of guy who can read stuff backwards looking at your desk and.... That always, to me, was kind of funny, because I like Fred. He's a pretty good guy. Every time I asked him to send someone a letter on their hundredth birthday or something, he did it, so I didn't care.

STEWART: How were you involved in Ted Kennedy's '62 campaign?

DONAHUE: I wasn't, really.

STEWART: At all?

DONAHUE: I was a delegate to the convention.

STEWART: I mean, first, in the decision to run, and so forth.

[-79-]

DONAHUE: Oh, I wasn't at all involved in the decision to run. It would have been my recommendation that he not run.

STEWART: Was there much opposition?

DONAHUE: Yes, I'd say that there was fairly solid opposition.

STEWART: Within the White House?

DONAHUE: I would say that there was a fairly general opposition to it.

STEWART: It was solid?

DONAHUE: No, I'm sure there were some people who were saying, "Great, great," but

they never talked to me.

STEWART: Except for the convention you had no....

DONAHUE: Well, I must say that we tried to help.

STEWART: Do you want to go beyond that or....

DONAHUE: Well, I think that we did everything, you know, that we conceivably could to pass along information to him that would be helpful. Where we could, we helped with a few delegates to the convention. I did not go to the convention although I was a delegate.

STEWART: What role did you play in the '62 campaign generally, throughout the country?

DONAHUE: On the congressional things? Well, we worked with a

[-80-]

[BEGIN TAPE 4, SIDE 1]

STEWART: Why don't we just talk a little bit about the President's personal attitudes about his own involvement in getting legislation though. It's often been said that he was never too enthused about personal arm twisting and had no real stomach for it.

DONAHUE: The people who write things like that don't understand the President as a political animal. I may have said to you before, but I think that of all the roles that he took, whether it was of the intellectual or the international adventurer, or of the historian or anything like that, the role in which he took greatest pride, and the thing he chose to characterize himself as, was a politician. He understood the Congress much better than the Congress understood him. The Congress chose to feel that because his role in the House had not been particularly significant and because in the Senate for a large body of his time he had been concerned with running for the presidency that he was not genuinely knowledgeable. The fact of the matter is he was keenly knowledgeable. But as a clinical appraisal we collectively determined that you can always win one fight by twisting arms—

[-81-]

that's the easiest thing in the world—but to win a sustained fight, to carry a whole program, you can't twist arms. You can apply pressure at a given moment, but if you press any given member so far that it hurts and it means a loss of pride for him to go back, you just can't get him the next time around.

The President was concerned with a total program and each individual bill was a very, very hard and long sustained fight. Now it was our judgment that the more the President was involved, the less effective he became, so that it was our job to get every single solitary vote we could, and to leave for him only the possibles that weren't impossible, that weren't firmly committed the other way, but to leave for him the possibles that he could make.

Now on a given vote it might be as few as five or six, it might be as many as twelve or fourteen. In the last twenty-four hours before a vote, we would suggest to him a list. "If you call these people, Mr. President, we have a good chance of getting them." That was as far as we ever let him get exposed. Now his natural inclination was to get into every fight,

[-82-]

but he recognized the restraints that we placed on him for the very good reason that you had a fight every week and every one was a cliff-hanger.

I mean, the fellow started out with a bad Congress in terms of numbers; it got somewhat weakened in some ways; and you just couldn't have him doing it. Actually, those people who accuse him of having a lack of interest, in a large measure, are some of the liberals. Now liberals only have a million weaknesses, but one of their more pronounced is that they can't count. They would rather have a marvelous defeat where everyone got bloodied than a legitimate accomplish, and we were, we hoped, pragmatic liberals who wanted to accomplish something. Sometimes we didn't accomplish everything that went up, but a lot of it went up for bargaining purposes. But the liberals, if they got a bill that they were convinced was wonderful, they wanted the President to go door to door and do it, and never worried about tomorrow. We had to worry about a total program. He was keenly interested. He knew every single solitary vote. He was much harsher in judgment on members who voted against him when we knew they had legitimate home

[-83-]

reasons why it was a difficult vote for them. He was much less generous in forgiving them than we were, and he was much more concerned with passage of legislation, I think, than anyone around. I think, that to me the one great weakness that surrounds those people who've sought to chronicle him so far has been their lack of understanding of the really important things he did with Congress.

STEWART: Would you say then that it is also a myth, as has been frequently stated, that many congressional people looked on him with a certain bit of, not suspicion, but—well, suspicion because he, in effect, hadn't entered the club when he was there and didn't feel the same kind of relationship that it's been said the current president [Johnson] feels?

DONAHUE: No, I would guess that strengthened him more than anything. Don't forget, to enter the club you've got to play the game, and he didn't play the game.

And, sure, the guys who are in the club like game players, but game players.... It's a rough game. Lyndon Johnson knows how rough a game it is. You know, you

[-84-]

don't have your number one man Bobby Baker [Robert G. Baker] if you're not a game player, and that apple didn't fall far from the tree. One thing that other members couldn't say to John Kennedy is, "Well, I had a piece of the action with him back in '48, '54, or '58." It strengthened him because, although, he had been among them, he had not necessarily been one of them, and those that were converted to his cause were converted not because they had genuine respect for him. I think he was much stronger for it.

STEWART: What about his relationships with, for example, John McCormack [John William McCormack]? How would you describe those?

DONAHUE: I just think, you know, unbelievably good, fantastic. So much drivel has been written that....

STEWART: Did he have genuine confidence in McCormack?

DONAHUE: He really liked him. He liked him because McCormack proved himself not a hundred percent or a hundred and fifty percent but, you know, eight thousand percent. There are points of suspicion which may have existed in the past, going back, but I'll tell you that when

[-85-]

John McCormack was majority leader, when Sam Rayburn was just about gone, when he became speaker, no guy, no man in Congress did more to do whatever John F. Kennedy wanted than John McCormack. He was just unbelievable.

I think that during the celebrated '62 fight, the Teddy-Eddie [Edward M. Kennedy-Edward J. McCormack, Jr.] fight, I know of two conversations that John McCormack had about it. One was with Larry O'Brien, because he told me about it; one was with me. They're interesting because they're almost identical. There was no conversation with the President by the President's own admission. But McCormack said to me—I know this is reasonably late in the fight—that, "Can anyone accuse me of being less than loyal to my president for anything that's going on in Massachusetts?" I mean, almost plaintively. I was, as you know, very, very strongly for Teddy, and I had to admit, because we were doing business with him on a day-to-day basis, that there's not a thing that you could fault him on. I'm sure other people have mentioned this, but McCormack as speaker took over after Rayburn who was supposed to be a marvel. He may have been; he wasn't a marvel when we got there, but he might have been a marvel before that. He had

[-86-]

a lot of tough fights. Some we won. The first minimum wage fight we lost closely. He got a lot of brickbats.

During the height of the campaign there was a Herblock [Herbert Block] cartoon which gave McCormack credit for some victory, probably the first good cartoon there was about him in the United States. On a Tuesday breakfast meeting, toward the conclusion of it, the President asked the Speaker if he would remain seated and not look in back of him. He had someone bring in an easel on which was spread something. He said, "Now will you turn around, Mr. Speaker." On it was a cartoon, the original of the cartoon, which was autographed by the President to the Speaker. The Speaker was literally in tears. He was so grateful, so pleased, talked about it and talked about it, so damned incessantly. He just didn't want.... Of course, I think that a lot of people don't understand McCormack. McCormack is no more of Massachusetts than the Palisades [New Jersey Palisades] [are] of New York. He's of Washington. Sure, Eddie's his nephew and sure he comes back here and all the people.... But he thinks in terms of that, and he thinks in terms of his president.

[-87-]

I would think their relationship was fantastic. And the President really, in my judgment, grew to respect him more. I think that when he was probably a younger congressman, he didn't really understand the old club rules and why McCormack would do certain things. But when he was president, I think he was very gratified by those old club rules.

STEWART: How would you describe his relationship with Mansfield [Mike Mansfield]?

DONAHUE: Mansfield was, I suppose, a late convert to the fold. Mansfield had been a Johnson man. He is a totally different type of leader. He's a much misunderstood leader. He's not a Lyndon Johnson. I don't say that in the terms that the Lyndon Johnson type of leadership is the most complimentary kind, because I don't think it's the most effective kind. Mansfield had a different attitude towards his role, and he did it, I think, very, very well. He had unswerving loyalty to the President, and the President had a tremendously high regard for him, because he would do the tough things. I mean, he was, and is, I think, probably one of the few people who hold high position in government who's got less of an ego than

[-88-]

anyone I know. He was more than devoted in terms of sometimes doing things that he felt were not pleasant. He wasn't always satisfied with being leader. There were occasions when he thought of quitting, and he's one of the few guys I know in a large power position in the United States who could quit, just quit, and not think that he had given up much. That's the danger, you know, of Washington.

STEWART: What about relationships with the Republican leaders, with Dirksen [Everett M. Dirksen] and Halleck?

DONAHUE: Well, Dirksen, you know, is a snake oil salesman. He's a great trader. He's a pickpocket at heart; I mean, he took more from the President, I think, than he ever gave. He stole....

STEWART: Did the President realize this, recognize this?

DONAHUE: Yes, but you see Dirksen always trades at a moment of strength. It's always when you really need him that he decides that if his cousin Charley isn't a federal judge, he's not too convinced that we should not have nuclear war. I mean, it's almost.... He's a very big *quid pro quo* man, and all of that long gobbledygook and jargon; when he comes to dealing, now, it drops.

[-89-]

He says, "Yes." "No." "Up." "Down." "In." "Out." That is very much a ploy for....

His relationships with Halleck were not the same. Halleck is an Indiana politician and you know they go for the jugular on everything. We didn't have any real reason to have the same relationship or negotiation with him because you couldn't. Not that we were above it, but you just couldn't.

STEWART: What about the whole role of the Vice President in getting legislation through? Here again many accounts have criticized him for not playing as large a role in the whole scheme of things as he might have.

DONAHUE: He played every bit of it he had. The plain fact of the matter is that, referring back to what I said before—his type of leadership, where he snaps the whip and where he cracks it and where he denies and punishes and rewards—when he left, the first thing that he had to learn was that he was now part of the executive. He was no longer in the role of the leadership. He had to be elected chairman of the caucus, which wasn't an easy election, because he was attempting to keep a foot in both camps. The fact is he had no chips to cash. He had nothing left.

[-90-]

Now the only chip that he ever cashed with regular consistency was Margaret Chase Smith. Whether they had something going or not, I don't know. But the only thing that he could never deliver, the only thing we ever asked him for, was Margaret Chase Smith because, quite frankly, he was about as welcome as a skunk at a lawn party in the Senate.

STEWART: Margaret Chase Smith. I don't....

DONAHUE: They had a ballgame. When he was leader, he had Margaret Chase Smith every time he wanted. When John F. Kennedy was president, we couldn't

get Margaret Chase Smith for adjournment. I don't know what the background is. I'm sure there's a body buried there, but whose, I don't know. He always came forward and volunteered, and there was really nobody. When you talk about somebody's effectiveness with Congress.... You take a lot of people that the public recognizes as sort of congressional leaders although they don't hold a position of leadership. The only question you ask is, Who can they get in a moment of stress? Some of them can do fantastically. An Albert Thomas with you can really change lots of people. A Lyndon Johnson with you, not as leader but as vice president, couldn't

[-91-]

get you a pass to the gallery. Just unbelievable.

STEWART: He tried, though?

DONAHUE: Oh, he did try, but it would be honestly embarrassing for him to go over his head count, and who he might work on, what he could do. Because the plain fact of the matter is he learned his muscle was gone. Well, that's the price you pay for using all that muscle. A lot of people were delighted to tell him to go to hell by agreeing with him and then voting against him.

STEWART: What about the role of Bobby Baker as a vote counter?

DONAHUE: Well, it was good if you could figure out what Bobby's game was. Now if Kerr [Robert S. Kerr] was playing against you, which he frequently was, we used Bobby as a ploy. Frequently what we would do is, we would feed back to Bobby bad information. We would tell him that we had people that we knew we didn't, which meant that he had to spend an exhaustive amount of time checking those people. We would always take his count, and we never could give him ours because we would always tell him that his was better than ours. He played games with Kerr.

[-92-]

He played games with Anderson [Clinton P. Anderson]. He played games, period. He had really limited utility. Sometimes he was pretty good. Then we found that when you licked him on the count a few times, he got to be a cheater. Then he started saying, "Let's go through them together," and take our count and then feed it back. There was no question, if it came to getting Kerr, Bobby could do it.

STEWART: I was going to ask you, what was the President's assessment of Johnson? Did he fully recognize this ineffectiveness?

DONAHUE: Well, you know, yes, he did, but he never acknowledged it. He had to do something with him in the sense that they have different ways of expressing

themselves. I suppose that John Kennedy was laconic in the sense that he said all he had to say in a very few words, and Lyndon Johnson says all he has in, you know, an hour and a half. It was a real burden. We all knew that if we made things unpleasant for the Vice President, he would go to the President, and we knew if he went to the President he was going to take forty-five minutes or an hour, and that was not going to be pleasant for the President and

[-93-]

we would hear about it. So I think everybody who was at least halfway smart recognized that you just shouldn't do it, and that if it meant that you had to be on the phone with him for forty-five minutes, better you than the President. But he would always publicly say for anyone who could hear it, "Well, now, Lyndon, you're going to handle the Senate bit here, and we're going to have a tough fight. And I honestly think Lyndon tried. I don't know how quickly the recognition came through to him, that he was harvesting a whole crop of all the years that he had spent kicking the tar out of those people. But he sure as hell could deliver nothing in a pinch.

STEWART: Moving on, how did you originally get involved in the New York political activities?

DONAHUE: Oh, I had been involved in that during the campaign. I suppose it went back to the convention, but, you know, I'd known a lot of the political leaders at the time; I'd known Sharkey [Joseph T. Sharkey] and Mr. Buckley [Charles A. Buckley]. I suppose they felt that at least they could talk to me and that maybe they couldn't talk to other people.

STEWART: What was the main concern of the President and others

[-94-]

in the White House? Was it the support of the congressional delegation, or a hand in future races in New York or what?

DONAHUE: No, I don't think we ever were concerned about a hand in future races. It was a question of divided loyalties. You know, to whom did you owe your real allegiance? Did you owe it to the people who made you president, or did you owe it to the people who were now, you know, voting in Congress? It wasn't that hard. There is a complicating, overriding issue, which was Bobby's role in New York. But basically the old line leaders—Mr. Sharkey in Brooklyn, Mr. Buckley in the Bronx, together the two largest delegations in New York—had been for John F. Kennedy. The Farleys, the DeSapios [Carmine G. DeSapio], the Roosevelts had not been for him. They were forced by the pressure of these two giant delegations. The Peter Crottys [Peter J. Crotty] in Buffalo.... I mean, those people had been with us. Now you had the Liberal Party, which had never been

with him, and others now claiming piece of their prize. Unfortunately, Prendergast [Michael H. Prendergast] got crosswise with Bobby

[-95-]

towards the end of the campaign. It's a long and silly story, and I suppose it really isn't right. For whatever reason, they got crosswise. Well, when all of these various county leaders who were used to organization could not speak through a state chairman, you started to get factionalization within New York. It is an unfortunate fact of life that this thing in and of itself did more to destroy the Democratic Party in New York than anything any man could conceive of. It was just a tragedy, because from a viable party which had produced some leadership, it became a whole bunch of fiefdoms, and with liberals who have access to media getting a heck of a lot more recognition than they deserve. But boy, from there on in it was just war.

STEWART: The President was adamant in his decision to support Buckley for his reelection?

DONAHUE: Oh, sure. Why not?

STEWART: Was anyone advising him not to go all out as he did?

DONAHUE: Anybody who did would be crazy. I mean, well, you know, politics does have certain basic loyalties, and anybody who just wouldn't be for whatever Mr. Buckley wanted, well, would just have to deny their own heritage. I mean, when the going was tough, he was it. Great guy,

[-96-]

tough guy, he was the original pragmatist, but he made no bones about it, and he had the power to frighten the rest of the delegation. I'm not too sure that the rest of the delegation, at all, wanted John Kennedy, but, by God, Mr. Buckley....

He told me the story one day. I'm just trying to think when it was. Kennedy had made a speech. Now whether it was announcing for the presidency.... I rather think it wasn't; it was something preliminary to it, but those were a lot of suggestions. He had come over to the House side of the Capitol, and he was meeting with various congressmen. Buckley went up to him and said, "Mr. President, I'm for you and we're for you." Probably the greatest concession of strength to him, certainly bigger than any primary victory that he could win. And the only thing that's comparable to it was a similar arrangement at a meeting that he had with Mayor Daley of Chicago in about January of 1960 when Daley said to him, "We will have fifty-four delegates for you in Illinois," and never talked to him again from that point until the convention. And I don't really think you can forget those things.

[-97-]

STEWART: Did the President ever doubt that Daley would deliver as a lot of people did?

DONAHUE: No, he knew Daley. I mean, you know, there are some people in this country still who are as good as gold, who don't give their words carelessly, and if they do give them, they're bonded. You see, a professional in politics doesn't deal in double-dealing. An amateur frequently does. This is the great liberals' weakness. A liberal honestly conceives that the end justifies the means and that you can lie, cheat, and steal so long as you're accomplishing the end. A professional may give you the impression that he's with you, but he won't give you his word. But if he gives you his word, you can go to your bank. There's no reason why you can't. My gracious, you know, Mr. Buckley, Sharkey, Mayor Kenny [John V. Kenny], Billy Green [William J. Green, Jr.], Daley, Jesse Unruh—my heavens, if they tell you something, and if they say it specifically, that's it. It's bankable.

STEWART: There was some concern among some people, though, wasn't there, about Daley?

DONAHUE: Oh no.

STEWART: No?

[-98-]

DONAHUE: Gee, not that I ever knew.

STEWART: Well, all right.

DONAHUE: There were some people, you know, that were around the edges who were saying, "Oh my gracious, he'll never come through." The man had given his word. Now this guy, he honestly lives by the book. He is a terribly straitlaced man personally. He believes very, very firmly in organization. He believes in people doing what he says because he's promised it, and he believes in doing what he says because he's promised it. I'm sure the President—my God, he was a real pro—he would never be concerned about it.

STEWART: Did you get involved heavily in any other internal state situations?

DONAHUE: Oh, yes, well there was Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Maryland, Delaware, Wisconsin, Minnesota...

STEWART: Regularly.

DONAHUE: ...yes, California, Texas, Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia.... Well, on a fairly regular basis, I would be in touch with most of the political situations in most of the states. Arkansas, yes.

STEWART: Primarily for legislative purposes?

[-99-]

DONAHUE: Well, for millions of purposes. First, it's terribly important to keep yourself informed on the internal political situation in every state because people are on the ascendancy and on the decline. There are two worlds. There's the Washington world of importance, and there's a real work of importance. They're frequently in conflict. And the President's aims change. We had a reelection fight coming up in '64. We have congressional fights coming up every day. You have changes in the power structure within the state. You don't always broker things one way or the other. You attempt to balance the equities. You always have to be conscious of both the past and the future, so you had to keep pretty well informed, yes.

STEWART: How involved or how interested was the President in some relatively minor internal situations?

DONAHUE: I'll tell you, he can tell you pretty quickly about an inter-city fight in a major state. It's amazing. He kept that stuff. Of course, Kenny frequently kept him current. His own reading, his own contacts with some of us. He would ask about it constantly. He'd be

[-100-]

doggone knowledgeable as to who was appearing where, who was running what, how a city election had come out, who was up, who was down. He may have known more about foreign affairs, but I would guess he probably knew more about domestic politics.

STEWART: He actively kept up his interest in politics.

DONAHUE: Oh, yes. He had a marvelous... Of course, he had a fantastic memory anyway, but from time to time you'd brief him on the problems with individual congressmen or a senator or something like that, but more frequently a congressman. You'd be staggered how well he could remember it.

STEWART: A few odd questions. I've heard the charge that enough use wasn't made of the honorary positions, the jobs on various boards and committees, of delegations to countries achieving independence in Africa and this type of thing.

DONAHUE: All right. I suppose if you're talking about domestic political strength, you're probably right. But you're Chad, and you're having your independence. So we

[-101-]

say, "Gee, to head our delegation we really would like to do something for Mike DiSalle, and Mike lost in Ohio." So the suggestion is made to the Chad legation in Washington that we're going to send Mike DiSalle, and they say, "We don't want any defeated political stiff to head the delegation. You don't think enough of us? We're an emerging country. We want the President to come." Well, you say, what the hell, "The President is going to Hyannis that weekend. He can't go to Chad." "We want the Vice President. We want the Secretary of State," or something like that. So you have all that problem. There's the international problem.

Then you have the problem of the State Department's own imagery, you know, in terms of what they're dealing with. Well, they feel that in order to reflect against the Russians, who are going to send Joseph Bierek who is head of the cobbler factory of the world or whatever the heck it is, we have got to send an equal. In other words, so a lot of your people may be eliminated. Then if you do have a political selection who is heading the thing up, then you've got to back him up with some guy who looks very State Departmentish.

[-102-]

So you take some rejected ambassador who had been beached for booze or something, but he's got a good name. Really, if you get down to the nuts and bolts of it, it looks terrific from the outside: Who can you suggest? Now the other thing is, particularly on international delegations, anyone who is not known to the State Department has got to be a political hack. Anyone. I don't care. If they did not know Alfred Einstein [Albert Einstein], and he was suggested by the White House, he must have been some precinct worker, and they refused to acknowledge that there's any ability except in people that they know, so they give you a tremendous argument and a fight.

STEWART: I assume you got involved in a number of these.

DONAHUE: Well, I'll tell you a classic example of it. I can't think of the fellow's name. But we have the International Joint Commission on Atomic Energy which meets in Vienna. I forget who the chief of the delegation was, but we had a suggestion for the deputy chief. He was a Negro physicist from the University of Chicago, a doctorate, well recognized. Now, we thought that it had good political overtones because whenever they took a picture,

[-103-]

if you've got a black face in the background, well, then the United States is not shut out. I remember because this happened to go on much longer than most of them, I said to Jerry Wiesner [Jerome B. Wiesner] one day, I said, "Look, look at this guy's qualifications, back him up. Find out is he any good, or is he just a janitor out there, but is he any good." Jerry said, "Yes, I'm startled. He's one of the most qualified guys in this particular field. He certainly was among the top twenty or twenty-five we have in the country. He's fantastic."

We fought and fought. And we lost, which is the staggering thing. We lost. Somehow no one over at the State Department had ever met him, so he was not qualified. You had these fights.

Well, heck, there's a load of them. There was a commission on cultural exchange affairs. There was a woman by the name of Ella Grasso [Ella T. Grasso], who was the secretary of state of Connecticut. She's Italian, which is a plus; she's an elected official, which is a plus; she's a woman, which is a plus; she's smart as hell, which is a real plus. This is marvelous. This is actually on the Fulbright

[-104-]

scholarships, that type of thing. She happens to be very close to John Bailey [John Moran Bailey]. She's led the ticket down there about eight elections in a row. The State Department thought she was highly unqualified. They had somebody's sister-in-law who taught some place. Terrible time! And John Bailey had to be very personal about it. If they didn't do it, it was a personal insult to him.

So, you know those people who complain may think that the effort wasn't necessarily made. Because, you know, it's fine to make a reward of things of this nature, but there's a much more important consideration. The government that perpetuates itself tends to become insulated and isolated. Unless you can inject into it people who have not been exposed to it, you don't get any kind of fresh fuel. I think, if Kennedy did one thing, it was attempt to bring fairly fresh fuel to problems. These were people that legitimately could help. I mean, there were places for stiff, but this isn't what we're talking about.

STEWART: Why don't we wind this up by my asking you for some comments on the general attitudes of the President toward his staff, this whole business of the way he treated people around him, people in the White

[-105-]

House and so forth.

DONAHUE: Well, I suppose everybody fell into a slightly different category. He was never a particularly easy man to work for in terms of tasks performed. He's a terribly easy man in terms of rapport. People that worked with him for a long time got to understand that he had foibles like everything else. He had some chameleon-like characteristics. He liked to pop off, but he would pop off in selected groups, basically people who understood him and knew him. He changed very, very rapidly between some acceptance of what people were doing...

For instance, someone that he had not known very well would always be treated in a very courtly fashion and a very generous fashion, even though he might have disparaged the work that he did. If you'd worked with him for some time, he had no compunction about kicking the tar out of you, but in a terribly reserved way, and the longer you knew him, the more cutting it became. I suppose the most cutting thing he could ever say was that you had done a bad job. Well, if he said you had done a bad job, you knew damn well you'd done a really bad job. By the same token he was never very, very big

[-106-]

on praise. It was a very rare thing for him, in my opinion, to ever compliment anyone. If he said that you had done a good job, this was, you know, a fantastic accolade because his standards were excellence. And if he said nothing, it meant that you must have done a fairly exceptional job. He was not given to criticism or excoriation. Rather, if you didn't do well, he wouldn't ask you to do something again.

He basically didn't like the personal personnel problems. Didn't want to have anything to do with hiring or firing, although he felt very strongly about people who should be hired and should be fired. He had a very soft streak about seeing anyone hurt. He wanted on a lot of occasions to do something about people that he wasn't satisfied with, but if it ever got done, it was done by accident. His natural tendency was really to let them wither on the vine than drive them out. Dr. Travell [Janet G. Travell]. You just never saw her after a while because he didn't really like to do that kind of hard fighting with the people around him. He from time to time could get people practically....

[-107-]

New people, he could drive them to the point of distraction. And they could drive him to distraction on simple things. He liked people to speak directly, say things quickly, and have a summation. But more importantly, if it was a problem, have an alternative. I think the worst mistake anyone could make was to him saying, "My God, Mr. President, we've got a problem." He had problems. He had loads of problems. He wanted alternatives. You know, what could he do to solve the problem? Sooner or later some new person would make that mistake, saying you do this or that. He'd say, "What do we do?" And he'd say, "Gee, I don't know, Mr. President, it's your problem." Hell, he didn't need people around to bring him problems. He had enough messages and cables to do that.

But he, with a very little effort, could, I think, make everybody very, very happy. His warmth was just absolutely unique. And if you had seen him work, and worked around him long enough, you were satisfied that if he merely said nothing but he just gave you another assignment, you recognized that you must have done something right, because if you did something wrong, he could be tough enough.

[-108-]

STEWART: Did he ever achieve this good relationship with any members of the cabinet that he had with people immediately around him in the White House?

DONAHUE: Well, I think he liked some of them differently. I think he was always perplexed by Rusk [Dean Rusk], in a way. I think everybody was always perplexed with Rusk. I think he genuinely liked McNamara for the work he did—not so satisfied that McNamara was so unbending, or Dillon [C. Douglas Dillon] either, that they were, you know, the types of guys.... Luther Hodges—well, they got crosswise over one silly little thing, and I think that it always kind of spoiled that relationship. I think he

liked Arthur Goldberg because of the fact that Arthur is the most indefatigable little worker that you could ever get. Let's see, Freeman [Orville L. Freeman], Day, Abe [Abraham A. Ribicoff], Celebrezze [Anthony J. Celebrezze].

STEWART: What about his relationship with Ribicoff?

DONAHUE: Well, he always liked Abe, you know. I think that when he recognized that Abe was looking at greener pastures.... They had a very good relationship discussing politics.

[-109-]

They probably did not have the same relationship on substantive things. I think he felt Abe was kind of passing through at that point, although they did and could discuss politics. He had great respect for Abe in that regard. Abe's only problem was he found out how tough the job was.

STEWART: He didn't realize it before?

DONAHUE: No. I think he knew.... Well, I suppose in a way he did. The job he ducked, of course, was attorney general, because he saw the civil rights thing coming. I think he thought he was....

STEWART: He ducked?

DONAHUE: My memory is that the night he was.... It may not have been the night but within two or three nights after he was named Secretary of HEW [Department of Health, Education, and Welfare], we were out at the Shoreham [Shoreham Hotel] at a party, and he was talking about.... [BEGIN SIDE 2, TAPE 4] ...naming Sarge his undersecretary, which we discouraged.

STEWART: Undersecretary of...

DONAHUE: ...HEW. He was saying how he had had a shot at being attorney general, but he wasn't about to bite that bullet.

[-110-]

Cuter than that. Well, I don't know if he was cute. He got himself in a worse can of worms than the one he had. I don't suppose that there were any people in the cabinet that were themselves as personally closer or associated as some of the people around him.

STEWART: Was he fairly satisfied, in the conversations you may have had, with the general institutional setup in the White House? The White House vis-à-vis the Cabinet?

DONAHUE: Well, I think that he was a very, very activist president. He was very much on top of it. The Cabinet as such didn't really make much sense to him because, you know, he felt that he was the president and that a committee doesn't decide anything. And he was not very effective in the sense that he was not himself when he sat over or presided at any major meeting because he didn't really say what he thought. Any meeting where there were ten or twelve, whether it was a cabinet meeting or something with the Council of Economic Advisors or something like that, he would either listen, or the things he would say would be so noncommittal. He was quite frankly afraid of

[-111-]

discussing—not afraid, in that sense, but I mean unwilling to discuss high policy matters in large groups. He was terribly candid in a smaller group. I don't think that he ever felt that his knowledge was so lacking that he needed the advice of all of the members of the cabinet. Now, there could be an internal crisis which might require that he consult with the Secretary of Agriculture and the Postmaster General or the Department of Interior, and if those three gentlemen met with him he would kick things around. By the same token, whether it was a question of Laos or Cuba he did not necessarily think that those men could contribute a heck of a lot to his thinking. I just think he thought it was silly that he should, unlike Eisenhower....

When a president isn't doing anything, you must create the impression that he is doing something. So we know from our relationships with the White House staff, that they used to have dress rehearsals for cabinet meetings. A cabinet meeting was a way of making news. They used to time presentations. A cabinet meeting would

[-112-]

have forty-eight, fifty people. What the hell, you might as well go out to, you know, D.C. Stadium. It doesn't make any sense. And everybody stands around, and the guy flips the charts; you know, we all stand up and.... Three cheers for Ike, and we give a big report to the press, and the President's been very busy. Well, he wasn't that kind of a man. His idea was, basically, that you made your decisions. Sometimes you had a cabinet meeting to inform them of what were decisions. Sometimes you had a cabinet meeting to inform them of what were decisions, but certainly not for them to give you their consultation....

STEWART: Just for the record and again, in conclusion, you left when? In the middle of 1963?

DONAHUE: November 15, 1963.

STEWART: That late? I thought it was earlier than that. And the reasons were?

DONAHUE: To come back here.

STEWART: Just purely personal.

DONAHUE: Oh, yes.

STEWART: Were you generally satisfied in your own mind that things had gone as well as you had anticipated in the beginning...

DONAHUE: I don't know what you mean.

STEWART: ...overall?

DONAHUE: You mean, had the administration done as well?

[-113-]

Yes. Oh, I suppose like everybody else you know, you had some criticisms of some things that might have been done, or were done, or weren't done. But, no, it was moving well. The whole texture of the things was going well. The problems he'd worked through and worked out. Nothing catastrophic. No, it was terribly hopeful. Some of the worst problems were coming through. The civil rights stuff, the tax stuff, all that stuff was over. The bad fights, I thought, were in back of us. It was kind of an exciting thing because....

Well, this would be apocryphal, too, but it is alleged the last letter the President signed was accepting my resignation, which was on his way to Dallas. He talked about the '64 campaign, and I think certainly it was my intention, and it was his intention, that when I got straightened out here and got things organized, that we'd start. And that would have been a fun thing, I mean, because then you had the power and the equipment of the presidency, and you had an ideal candidate coming

[-114-]

up. I suppose for a political swan song it was ideal. What the heck, you might as well go out on top. That would have been it. I'm sure we all would have been delirious for that one. Well, it was probably too easy, but that would have been fun, having an easy one for a change.

STEWART: Well, he certainly was looking forward to it.

DONAHUE: Oh, gee, it was ideal. And, you know, it would have been much lighter. It would have been not nearly so heavy handed. I don't know if you'd get any more votes because I don't think you can get that many more votes, but it wouldn't have been tough.

STEWART: Well, that's all I have. Is there anything you want to add to conclude?

DONAHUE: No, no.

[END OF INTERVIEW #2]

[-115-]

Richard K. Donahue Oral History Transcript – JFK #2
Name Index

A

Anderson, Clinton P., 43, 93
Aspinall, Wayne N., 38

B

Bailey, John Moran, 105
Baker, Robert G., 85, 92, 93
Beer, Samuel H.,
Billings, Kirk LeMoyne, 2, 3, 4
Block, Herbert, 87
Bolling, Richard W., 37
Boutin, Bernard L., 65, 66
Brawley, H.W. "Bill", 5, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55
Brown, Edmund G. "Pat",
Buckley, Charles A., 94, 95, 96, 97, 98
Burke, William H. "Onions", Jr.,
Burns, James MacGregor,
Bush, John W., 13

C

Carstenson, Blue,
Carver, John A., Jr., 20
Cass, Joseph J.,
Cass, Mary Walsh,
Celebrezze, Anthony J., 109
Celeste, Vincent J.,
Cleary, Bernard F.,
Clements, Earle C.,
Clifford, Clark M., 4
Clohery, Peter J.,
Crotty, Peter J., 95
Curley, James Michael,

D

Daley, Richard J., 75, 97, 98
Davies, Dorothy, 44, 49
Day, J. Edward, 15, 18, 49, 50, 53, 109
DeSapio, Carmine G., 95
Desautels, Claude J., 38
Dever, Paul A.,
Dillon, C. Douglas, 109
Dirksen, Everett M., 89
DiSalle, Michael V., 13, 102
Donahue, Nancy,
Dulles, Allen W., 3, 4
Dungan, Ralph A., 7, 11, 20, 36, 45, 46

E

Einstein, Albert, 103
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 23, 30, 32, 112, 113
Elliot, Carl A., 37

F

Feldman, Myer "Mike",
Fenn, Dan H., Jr., 46, 47, 48
Fisher, Hugo M., 14
Floete, Franklin G., 66
Flood, Richard,
Fogarty, John E., 43, 44
Freeman, Orville L., 109
Furcolo, Foster, 33, 37

G

Galbraith, John Kenneth, 8
Gleason, John S., 60, 61, 62, 63
Goldberg, Arthur J., 10, 15, 109
Grasso, Ella T., 104
Green, William J., Jr., 98

H

Hackett, David L.,
Hall, Leonard W.,
Halleck, Charles A., 68, 89, 90
Hampton, Robert E., 31, 32
Harlow, Bryce N., 30
Harris, Louis,
Hartigan, William J.,
Hill, Herbert, 23
Hill, Robert C., 23
Hodges, Luther H., 6, 10, 109
Holborn, Frederick L., 78, 79
Hopkins, William J., 31
Hoover, J. Edgar, 4, 44
Humphrey, Hubert H., 43

J

Jackson, Henry M. "Scoop", 43
Johnson, Lyndon B., 6, 27, 43, 84, 88, 90, 91, 93,
94, 102
Jones, Robert E., Jr., 37

K

Kennedy, Edward M., 14, 79, 86
Kennedy, John F., 1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 16,
17, 18, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 32, 34, 36, 41, 42,
43, 44, 48, 51, 52, 53, 56, 57, 58, 59, 63, 64,
65, 69, 71, 75, 76, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 87, 88,
89, 91, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 97, 98, 99, 100, 102,
105, 113, 114
Kennedy, Joseph P., Sr.,
Kennedy, Robert F., 2, 3, 51, 52, 57, 95
Kenny, John V., 98
Keppel, Francis, 75
Kerr, Robert S., 92
Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeyeovich,
Klotz, Herbert W., 69

L

Laughlin, Lawrence R.,
Lawrence, David Leo,
Lehman, Herbert H.,
Levin, Murray B.,
Lippmann, Walter, 28, 29
Lodge, Henry Cabot,
Luckey, A.B. "Bud", 57
Lynch, Agnes,
Lynch, John M. "Pat",

M

Macy, John W., Jr., 49, 73
Manatos, Mike N., 38
Mansfield, Mike, 88
Martin, Clarence D., Jr.,
Martin, Louis E., 40
McCormack, Edward J., Jr., 86, 87
McCormack, John William, 85, 86, 87, 88
McDonough, Robert P.,
McGuire, Richard V., 45
McHale, Frank M.,
McKinney, Frank E.,
McNamara, Robert S., 10, 16, 17, 36, 109
Meyner, Robert B.,
Moore, John L., 65
Morrissette, Armand,
Mosk, Stanley,
Murphy, Richard J.,
Murphy, Robert F.,

N

Nesbitt, John W., 75
Neustadt, Richard E., 4
Nicholson, Ralph W., 18
Nixon, Richard M.,

O

O'Brien, James,
O'Brien, Lawrence F., 2, 5, 7, 9, 11, 24, 35, 36, 37,
38, 45, 47, 48, 54, 55, 63, 64, 86
O'Connor, Thomas J., Jr.,
O'Dea, James H., Jr.,
O'Donnell, Kenneth P., 2, 5, 14, 24, 35, 45, 47, 48,
55, 57, 64, 76, 100
O'Meara, George F.,

P

Potter, Philip,
Powell, Adam Clayton, Jr.,
Powers, David F., 58
Prendergast, Michael H., 95

R

Raskin, Hyman B., 10
Rayburn, Sam, 86
Reardon, Timothy J., Jr.,
Reese, Matthew A., Jr.,
Reuther, Roy,
Reuther, Walter P.,
Ribicoff, Abraham A., 109, 110
Roche, Charles, 40
Roncalio, Teno,
Roosevelt, Franklin D., Jr., 17
Rose, Alex, 22
Rusk, Dean, 109

S

Salinger, Pierre E.G., 2, 77
Saltonstall, Leverett,
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., 8, 23, 78
Seigenthaler, Joh,
Sharkey, Joseph T., 94, 95, 98
Shriver, R. Sargent, Jr., 2, 5, 6, 7, 11, 36, 110
Sinatra, Frank, 55
Slack, John M., Jr.,
Smathers, George A.,
Smith, Benjamin A., II, 32, 33
Smith, Margaret Chase, 91
Smith, Stephen E.,
Sorensen, Theodore C., 2, 79

Stevenson, Adlai E.,
Symington, Stuart, II,

T

Taft, Robert A.,
Thomas, Albert, 60, 62, 63, 91
Thompson, Frank, Jr., 37
Travell, Janet G., 107
Truman, Harry S.,
Tuck, Richard G., 57
Tydings, Joseph D.,

U

Unruh, Jesse M., 14, 98

V

Vanocur, Sander, 9

W

Walsh, David I.,
Ward, Joseph D.,
White, Byron R., 10
White, Theodore H.,
Wiesner, Jerome B., 104
Williams, G. Mennen "Soapy",
Wilson, Henry Hall, 38
Wine, James W.,
Wofford, Harris L., Jr., 7, 11, 36

Y

Yarmolinsky, Adam, 7, 11, 36