

**G. Mennen Williams Oral History Interview –JFK #2, 1/28/1970**  
Administrative Information

**Creator:** G. Mennen Williams  
**Interviewer:** William W. Moss  
**Date of Interview:** January 28, 1970  
**Place of Interview:** Grosse Pointe Farms, Michigan  
**Length:** 52 pp.

**Biographical Note**

Williams, G. Mennen; Assistant Secretary of State for African affairs (1961-1966). Williams discusses his role as the Assistant Secretary of State for African affairs, African and other international affairs, and the impact of John F. Kennedy's [JFK] civil rights program on Africans, among other issues.

**Access Restrictions**

No restrictions.

**Usage Restrictions**

According to the deed of gift signed June 14, 1976, copyright of these materials has been assigned to the United States Government. Users of these materials are advised to determine the copyright status of any document from which they wish to publish.

**Copyright**

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the photocopy or reproduction is not to be "used for any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research." If a user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or reproduction for purposes in excesses of "fair use," that user may be liable for copyright infringement. This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a copying order if, in its judgment, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of copyright law. The copyright law extends its protection to unpublished works from the moment of creation in a tangible form. Direct your questions concerning copyright to the reference staff.

**Transcript of Oral History Interview**

These electronic documents were created from transcripts available in the research room of the John F. Kennedy Library. The transcripts were scanned using optical character recognition and the resulting text files were proofread against the original transcripts. Some formatting changes were made. Page numbers are noted where they would have occurred at the bottoms of the pages of the original transcripts. If researchers have any concerns about accuracy, they are encouraged to visit the library and consult the transcripts and the interview recordings.

**Suggested Citation**

G. Mennen Williams, recorded interview by William W. Moss, January 28, 1970, (page number), John F. Kennedy Oral History Program.

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

Gift of Personal Statement

By G. Mennen Williams

to the

John F. Kennedy Library

I, G. Mennen Williams, of Grosse Pointe Farms, Michigan do hereby give to the John F. Kennedy Library, for use and administration therein, all my rights, title and interest, except as hereinafter provided, to the tape recording and transcript of the interview conducted at Grosse Pointe Farms, Michigan on January 27, 1970 and January 28, 1970 for the John F. Kennedy Library. The gift of this material is made subject to the following terms and conditions:

1. The interview is to be opened immediately to general research.
2. Researchers who have access to the transcript of the interview may listen to the tape; however, this is to be for background use only. Researchers may not cite, paraphrase or quote from the tape.
3. I hereby assign literary property rights in this interview to the United States Government.
4. Copies of the interview transcript may be provided upon request to any researcher.
5. Copies of the interview may, upon request, be deposited in other institutions.
6. This agreement may be revised or amended by mutual consent of the parties undersigned.



G. Mennen Williams

5/26/76  
Month, Day, Year

  
Archivist of the United States

June 14, 1976  
Month, Day, Year

G. Mennen Williams – JFK #2

Table of Contents

<u>Page</u>	<u>Topic</u>
31	Support for John F. Kennedy [JFK] and his book, <u>The Strategy of Peace</u>
31	Nationality groups and JFK's presidential campaign, 1960
32	Williams' role in JFK's presidential campaign, 1960
33	JFK's political appointments
34, 39, 51, 55, 66	Williams and the position of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
35, 65	African affairs
37	Citizens Advisory Council on African Affairs
38, 52, 55, 58	Europeans affairs
42, 46, 76	Agency for International Development [AID]
41, 44, 50, 53, 61	Democratic Republic of the Congo
47, 55, 74, 79	Structure and relationships within the United States Department of State
52, 54	Williams' liberalism during the Kennedy Administration
56, 60	Portuguese affairs
58, 62, 73	French affairs
63, 70	Robert F. Kennedy [RFK] and African affairs
73, 77	Impact of JFK's civil rights program on Africans

Second Oral History Interview

with

G. MENNEN WILLIAMS

January 28, 1970  
Grosse Pointe Farms, Michigan

By William W. Moss

For the John F. Kennedy Library

MOSS: All right. I believe that we had gotten pretty well up to the election last time, Governor. Was there something left over from the last time that you wanted to cover?

WILLIAMS: Yeah, I have made some notes. Let me see if I can find where I put them. I have a file here you might want to look at which you might want to have copies at some time. This was a letter I sent out to all of our posts in Africa to get reaction to the Kennedy death and there are all kinds of responses of different sorts there. You might not be interested.

MOSS: Yes. Certainly.

WILLIAMS: There's also correspondence, of course, with the family. Then on another occasion I delivered the Kennedy coin and here are some reactions to that, that is that mint fifty cent piece. Now here is some stuff that I had copies here. The copies are indifferent. On one occasion I went down to talk to Jack when he flew from New York to Hyannis and he had a bad voice and didn't talk so he talked on paper. And so I just had them take pictures of that. There's one other piece that I can't quite locate at the

moment, because I put it away so well to preserve it, in which he said, "This is a hell of a party." Then he traveled with various Democrats here and there.

[-30-]

All right, well, I thought we might just spend a couple of seconds taking a look at *The Strategy of Peace* because that played a fairly significant part in helping me make up my mind to get in back of Kennedy. And to make this as contemporary as possible I just happen to have found a memo I dictated to Ray Courage, who was then with the *Detroit Free Press*, but is now in Washington. It was dated June tenth. It began:

You have asked me what particular paragraphs in Senator Kennedy's *The Strategy of Peace* especially influenced my decision to support him. This is an honest and fair question, but not an easy one. It's not easy because whole chapters, recurring themes, and the feeling of the whole book gave me my impression rather than just a few, hard-hitting paragraphs. Senator Kennedy's *The Strategy of Peace*, I think, does three things. It indicates that the Senator is at home with the great challenges of the day and has a wide breadth of understanding of the world's outstanding problems. Second, the book demonstrates that Senator Kennedy made a keen and tough-minded analysis of the great issues often in advance of the field and then comes up with specific, courageous answers. Third, these few pages of speeches show Senator Kennedy to have the vision, the understanding, the determination and ability to take on Mr. Khrushchev [Nikita S. Khrushchev] and SOveit communism as well as lead America and the free world.

Well, there's more to it, but that's the gist of it. And I was sufficiently impressed that I sent about three hundred copies of the books around to influential Michigan Democrats at the time that we were, you know, persuading them that Kennedy was *the* man. And I also sent it around to Democratic leaders who were friends of mine throughout the country.

MOSS:               What kind of response did you get from these people to the book and...

WILLIAMS:       Well, in Michigan we had a generally good response. The feelings that he expressed were sympathetically received by our people. Now, another point that we went over somewhat hurriedly was the nationalities impact. I had a file here -- I have got too many files -- in which.... Oh, here we are. We made an analysis of the crucial

[-31-]

states -- California, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, Michigan, Minnesota, New York -- with the breakdown of the Polish, German and Italian and then some of the other minority votes to determine their impact on the election. In many areas it ran to around a third, a quarter of the

vote and we set up a scheme to zero in on these votes through the organization that the Democratic Party had built up under Senator Green [Theodore F. Green], going back to Harry Truman's day. And one of the things that we did -- seem to have missed this note -- we established all of the large nationality days throughout the country, like the St. Patrick's parade or the Pulaski parade and so on, to see whether the President or some one of his representatives who had the strong nationality association could be at those events. And we did so and I went to some of them for him. Well, I don't need to belabor that anymore.

One little note which is indirect, but at the convention Sarge Shriver [R. Sargent Shriver, Jr.] and I got together and established a friendship and a contact that has continued.

Then, during the campaign, in addition to Michigan, I did some campaigning in both California and New York. The strongest recollection I have of the California campaign is the terrible problem of running into Stevenson [Adlai E. Stevenson] supporters. These people resemble the McCarthy [Eugene J. McCarthy] supporters in the last election. They were for Stevenson and the fact that they weren't going to vote could put a Nixon [Richard M. Nixon] in didn't seem to bother them at all and it was very, very difficult to, you know, even talk to them although these had been people I'd known and worked with for a considerable time.

The New York campaign was largely working with the nationality groups, most of whom had their national officers located in the city of New York. And also I campaigned several times up in Harlem and that area.

MOSS:           Okay. Anything more?

WILLIAMS:       No, I think that covers most of it.

MOSS:           All right. Well, let's talk for a few minutes then about things that happened after the election and particularly let me ask you, as a starter, what your own expectations were in the way of a federal appointment at that time?

WILLIAMS:       Very good. Let me come back to that. Election night of course, was a rather hairy one because the votes were slow in coming in and I was in constant contact, mostly

[-32-]

with Bobby that night. And I think it was about three o'clock in the morning that we finally were confident that Michigan had carried. Our situation generally is that the out-state votes get counted first because the precincts are smaller, and this area, of course, is more apt to go Republican. So, if you just listen to the votes consecutively, it looks as though the other side is winning, until they start counting Wayne County. And that's the way it was. While on our projections we had projected a Kennedy victory much earlier in the evening, it wasn't until a late hour that we were able to confirm that this was for sure.

Well, on the expectations, when we had talked to the Senator, we had at no time made any remarks about what any of us wanted much less expected. So there had been no discussion, so there couldn't even possibly have been an understanding. My friends and I had

been interested in a Cabinet position, and the one that seemed to fit most likely the qualifications that I had was the one that's usually discussed, the HEW [Department of Health, Education and Welfare] one. Although again we had no claims or ties on because we hadn't discussed anything with anybody and did so purposely.

MOSS: You say you hadn't discussed anything with anybody. Who was pushing you for the HEW slot and in what way were they doing it? Did this ever prove embarrassing?

WILLIAMS: Well, when you say pushing that would indicate that there was a kind of campaign of contact with the senator. There wasn't, as I recall or was conscious of, any formal, organized approach of that kind. I think toward the end there were some telephone calls to various people. I think to Schlesinger [Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.] there were some. I don't recall any to anybody else, but that was about the size of it.

MOSS: I was thinking more of an over enthusiastic supporter going out on a limb without your knowledge and understanding or anything of this sort.

WILLIAMS: You mean there were some and what did they do?

MOSS: Yeah.

WILLIAMS: Well, I really don't know.

MOSS: Okay. Because once in a while this kind of thing does happen.

WILLIAMS: Yeah.

[-33-]

MOSS: Now, when were you first approached on the question of an appointment? Was the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs the first one that you were approached on?

WILLIAMS: Yes.

MOSS: Okay. And when did this happen? The announcement came around one December as I remember.

WILLIAMS: Yeah, I think that's accurate, although I didn't...

MOSS: Somewhere in the first week in December. At any rate it's in...



WILLIAMS: I can verify it anyhow.

MOSS: ... Schlesinger's book and so on so that it can be checked out.

WILLIAMS: Well, I don't know, it was within a couple of weeks before then that there had been an intimation of it and... [Interruption]

MOSS: Okay, we're back to your being approached to take position of Assistant Secretary of State.

WILLIAMS: Oh yeah. Well, I had -- I don't know -- I had some intimation of this on the telephone either directly or indirectly, as I say, I think a couple of weeks before, although I don't have any record. So when I had the invitation to come down to talk to the president-elect, I knew what he was going to say.

MOSS: Had you made up your mind before you went down to talk to him?

WILLIAMS: Yeah.

MOSS: Okay. Now, when I was looking through your papers out there at the University [of Michigan], there were two letters that I ran across that were pertinent to this. One was a letter from Abram Chayes in which he talked of a dinner at Chester Bowles' in which you were talking about the position and that you had feelings of ambivalence about accepting it. Do you recall this and what the ambivalence was all about?

[-34-]

WILLIAMS: Well, I don't recall the dinner because my recollection is I was back in Michigan at the time I first heard of it, although I might have possibly been, you know, in and out of Washington. Well, I think the ambivalence was whether there was an opportunity to serve directly in the cabinet or not. There wasn't any feeling that the African position wasn't, you know, a good and challenging and exciting one. It was whether there was a different role here at home.

MOSS: Well, I wondered about that particular point because the second letter that I want to refer to is one from Arthur Schlinger in which a *P.S.* he says to you, "I am sure that Jack was wholly in earnest about Africa and I should be delighted to do anything I can to help upgrade his views about the alternative." Now is this specifically in reference to what you were just talking about?

WILLIAMS: Yeah.

MOSS: Okay. Now, when you talked to the President -- the President-elect at the

time -- what understandings or expectations did you and he have about the job that you were going to do in the State Department? Do you recall in what terms it was put?

WILLIAMS: Well, there are only two specific items that stick out in our mind that were in our discussions, outside of the things that appeared in the statement he released and the statement that I released. One was that he wanted me to go to Africa as soon as possible to meet and talk with the Africans. As a matter of fact, he put it in such a way that I tried to find out whether I could go before I was sworn in, but the problems of going in a sort of unauthorized fashion, not so much from the reception by the Africans but the official clearances for transportation and so on (part of our government), made me wait until I was sworn in. And then I moved out as quickly as possible. I say that I remember this specifically which, in a sense, may be a small point, but I think it indicated the thrust of what he wanted to do and that was to project our feeling of wanting the Africans to know that we wanted friendship with them, wanted to recognize their independence and to be friendly with them.

MOSS: All right. Anything else in the way of understanding and expectation? I'm thinking about the...

WILLIAMS: Yes. He, of course, was a very gracious fellow and, of course, he recognized that my friends and I had thought

[-35-]

of being in the Cabinet instead of a sub-Cabinet post and he talked about the importance of the liaison with the President. And he made reference to Sumner Welles when he was a subordinate in the State Department but yet had the confidence and ear of the President and consequently was able to, you know, establish policy and carry on. And so he did indicate at that time that this was what he expected the relationship would be. And as it turned out, it did work out that way.

MOSS: Did you have any conversation about who your cohorts in the department would be, who would be Secretary of State, for instance?

WILLIAMS: No.

MOSS: You didn't. You didn't know at this time who would be occupying the other positions.

WILLIAMS: No.

MOSS: No talk of Ball [George W. Ball] or of Chester Bowles or Rusk [Dean Rusk] or Abram Chayes or Alexis Johnson or any of these?

WILLIAMS: There may have been, but I really don't recall it.

MOSS: Okay. Well, let me push you back...

WILLIAMS: But I know this: I mean, I made up my mind that I was going to accept sort of as an act of faith in the ability to serve your country. And so I didn't have any list of conditions or was I, you know, going to be concerned who the other people were.

MOSS: Okay, now Averell Harriman had gone on a fact-finding tour of Africa and came back with a report. Did you find this very useful or what was your relationship to Averell Harriman in all this?

WILLIAMS: My relationship with Averell has always been very close and friendly. When Averell was governor, I was also governor and we worked together, particularly in the field of civil rights, not only at governors' conventions but independently we established, along with Freeman [Orville L. Freeman] and three or four other governors, the Governors' Convention on Civil Rights.

Now, specifically on the report, I don't have any exact recollections what we did or did not do with that report, but I do know that

[-36-]

I talked with Averell constantly because we found that by and large our ideas coincided very well and Averell was always a person who knew his way around Washington and had a lot of useful contacts. And so on many occasions when we had need to work things out in the department, we worked together.

MOSS: Do you recall the role of Winifred Armstrong, who is described in one place at least as a consultant on African affairs to Senator Kennedy in late 1960?

WILLIAMS: Well, I know Win Armstrong. I appointed her on the advisory committee that I set up of people in the field of education and the universities and industry and so on. She was one of the consultants on that that we met with quarterly and from time to time. She had written some papers and I was familiar with those, and later she went with American Metal Climax [Inc.] and worked with Taylor Ostrander. She was helpful in supplying information in the beginning, but I don't think she played any special role in the determination of policy.

MOSS: Let me talk a minute about this citizens advisory council on African affairs, because this kind of thing is very interesting and not much is known about the operations of these. How was this set up and when?

WILLIAMS: Well....

MOSS: Did it grow out of the task force report?

WILLIAMS: Well, the task force report may have recommended it, but I as governor had always employed citizens commissions most extensively and had found them most useful both in developing information, coming up with useful recommendations, and also in implementing them because it gave you a constituency when you went to the people or to the Congress in order -- in my case, the state legislature -- to try and put the ideas over. And so this was something that was a part of my general operations. Wayne Fredericks who played an exceedingly large part in the success of our operations, suggested many of the names because he had been with the Ford Foundation, had previously served with the Kellogg Company in [Republic of] South Africa and was an old African hand, so to speak, and had a lot of these contacts. So he was as helpful as anybody in coming up with the personnel for it.

MOSS: And what sort of role did you assign to them and how did you use them?

[-37-]

WILLIAMS: Well, we tried to meet with them quarterly. This wasn't a usual State Department operation, so there wasn't the amount of funds to work on it that would have been useful. We used it in a number of ways. We would have specific agendas and maybe some kind of papers or at least exchange of letters on specific problems or we would just freewheel it or we'd try to work it out so that there'd be some formal sessions in the State Department. And then we always had a cocktail party reception at my home and we had more informal talks so that as the years went by we had a great friendship as well as the formal relationship. And through that there was a constant interchange of ideas which didn't relate necessarily to any specific meeting. Well, for example, John Markham was an expert on Portuguese affairs and so we had any problems of that nature, we'd probably be on the phone exchanging ideas on it. Or some of the bank people, we'd be in communication with them. And of course, Vernon McKay, who acted as chairman for quite a while, assisted us in innumerable ways. We set up other kinds of meetings and he would chair them.

And, well, this was really one of the happiest things because some of our policies were not altogether orthodox and these people were an excellent sounding board to both send messages to and receive messages from the country. And I think we got better acceptance because of it. But I think one of the greatest benefits we got out of it -- I know that I got out of it -- was a fairly objective independent appraisal of problems. And I know that one of the things I always carried with me was the projection by this group that in the long run it would be Ghana not Nigeria that would be the stable, developing element. And, of course, at that time when we were in the midst of all the problems with Nkrumah [Kwame Nkrumah] and whether or not to continue with the Volta Dam, this seemed almost heretical, particularly

when things were seemingly going so swimmingly in Nigeria. So I think this is illustrative of the use that these people were. It wasn't that we had any lack of confidence in our contacts through the normal embassy sources, but many of these people had, oh, sort of in-depth and comprehensive perception of these problems that the State Department people -- really going into a continent where the State Department had operated through the European bureau up until just a few years before -- gave us sort of a morgue, to use a newspaper term, or expertise that wasn't as fully developed as it became. That is it wasn't as fully developed in the State Department as it became through the years that we were there.

MOSS: Speaking of the Foreign Service, there is a statement, and I've got it in these notes somewhere, that towards the end of the Eisenhower Administration there was an

[-38-]

attempt to staff the African embassies with FSOs [Foreign Service Officers] who were on the verge of retirement and that the incoming administration really had to wipe this out in order to get something going in Africa. Do you recall this?

WILLIAMS: Well, I think it was true that.... Well, it's always true that every State Department official, Foreign Service officer, wants to end up as ambassador and obviously toward the end of their career it's a problem to find enough embassies to go around. And of course, Africa with twenty, or as it turned out, almost forty new embassies was a fertile ground to place these people. And, as a consequence, there were a number of people who were ending their careers with an embassy who probably hadn't thought of ending up in Africa and weren't particularly prepared or sympathetic. We had one terrible story of the wife of one such ambassador who, in the old style, had all of the embassy ladies in, juniors, to tell them what's what and, at least apocryphally, it's said that she told them, "Always wear gloves when shaking hands with the natives." This kind of mentality, while it wasn't the general thing, there was some of that there and it was this kind of thing that, well, particularly Chet Bowles was anxious to sweep out. And he was in this operation really before I got my feet on the ground because I had to get over to Africa to understand what was going on and so on before I got into the personnel problems. So they were moving strongly in that direction and the ambassador selection was something I didn't get into until later on in the game. But there was some problem like that. I honestly can't say how extensively because by the time I was getting around, a good many of the changes had been made and it was a fairly sympathetic group even in the first year.

MOSS: Okay. Let me talk a little bit more about personnel -- this is an exercise that we go through with most of the people who were assistant secretaries and that sort of thing -- and ask you about your office directors and so on, what kind of roles they played, who selected them, how they were selected. First of all, your immediate staff, including people like Wayne Fredericks, how did he come to join your staff

WILLIAMS: Well, Wayne Fredericks and I had known each other, not too closely, but had known each other, in prior years in Michigan, and we had a mutual friend, Neil Staebler, who knew us both well. And his was a name that came to me as somebody who'd be very useful as indeed he turned out to be. And I don't know where he knew him, probably in the Foundation [Ford Foundation], but Dean Rusk seized upon this and very joyfully went along with that suggestion.

[-39-]

The second deputy was Henry Taska. Henry was a Foreign Service officer who had come in out of the field of business. I think somewhere along the line he had not been fully appreciated, and so he wasn't regarded as of the greatest promise. But we.... Let me go back. When I say I wasn't regarded as the greatest promise. But we.... Let me go back. When I say wasn't regarded as the greatest promise, he probably made some enemies because of the honesty and bluntness of his stand and so didn't have a completely favorable reputation with the sort of powers that be that sometimes determine these things. But we found him a tremendous realist, excellent economist, a man with a sympathetic feeling toward the whole African problem and the Africans themselves. And so we went to bat for him and felt that we were well repaid for our loyalty to him, not only by his loyalty to us, but also by the tremendous service he has rendered the government. And of course, he moved on out of the department to be ambassador to Morocco and is now going to Greece. He, as I say, did an outstanding job throughout.

Later on we added another deputy, and we set up our own sort of table of organization whereby Wayne Fredericks was sort of an alter ego and worked on the plans and projections and contacts with Congress and so and that I didn't do. Henry Taska became sort of chief of operations and all of the formal channels went first through him, and he did an absolutely excellent job of direct supervision and encouragement. We tried to have the more general field of leadership in Fredericks and myself.

Well, we subsequently then added another deputy, Sam Westerfield [Samuel Z. Westerfield Jr.], and he was an economist. He also happened to be black. And he was of great help to us. And he is now ambassador to Liberia.

Well, the next echelon of section heads, most of them were there because they'd come up through the ranks, and I think we were fortunate in having a very good group. And we found that we could support practically all of them. And on occasion, because, as I say, some of the operations are somewhat unorthodox, we found that we had to buck the European bureau to begin with and so on and so forth, so our people weren't always too affectionately regarded by the old power structure that was more oriented from people coming out of the other areas. So sometimes we had to fight for our people to get them embassies and so on, but we feel that they returned all of our efforts in good service to the government. And I think during the course of these five years it's generally conceded that the African bureau established an esprit de corps, and we were able in Washington and in the field to give people an opportunity to express themselves in doing a good job. And as a consequence, I am proud to say, we attracted lots of very able young people who felt that this was a field where

you could perform a service and grow. I think in the developing countries, at least for my type of mentality, there's more of a chance to do a job and there are lots of young people like that and so they found Africa very challenging. And since we had many posts that were small, a young person could assume a degree of authority and have a level of contacts in the host government that was very rewarding and growth-developing. So I think we had an exciting personnel. And as I look over the recent appointments in Africa today, most of the embassies -- well, maybe that's too large, but a good share of the embassies are filled with younger people that grew up during the time that we were there, so that's a very exciting and satisfying sort of feeling.

MOSS: Let me ask you about people who were in related bureaus, for instance the director of the Office of Research and Analysis for Africa in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Richard Sanger and later Robert Good.

WILLIAMS: Yeah. Well, Dick Sanger happened to be an old friend of ours from some of my previous experiences in Washington. Going back to the days of the New Deal, for example, we'd square danced together and had known each other socially. My wife's cousin lived in Washington and we lived there, and they were friends of the Sangers, so that we knew him and respected him and we had a close association. And he went with me on my first trip to Africa. So we did have a good association.

We had an excellent association also with Bob Good, and we thought so highly of him that we fought to get him appointed as ambassador to Zambia, which we felt was a very critical post as a out-frontier of independence toward the white supremacy area. And so we did have good relations with the head of the bureau too.

MOSS: How about the relationships between the Intelligence and Research Bureau on Africa and the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] people from Africa?

WILLIAMS: Well, we had very good and very close relations because we had a working problem and that was the Congo. The liberals are supposed to be unfriendly to CIA, but we found that we had a very understanding relationship with all of the personnel, and unfortunately some of the names slip my memory right at the moment. But we found that the relationships that we had in Washington and that Ed Gullion [Edmund A. Gullion] had with his people in the field were close, with mutual confidence and with a mutuality of

objective. In other words, it wasn't that we had high motivation and the CIA had base motivation, we both were anxious for the Congolese to have self expression in national

independence and we worked in that direction. Now, obviously, the CIA had certain... [Interruption]... they had certain practical problems that had to do with combatting the Communist efforts at subverting the central government, but they were just as enthusiastic and helpful in the problems of economic development, development of the political leadership that could give the country the kind of stability in which their independence could flourish. They were just as helpful as anybody else in trying to put down the somewhat reactionary Katangese rebellion. And so it was, I think, an effective and sympathetic operation with their chief and subordinate people in the field and also all of the people in the office.

MOSS: Do you sense any difference in priorities or style between, say, the operations people in CIA and those who were in OCR [Office of Current Research] or OER [Office of Economic Research]?

WILLIAMS: You're getting ahead of me on the alphabet there.

MOSS: I'm sorry. Office of Current Research and Office of Economic Research.

WILLIAMS: Well, I was dealing with these people as individuals and...

MOSS: I see. Okay. Well, this is interesting too.

WILLIAMS: ...that distinction didn't.... It might have made a difference to some of the people in the Congolese section or something like that, but to me, I wasn't conscious of that.

MOSS: Well, this is interesting that it didn't surface at your level. What about over in the economic aid area. For instance, originally in ICA [International Cooperation Administration] Marcus Gordon and Oliver Sause, is it, were there in ICA at the beginning, and then Ed Hutchinson [Edmond C. Hutchinson] later in AID [Agency for International Development.]

WILLIAMS: I don't recall Ed Hutchinson's predecessors. Well, our feeling with AID was that they were too cautious. We liked Ed Hutchinson, but he knew that we thought he was cautious and we kidded him about it. But I guess he felt that he was reflecting the line that AID developed, although we talked to

[-42-]

others up to and including the administrator as well as talking with him. Because we just were not convinced that the AID program was as, oh, as liberal as it ought to be, not only in terms of dollars, but that they seemed almost pettifogging in the demands they made in justifying the operations. The thing we found was that the Africans, you know, weren't like the Europeans with the Marshall Plan. They weren't a lot of expert economists that were



familiar with the kind of justifications necessary to receive foundation grants or government grants and if they were, they were acquainted with the British system or, more particularly, the French system. So they sort of chafed at having to come up with the kind of justifications that we demanded, which were foreign to them, which they didn't have the staffs, in many cases, to develop. So the AID people would agree with us that, you know, this kind of a project seemed like a good one, but the red tape and the struggle to get the technical justification for it, you know, over and beyond the problems of having the necessary operational engineering, was always a constant tension between our bureau and the AID.

Now, some of the people in AID, some of the people representing countries rather than the overall, these people seemed to be more flexible to us than Eddie Hutchinson was. And they seemed to be fighting the flight on our side rather than the fight that Hutchinson had. But throughout, our relationships with him were cordial and friendly and we saw each other socially. And when he went into industry he asked me for recommendations which I gave gladly. And then, as I say, we dealt with the administrator -- whoever it might be, from Fowler Hamilton to his successors -- and the various other economic and other people they had. On the whole, it was friendly and understanding, but constantly we had a more aggressive posture than they did.

MOSS: I'd like your opinion on another thing on this same general area. It's been suggested that one of the solutions to the question of making the AID business work properly is to integrate it with the regional bureau. What do you think of this proposal?

WILLIAMS: Well, of course, they did this in the Inter-Americas Bureau [of Inter-American Affairs], and it was suggested as a model for us. And the AID people wanted Wayne Fredericks to take on that responsibility, which he could have done well. And if we'd had two Wayne Fredericks, that would have been a beautiful operation. But the problem was that the work that he was doing in the general development of policy and so on was so much more vital to the final results we wanted than the more detailed work that

[-43-]

AID performed that we preferred to put up with the struggle in getting aid under the other system rather than a form of integration.

MOSS: In the Peace Corps end of things, of course, Quimby [Thomas H.E. Quimby] was over there, and you had known him for some time.

WILLIAMS: Yeah. Tom wasn't the first fellow over there.

MOSS: No.

WILLIAMS: I forget who was there before. But I had good relations with Sarge Shriver,

as I mentioned a little earlier, and we worked very well together as far as Africa was concerned and with whoever his subordinate in Africa might happen to be at the time.

MOSS: John Alexander? In '62-'63 at any rate. I don't...

WILLIAMS: Yeah, I remember the name. There were one or two people over there that we thought were a little regulation-minded rather than action-minded, and we weren't always as one with them. But overall we worked well. And of course, Frank Williams [Franklin H. Williams] was one of his associates that.... He subsequently took over in an ambassadorial post.

You haven't mentioned the Defense Department.

MOSS: No, not yet. And in two ways, I suppose. One is their support of the Congo operation logistically, in particular. And secondly, did DIA [Defence Intelligence Agency] have any role?

WILLIAMS: Yes, they had some role. In the Congo we had a general operating task force that included everybody that you've mentioned plus at various times people like Treasury [Department of Treasury], Agriculture [Department of Agriculture], or congressional relations, the Bureau of Information, the whole thing. Well, in the Congo we had good and, I think, effective and again mutually satisfactory relations with the Defense Department. And there were a couple of their people that were particularly helpful, and I'm sorry that....

MOSS: There's a Lieutenant Colonel Greene particularly.

WILLIAMS: Yes we thought he did an outstanding job. I wrote letters of recommendation for him. He subsequently went

[-44-]

into some other area, I think Southeast Asia or something. Yeah, we thought he did a good job. And there is another one that.... In the field they had excellent relationships with the Congolese and obviously it was important that there be some feeling of mutuality among them rather than that we were telling them what to do and so on. And so, oh, gosh the colonel that was up in Bukavu, he did a magnificent job. I'm sorry, offhand I don't remember the name.

MOSS: I have two particular questions on the Congo. Most of the Congo has been done and done again and any other observations you have on it I would appreciate, but...

WILLIAMS: Well, I might say that the chapter in my book is fairly comprehensive. It

may not be as confidential as what you want, but it covers the thing pretty generally.

MOSS: Well, let me ask first of all: There seems to be a discrepancy in the record as to whether the President was for or not for -- not necessarily against, but not for -- strong sanctions under the U Thant plan following the collapse of the Kitona Agreement, whether he was ready to go all the way or not.  
Excuse me. I have to flip this tape while you think about that one.

[BEGIN SIDE II, TAPE I]

WILLIAMS: Well, first of all let me be sure I understand your term. When you're talking about strong sanctions I presume you mean strong support of the U.N. forces *vis-a-vis* Katanga.

MOSS: Right. Yes. Well, and specifically the use of force against Katanga to make them step into line.

WILLIAMS: Well, this obviously is an area where there needs must be a lot of shadowboxing because people like Senator Dodd [Thomas J. Dodd] and that clique were in favor of Tshombe [Moise Tshombe.] The Union Miniere [de Haute Katango] had certain agents that worked not only on Dodd, but other areas. And so I imagine that it was incumbent upon the president to move carefully in these areas to accomplish his essential purpose without a scattering of bones all about. But I think that rather than trying to make a subjective analysis of what the President thought, I think the best thing is to see what actually was done, and I think that General

[-45-]

Truman's [Louis W. Truman] survey of what was needed and then the very strong military supply and logistics enforcement of the U.N. troops tells its own story because without that reinforcement the U.N. would never have been able to get into Katanga. And if the U.N. had not been able to move down there, it wouldn't have accomplished the purpose of reducing the Katanga rebellion. Now it's probably true that at the finale the Indian generals, you know, sort of took matters in their own hands. And there was a period when the U.N. in New York either said it was or it actually was out of communication with the advance of these forces. They ran wild and the vaunted, impregnable western Katanga towns fell unexpectedly and rapidly. But in any event, I think the important thing to recognize is that none of this could have been done without the logistics which were supplied by the United States. And so I think if you as a historian went back and looked at what our policy was, assuming that the military were supporting the policy -- there would be no question but that a strong position was the policy of the United States.

MOSS: Well, I'm looking back before what happened, really to the question of

whether or not there was a policy debate within either the White House or the State Department as to just how far the United States was willing to go, given such things as the Dodd pressure and so on, in endorsing the so-called U Thant plan.

WILLIAMS: Well, I think that the strategy was always clear. There were military back-shelf plans for even stronger possibilities, if necessary. They hasn't been endorsed, but they'd been reviewed not only by the military but by the State Department, so that planning was made in a background of what was necessary to accomplish the results. Now tactically, obviously the Dodds and the other things had some impact as to the methods that were employed and the statements made and so on, but I think, again, these were just necessary tactics with the general objectives pretty clear.

MOSS: All right. Somewhat along the same lines, why was the McGhee [George C. McGhee] mission necessary?

WILLIAMS: Well, I think this was a tactical program. At least, that's the way I sensed it. We -- I saw we, I'm thinking mostly of Wayne Fredericks and myself as we approached this with our people, you know, we weren't too happy about it. I think George McGhee, with whom we had very friendly relations, felt he had a job to do. It was obviously an attempt to appease the Dodd kind of business, although if some kind of working arrangement could be effectuated, as he was trying to do, why, that certainly would have been a worthwhile objective. I don't mean to indicate that this

[-46-]

was pure shadowboxing. But it didn't work out that way. You know, I don't mean to say that there weren't elements maybe even in the State Department and maybe a few in the African bureau, though I'm not conscious of any in the bureau, who felt that the program was too single-mindedly strong. But I think that historians will view that the main thrust went on, but with all kinds of tactical retreats or bulges being dented by the opposition.

MOSS: Okay. Is there anything more that is not in your book or you have not mentioned that you think is significant on the Congo? These two questions were the ones that I wanted to nail down.

WILLIAMS: Well, in the book I deal with our later relationship was Tshombe, the way he came in, and I think the book is fairly explicit on that and pretty comprehensive. I just want to say that I think Ed Gullion was one of our very best officers. We recommended him for the highest civilian award that the President ultimately was to give. And tactically we weren't as smart as we should have been because we could have recommended him for the highest departmental award too, which he surely would have gotten, but didn't get because we were shooting for the top thing that he just missed out on. So I would say that he did an excellent job, and I think his successors did too.

MOSS: Okay. Now one thing that I would like to do at the moment -- again it's a kind of exercise and I have taken the Schlesinger account of Africa during the Administration...

WILLIAMS: Before you do that, I think we didn't cover one part of the personnel problem, and I gather that you sort of finished with that.

MOSS: Right.

WILLIAMS: And so, while I think of it, we better get into it. I deal with this somewhat in my book, although some of it was edited down. In general, the State Department operation, I think, is somewhat more amorphous than any government department ought to be. I think it begins with a problem in that the secretary turns out to be, is thought of as more of a technician than as an administrator. And to have one of the largest departments in government headed by a technician is all right if he's a practicing administrator, but a technician who is supposed to be a practicing technician isn't, I think, a very viable operation when

[-47-]

our foreign affairs are so widespread. A man just can't possibly perform the two functions successfully. I was the executive assistant to the Attorney General when Frank Murphy was Attorney General. Well, now the President doesn't deal with the Attorney General in asking him legal opinions in the way a President presumably deals with a Secretary of State in the detailed advice on foreign affairs. And likewise, the Attorney General doesn't try cases himself. He's an administrator and a director. Well, I don't want to carry this too far except to say that, you know, it's almost *infra dig* for the Secretary of State to have his top expert on the subject with him and refer to him when he's talking to the President rather than having the whole thing in his own mind. Now, obviously on a top question, the secretary will be following this and having it in his mind. But to be able to respond on the whole gamut of world affairs, I think just isn't possible.

Well, then the next thing is that the under secretaries are likewise little secretaries. For example, George Ball or even Chet Bowles, they sort of were running their world, Department of State. I mean they were excellent people and both friends of mine, but if I'd been Secretary of State, which I had no idea of, but I mean, I don't see how you could have that kind of organization. And as you went down to the other under secretary, or in the deputy under secretaries, there really was no operation function as there would be in the Pentagon or almost any other department with which I am familiar. I think that this makes the State Department a much more amorphous mass than it need be.

And while I don't want to tout the Republicans, I understand that now they have some sort of recognition of this and are trying in some way to respond to it. Well, I think both Kennedy and Johnson and Rusk made some efforts on this. They tried to bring this systems analysis in, but I think the systems analysis that they worked on was somewhat unrealistic

because I think it really put in more men rather than reduced the number of men. I think while some parts of the concept were useful in demanding more planning and relating structure to the plan, that it tended to break down into imposing a mechanism on an operation rather than making the operation articulated through a mechanism.

Well, just one more comment. I think that one of the problems in the State Department is that there isn't a consciousness of the need to train executives as well as to train area or technical experts. As a consequence, I was conscious of this when I first got into the African bureau. Many of the really fine officers had no expertise in the delegation of responsibility and of follow-up,

[-48-]

and they tried to do too much of the detail work themselves -- this isn't true of all of them, but it was true of too many of them -- I talked to a number of them, and I think they gradually realized this problem. I think this happens in the field, too. All of a sudden if a man becomes ambassador -- now he may have been a deputy someplace, probably was -- either at the deputy level or the ambassador level, he suddenly is confronted with a lot of operating responsibilities which too often he isn't prepared to meet. There needs to be some mid-term executive training or some build-up before. I told the younger officers that I've met it seemed to me that the happiest solutions in the world for any of them in their developing careers was to become a vice consul in some of our African posts because they really weren't consulates in the general sense in that they were, you know, doing immigration and visas and that stuff; they were really small sub-embassies. And here these young men had by doing to learn to become executives at an early enough age so they had an appreciation of what the problem was, so that as they went on in the rest of their career, they were conscious of the necessity of developing these skills in themselves as well as all of the other skills of diplomacy. Well, that's sort of an aside, but I thought it was part of your original question.

MOSS: In a way it was. And there are one or two things that you've touched on that lead me into a slightly different area, and that is the relationship between the Bundy [McGeorge Bundy] operation in the White House and the State Department. Now, as I understand it Bill Brubeck [William H. Brubeck] was sort of the go-between, wasn't he, or were there direct contacts, and what happened?

WILLIAMS: Well....

MOSS: That's a broad question.

WILLIAMS: Well, your question -- I don't think you're conscious of it really -- has two somewhat unrelated parts because Bill Brubeck was not really in the line of fire and he didn't come in until later on. No, we enjoyed a relationship with the White House that perhaps some of the other bureaus didn't have because of my political background and association with the President. And it worked both ways because Bundy recognized it and I was able to deal very freely with him. But then he had his own

Cabinet and he had various men on Africa there. He started out with that Harvard economist whose name I shouldn't remember, shouldn't forget.

MOSS: Kaysen [Carl Kaysen]?

[-49-]

WILLIAMS: Kaysen, Carl Kaysen. And we had excellent relations with him. And, you know, this was sort of a daily working operation. And the White House for us was, well, almost more of a lateral rather than a vertical clearance or contact. I mean particularly when I'm talking about the Kaysen level because daily.... I mean we didn't finish what we were doing in the State Department and then talked to Carl; he was part of our thoughts as we moved along. And then, of course, his successors -- Bob Komer [Robert W. Komer] was there -- then eventually they paid us the compliment of stealing one of our fine, young blacks Haynes [Ulrich Haynes], to go over and take the position that Komer had had. So we had a day-to-day working relationship there.

Now, the Brubeck relationship was a different one and at times a difficult one. He worked for and we sometimes thought he worked for George Ball. He was supposed to, or assumed to, act as a clearance point on everything before it went to George, and sometimes this was somewhat irksome. But this is part of the amorphous character of the thing. Because at times we were supposed to clear things with George McGhee, at times we were supposed to clear things with George Ball -- two different offices. And of course, when Averell Harriman succeeded George McGhee, we had a very pleasant relationship with him and it was very helpful. So it's a little difficult to reconstruct any line of vertical clearance because, first of all, it occasionally varied with a personality as to who held what office and second, it didn't always make that difference because depending on what you were working on, you'd go through one way or through another. And the same way -- I discussed this in the book -- with the lateral clearances. Sometimes I would get a personal order from the President to do certain things. Well, he said, "Clear it if you can, or, if you can't, give me your opinion." And so that was a different operation altogether. In that way, I was thinking more of, you know, dealing with the Defense Department and some of the other departments.

MOSS: On what kinds of things might he say that to you?

WILLIAMS: Well, this was mostly when we were dealing with the Congo.

MOSS: I wonder on this whole White House-State Department relationship because sometimes the Bundy operation is rather glibly referred to as the "little State Department."

WILLIAMS: Yes.

MOSS: ...the implications being that they could do things that the State

Department could not because the State

[-50-]

Department was too cumbersome and that sort of thing, that it was sort of a shortcut to policy solutions, to action. How does this stand up in your experience?

WILLIAMS: Well, I think that again it's difficult to establish any specific rule. Everything wasn't treated in the same way. And then you talked about policy and action. Of course, sometimes it's difficult to differentiate because each action really becomes a policy. But once general lines of policy were established, why then maybe some of the specific actions that went on might be discussed, certainly with Bundy or Carl Kaysen or so on or equally with Dean Rusk or the others. You know, I never felt that we were working at cross-purposes with anybody. I just felt that certain problems had an urgency for solution and just went the way that went quickest.

MOSS: Was there ever an occasion on which you felt out of touch with the President or with the Bundy operation? That they were going or...

WILLIAMS: Well, the only thing on which I really felt out of touch was later on -- this was during the Johnson Administration -- with the Korry Report. This thing wasn't discussed with me until the very end. Outside of that, I really didn't have any, you know, different kind of relationship with the Johnson from the Kennedy because again there'd be different White House contacts. Sometimes there'd be their press people. Oh, who's the young Texan that -- publisher?

MOSS: Reedy [George E. Reedy, Jr.]? No. Oh, Moyers [Bill D. Moyers].

WILLIAMS: Moyers. I had good, friendly relationships with Moyers and, well, things worked better that way than going through a Bundy route sometimes. So it was flexible. For example, this whole Chinese intrusion into Tanzania. Well, this went over a long time and you were always working to get the best handhold, so you were working at different places in the State Department and in the White House and on the Hill. I mean we felt that the African situation was a new and novel one and didn't necessarily fit in the orthodox scheme of things and so consequently we had to play all stops and did. And I rather suspect that, you know, this is true in other areas. People who had friends on the Hill worked with their friends on the Hill as well as with the people in the State Department. You had to because obviously, as the Katanga thing pointed out, the Hill was interested and, if you didn't keep them informed or work with them, they intruded in on

[-51-]

you. And so it was part of the whole development of policy.



Well, to come back to your specific question about the little White House and could policy be developed more quickly that way, I couldn't say for a general thing. I had the feeling that I had a friendly relationship with Rusk of mutual regard and that he, for one reason or another, gave me a freer hand than he might give somebody else. I tried to respect it by doing what I thought had to be done, but, you know, always working with him, keeping him informed. If I had to go to the President, you know, this wasn't anything hidden. I went and told him and worked with him. I never felt that I was doing anything that he disapproved of, although I felt many things that I did he might not have done himself, but he gave consent or agreement to. So I felt that I was working within the bounds of tolerances and agreement. And never had anything but most friendly of relationships and I always had a feeling of great affection for him.

MOSS: All right. I mentioned a few minutes ago that I wanted to go through a little exercise on Schlesinger's book and take some of the statements that he makes out of the Africa section and ask you what your reaction to the statements, as I gist them, are. Again, talking about the State Department, he says that you were really not able to operate proficiently in the State Department's intramural warfare and that your liberalism was perhaps too excessive for John Kennedy to be entirely comfortable with you. And by implication, putting these two statements together, he tends perhaps to downgrade your effectiveness in the role. How do you respond to this?

WILLIAMS: Well, I think that I don't share the impression that I didn't get along with the State Department, with the Foreign Service officers. He's not the only one that's had that impression. I may have been brash and in a hurry and may have, you know, upset some people, but I think I ended up with the affection, if not the respect, of most of the powers that be. I mean I got along well with Alexis Johnson, with Bohlen [Charles E. Bohlen] and all of those people. Now, they may have thought that I wasn't doing things the right way, I don't know, but, you know, I talked with them, worked with them and got things through with them. In the end, while we had great differences of opinion with the European bureau, which is the one that we were most directly in conflict with, with the successive chiefs I had warm, friendly relations and I don't think they were, you know, so dissimulating that they were just fooling me. So I don't share the feeling that I was a *bête noir* in the State Department. I may have been for a while, and certainly

[-52-]

there were people that didn't agree with my policies, but I had and I have warm friendship and, as far as I know, general respect, although perhaps differences of opinion.

Now, whether I was regarded as ineffectual in moving the State Department machinery, I really don't know. We developed a strong policy program that was very comprehensive over a period of time that was worked over in a couple of conferences with all of the ambassadors in Africa.

MOSS: The chiefs of mission meeting?

WILLIAMS: Yeah, the chiefs of missions meeting. But toward the end we had papers and everything, and, at least in the people that were working in the African field, we had a policy that about 95 percent agreed with. And I would say that in our chiefs of missions meeting the Korry Report was anathema; nobody agreed with it. Now obviously this is subsequent to the Kennedy time. And the program that we developed was approved by the Secretary and approved by the President, so that from that point of view we were successful in getting agreement with our overall thrust. Now, whether it was our policy or their policy, that is, the White House policy, what we wanted in the Congo was what happened. The Dodds and the others, you know, they were listened to. As I say, there were tactical retreats, but the essential strategy was followed, and I think subsequent events have proved that it's been successful because the Congo is not Communist.

The Congo today is beginning to start some economic development and things are going ahead. The Belgians are coming back. We had plenty of blows with Union Miniere, although we ended up fast friends with the Belgian ambassador, Spaak [Paul-Henri Spaak], and the whole lot. As a matter of fact, Spaak helped us temper some of the Belgian industrialists. The Volta River project, this was something that there were a lot of people that said we should get out. We said we ought to go ahead. And it seems to be generally known now that Clarence Randall went over there and reported we should get out. But the President went along with us. Now, these were some of the most specific problems that we had that we were successful in carrying our policy through.

Now, on the Tanzania Railroad, with these we were not ultimately successful. We were successful in some of the minor skirmishes that never saw the light of day in getting presidential reaction quickly. So I don't know, I suppose everyone has a feeling they're doing a better job than they actually do, but I never felt that this kind of

[-53-]

criticism was profoundly based. I think superficially, you know, a lot of the writers, columnists came up with this kind of guff. But I think the main thrust of our policies we got through, that there was peace and friendship between the powers that be in the department, in the Foreign Service organization and so on. And I think one. . . . This is again past the Kennedy, but it does go back to the Foreign Service. I did not seek the office of ambassador to the Philippines. As a matter of fact, when there was a preliminary sounding out I said that I didn't want any full-time job of any kind, but they nonetheless asked me. I don't know of anybody who put any political pressure on anybody. I think this was a departmental decision. And maybe, oh, I can't believe that the Philippines is such a kettle of fish that they couldn't find anybody brave enough to take it. But it still, it's the third largest embassy that the United States has and it's a Class 1 post and there are plenty of professionals who would just as soon have that title and pay. So, I can't help but feel that this was, you know, a mark of confidence.

MOSS: What about the other half of the Schlesinger remark that you were perhaps

too liberal for President Kennedy to be easy with you?

WILLIAMS: I think in part this is true. And I think that....

MOSS: Does it have any significance?

WILLIAMS: Yes. I think probably I'm more a John the Baptist than a disciple if I can put it that way. I am a liberal. I've been in the vanguard. I've fought the battles. I've made both friends and enemies. And as Judd Arnett, who started out as a critic and ended up as a warm friend, a columnist in the Detroit papers, says, he said, "Williams has been criticized, but his only trouble was he's ten years ahead of his time," because all of the things that I fought for as Governor subsequently a Republican administration had to come to. Like the income tax, which was a big fight. So perhaps I had not more vision, but at least I had sufficient vision to see what the problem was and maybe I had too much courage and not enough common sense, maybe too much idealism and not enough practicality to go out and fight for them. And so I think that this has been part of many problems that I've had.

MOSS: Could you make that specific application to the Kennedy Administration on this?

WILLIAMS: You mean whether I was....

MOSS: Yes.

[-54-]

WILLIAMS: Well, I wouldn't necessarily say that I was more liberal than the Kennedy Administration, but I think I had the reputation of being more liberal and so I had both built-in friends and built-in enemies. And as a consequence, you know, maybe dealing with the Congress and so on that the President would feel that I would have certain liabilities whereas somebody else might not have the assets. He might not have the liabilities either so might be less controversial.

MOSS: Okay. We have touched once or twice on the question of Europeanists versus Africanists in the State Department, and Schlesinger does make a great deal of this, particularly with regard to policies on Algeria, the Portuguese territories and South Africa.

WILLIAMS: Can we take just a break for a minute.

MOSS: Surely. [Interruption] We were talking about Africanists and Europeanists.

WILLIAMS: Let me, before answering that question or in answering it, go back to the

previous Schlesinger report. I think that if you would talk to anybody in the African bureau or associated with it that there was a severe drop in morale after I left because I had been able to push successfully Africanists policies in which they believe that my successors either weren't able to push, which I think is the case, or they didn't believe in, which I don't think is the case. And I think that the intellectual community in the universities and so on would have been found generally sympathetic to the policies that we pursued and have been disappointed with the either lack of vigor in pursuing them subsequently or in dropping away from them. So that again going to the question of whether we were effective or successful, I think that in a sense we were underrated in some areas because I think that among the people who were knowledgeable about Africa, we were pursuing right policies and with some degree of effectiveness.

MOSS: Well, let me ask you if there was any noticeable European bias on the part of people like Rusk and Ball and Johnson that prevented your being more effective than you were?

WILLIAMS: Well, let me say with respect to Rusk, I didn't feel anything special about that. I just had the feeling with respect to him that the Vietnam situation and sometimes specific European situations were so pressing on his time that he couldn't give the amount of time to the African situation that we

[-55-]

wished he could. And I think that when he did have time to confront the African decisions I think he had a fairly straight-forward approach to it. And I wouldn't feel that there was any excessive European bias. After all, he was East Asian rather than European.

MOSS: Right. But I'm trying to locate, if there was any, the persistence of what you might call an Acheson [Dean G. Acheson]-McCloy [John J. McCloy] perspective.

WILLIAMS: Yeah. Well, let me talk about George Ball of whom I'm very fond and have great respect for. He obviously is a Europeanist, there's no question about that. But I have a tremendous admiration for George Ball as an advocate, and by that I mean he can see both sides of the question, and if one particular side is the side that the President or somebody wants to support, he'll support it. I don't mean to say he doesn't have his convictions, but he's an advocate, and if he's working for you, he's a fine guy to have on board. Well, on some of the African situations, for example, he made one of the best speeches against the Katanga succession that was ever made and was widely used. And when it came to the dam, the Volta Dam, this is one place where you had this sort of idea of a formal policy decision. We all went over to the White House and he presented the case that we'd agree on and I thought it was a fair, honest case. Now, there wasn't anything particular European or otherwise in this particular place, but I'm just trying to prove that I think that he approached many of these things from an ad hoc position.

Now, to move more closely into a European confrontation, on the Portuguese question George Ball was the most successful of all of us in getting the Portuguese to drop their front of for God and country and that we came to Christianize the Angolans and so on and we have a different mission. He went back to Lisbon and he was able to talk to Salazar [Antonio de Oliveira Salazar], and the report came back that they couldn't get out of Angola or Mozambique in the same way that the British or the French could get out of their territories and still keep their fingers in things, because they didn't have the economic and political power that these two great powers had. And as consequence they feared that if they got out of their territories, that they would completely lose them, whereas the British and French could grant independence but still have an association, whether or not in derogation of independence, that met their national needs.

So whether he was a Europeanist or an Africanist, in the specific context he was effective in getting the dialogue into a realistic

[-56-]

basis so that we could look at the problem as it was rather than with a lot of shams. So I would say George Ball, obviously by association and training and maybe inclination, he was more Europeanist than developing-country-sided, but he has an excellent mind and could see the other side. Now in his book, which I haven't really read, he gets way off the reservation, and I haven't studied it enough to know why. Maybe that's the real George Ball, but the George Ball that I knew and worked with, I found situation by situation that in some cases he was, you know, a better advocate than I could be myself. He was always a guy that you could work with. And you'd have differences of opinion, but no abiding animus or problem that I was conscious of.

Incidentally, I first met George Ball in Los Angeles at the 1960 [Democratic National] Convention before it opened. There was some sort of a radio program, and I was sitting in for Kennedy. He was sitting in for Stevenson, as I recall, and there was somebody sitting in for Johnson. So we've known each other quite a while. Now, let's see. We've got Rusk and Ball and who else did you mention?

MOSS: Alexis Johnson.

WILLIAMS: Well, here he's not a Europeanist by training. Alexis Johnson really I had no contact with him until later on. And so by that time my brand of Africanism had been established and the European battles had been mostly fought and won or lost. Let me look at this question generally with you. And I'm sure there are many other sides to it but at least this will illuminate a part of the picture. I've already said that with the directors of the European bureau I had warm and friendly relationships, and I think genuinely so. So that it was not a case of personal bitterness that I was aware of. And you mentioned Algeria and Portugal so let's look at those.

Let's look at Algeria first because when I came into the bureau Algeria was still a part of the European bureau and there was some general idea that as it approached independence, it would move toward the African bureau. Well, we did have a period during which we had a

condominium, so to speak, and from my point of view, we didn't have too many problems working in that joint relationship. They may not have been satisfied with the relationship, but at least as it worked out we felt that we got what we were supposed to get. We weren't conscious of any feelings that they thought we were "having" them, which as the so-called junior body maybe they wouldn't have admitted to or felt possible. So I think from that point of view there wasn't too much asperity. And duly the country did become a part of our bureau.

[-57-]

We did have, you know, certain little diplomatic situations where we put the pressure on. For example, the level at which the Department would speak in conversing with the Algerian nationalists, or whether we would speak to them at all. And we constantly raised the level and of course eventually I talked to their top leadership in Tunisia. And well, the European bureau may not have been altogether happy about this, but, you know, we didn't pull the wool over anybody's eyes. We talked to them, and we tried to get agreement, and I think we generally stayed within the relationship that at least we thought was authorized. But we obviously pushed the process faster than they would have pushed it, if they were left on their own. But this is the whole purport of collective bargaining when you have representatives of two different groups that had different ideas that there has to be some give someplace. And the way of the future, to use the Kennedy phrase, was certainly on the side of independence for Algeria. Of course, the President had made the speech on that many years before. Anyhow the thing went.

There didn't seem to be.... I mean, nobody ever called me to order or anything or asked me what's going on. So I felt that either we had had grudging assent or we had the political clout to do it. And by political I mean generally departmental or otherwise. Because as I saw that, there never was any particular explosion about it. And I think that it was our feeling that the way things worked out in the Evian-les-Bains Agreements that, you know, the French went a long ways at the end to meet the problems of Algeria, and, if it hadn't been for the French terrorists at the end, there would have been a pretty good deal. And so as far as Algeria was concerned, I think we made out all right.

MOSS:               Okay. Excuse me. I have to put on a new tape here.

[BEGIN SIDE I, TAPE II]

WILLIAMS:       Well, let me look at the Paris side of this. We in the African bureau and I myself established fairly good relationships with that part of the French Foreign Office that dealt with Africa. I had made it a policy not to visit with anybody in Europe until I'd visited every country in Africa. And this didn't exactly please the Europeans, but my business was to carry out what I conceived to be the Kennedy policy of making friends of the Africans and giving them an understanding that we recognize and appreciated their independence. But when I did try to make contact with the Various European capitals, we made out fairly well.

Now, as you know, the great Charles [Charles A. de Gaulle] had changing moods, but several times we had official discussions in the Quai d'Orsay

[-58-]

where I and one or two of my colleagues sat down across the table with the French foreign office and we discussed problems. We just went through it. On other occasions I had personal conversations with these officials in the foreign office. Occasionally I talked to the foreign minister, Couve de Murville [Couve de Murville], and others. I think we, well, had several banquets here and there. There were times when the President wasn't feeling so well toward the United States so then I met with the French African bureau chiefs in the home of our DCM [deputy chief of mission] in Paris. On one occasion this same official took me to lunch at the airport so that we did maintain a friendly contact. I also was in contact with Joxe [Louis Joxe] and, oh, a de Gaullist, I can't remember his name. He looked like a Sicilian, but he was more on the political side than on the.... And he had dinner, luncheons for me and with some other.... So we had a relationship that was tolerable to warm.

And with the French ambassadors in the various countries in Africa we always made it a point to see them, particularly in the French-speaking countries. And our ambassadors had good relations with their ambassadors, and I personally did. And I'll just relate one incident to give a feeling, give color.

On one occasion I was making a trip to Africa with five or six colleagues and our first stop was to be Bamako. We got to Paris -- because we had to go to Paris to get the plane down -- and we discovered at the last minute that our Paris embassy had not understood the number of people that were going to be in my group and they had reservations that night on the direct flight to Bamako for only a part of the group. But we didn't find this out until part of my party had gone out visiting Paris and we couldn't get hold of them. So I think there were two of us who were going to go down at night and the rest got tickets to go to Dakar and then come up to Bamako a little later. But these several people who were out in Paris, we couldn't get them on that plane because it left earlier and we couldn't get tickets on the direct flight to Bamako. Well, they came to the airport that night with me and fortunately for us the French ambassador to Mali was at the airport going to Bamako and we had a general conversation and finally he either asked me how everything was going or whether I had any problems. And he learned that I had these two or three people who didn't have any tickets and were just waiting around to see what happened. He didn't tell me what he was doing, but he went to UTA [Union de Transports Aeriens] and made them unload freight so they could carry my colleagues. And at that time when the State Department was sending the assistant secretary tourist, I sat with him in first class and had dinner with him on the plane. Well, I think it indicates that -- I think this is a little

[-59-]

above and beyond the diplomatic niceties -- we did have a good relationship. And so this didn't....

I suppose you could have a good relationship with the French without having a good relationship with the people in the department. But I think we got along a lot better than people thought. And with the French ambassador, Charles Lucet, and I always look each other up when he comes here. With Alphand [Hervé Alphand], at first he wouldn't speak French to me but after a while he did and made a point of having me around. Maybe because he saw we were getting along with the Africans. But in any event, some of his other officials we got along with quite well. We got along well enough.

With Britain we did have cordial relations and it turned out that Wayne Fredericks had personal friends when the Labor Party came in. And so we had really warm and friendly relations from the minister on down. And of course, for a while we had the complex problem of dealing not only with a foreign office, but their commonwealth and colonial offices. And we managed, I think, quite well. And we had warm, friendly relations with their ambassadors in Africa and in Washington as well.

The only people on the French scene -- going back to it -- we really didn't get along with very well were some of the French colons. But these people I don't think even got along well with the French policy. These people were quite difficult, and Charles Darlington in his book tells how he had more trouble with them than with anyone else.

Now, let's deal with the Portuguese problem because this was one where we had a sharp issue. The big problem, of course, was the Azores. And here again I think whatever differences of opinion that we had and this relationship.... I can't boast of any friendly relationship with the Portuguese because they didn't like what I said about them. And, you know, we met and saw each other and got along, but I don't pretend that we had the cordial relations we did with the other countries. But this, of course, was a problem that the military joint chiefs were interested in and obviously our Portuguese desk was interested in. And well, I would say that by and large the African policy prevailed. The point I made with the chiefs, I said, "Look, I recognize that the Azores is tremendously important strategically and the economically because if you can re-gas half way across the Atlantic" -- and two-thirds of all of their cargo ships flew the southern route because of the weather -- "you can carry a heavier payload. We've got to have the Azores."

But I said, "Look, I am just as confident as I can be that the Portuguese want us in the Azores just as much as you want to be.

[-60-]

So I think that we can pursue our policies in Portuguese Africa, and you still will stay in the Azores." Well, that's what eventuated. Now, it wasn't as comfortable for the military as they would have liked because they couldn't renew the five-year leases. And I was confident they wouldn't renew them either. But the only thing this meant was that they couldn't convince the Congress that they ought to spend a lot more money on installations there, because not having a lease, the Congress wasn't going to give it to them. But as far as making use of the airports and other Azores facilities there never was any trouble. I visited the Azores any number of times myself because I flew to Africa on military planes, and we had to stop. It was a very pleasant place, and we got along very well there. Now, whether the actual



Portuguese desk officers were a little put out with us, this doesn't stick in my mind as well as the French or the British.

MOSS: Let me ask a specific question since we're talking about Portugal. How was it decided to reverse the Eisenhower position on that Angola vote early on January 30th, I guess it was, in the UN?

WILLIAMS: This, I can't address myself to directly. I don't think in this particular vote that I participated or had impact because at this time the Congo was the hottest thing that we had. I wasn't yet.... Well, I had just been sworn in and I was getting ready to go on my trip, so that while.... This was a very important vote for our relationships with all of Africa and it made my position and the President's much easier in Africa, but I don't claim any impact on this except very indirectly.

MOSS: Another decision, early policy decision, was to deal directly with the African countries themselves on the matter of aid rather than clearing it through the European metropolises or at least this has been mentioned as a policy change. Do you recall this as a definite departure?

WILLIAMS: Well, the fact is that we dealt directly with the Africans, and we couldn't have done anything else but that without being terribly insulting to them. Whether we had any discussions about this or not, I frankly don't recall. We did have conferences occasionally with the British and the French about what we were going to do. This was informative. Well, and then there were a lot of multilateral programs where obviously we would have to have discussion, like the Volta Dam. The British and other Europeans were involved, but it didn't go through them.

[-61-]

Now, when it came to military aid, there was much more discussion, particularly vis-a-vis the French because.... For example, what we tended to do would be to give people jeeps for all kinds of reasons and, of course, they were noncombatant things and that was the kind of thing we liked to do. Well, the French, who were supporting a lot of these countries, were a little loath to see us give them jeeps, because they had to pay for the gasoline. SO what we tended to be doing would be to give capital goods and they were involved in the operational budgets. So they had some feeling on that. But that's about the only thing that I could comment on.

Incidentally, I had a general theory, which I think is true, that I tried to sell the Europeans. I said, "Look. We're not really trying to displace any of you here. But we need a presence, and you need our presence there because these Africans are insisting on independence, and independence means, in large part, being relieved of dependence on the metropole and particularly exclusive dependence. And so if they have a second leg to stand on, they can put more weight on the leg that joins the metropole and the former colonies." So I said, "In reality we're not diminishing your influence. We're giving you an opportunity to

continue an influence which otherwise they might insist on terminating.” And I think this was true. I think, for example, in Mali which was very anti-French for a long time, the fact that we were there helped them swing back.

And of course, we were always anxious in Guinea to have some sort of a rapprochement between de Gaulle and Sekou Toure, but this was a personality hang-up as well as a policy problem, and of course the French had been most provocative when they pulled out so that there was good reason for the Africans to have a feeling. But, you know, the Africans had greater or less extent of reality about this thing and without the French support, particularly of their francs, these countries couldn't get along. Mali wanted to eventually have some sort of trade relations and so on with Senegal and Guinea, but the franc in Mali and Guinea wasn't worth anything. So they couldn't have a viable trade, and as a consequence the only thing they could do is have the French back them up.

Well, let me just complete this round on the European relationship. With the Spanish, I had excellent relationships with the Spanish ambassadors in Washington, with the Spanish foreign minister in Madrid, and I visited the then still dependent Spanish territories along with the Spaniards. And you know, I lectured to them on independence -- maybe the word lecture isn't right -- and they accepted with good faith, and they were moving, eventually moved in that direction except for those small enclaves up in North Africa. And so I think

[-62-]

we have a good relationship with the Spaniards. And we had good relationships with the Germans, we had joint talks and friendships. And to a lesser extent with the Italians. I mean our relations weren't cool, but we just neer got around to really developing those and there was less reason to do so.

MOSS: Okay, in a slightly different area, still on Schlesinger's comments, he credits you with proposing the idea of a full embargo, arms embargo on South Africa. Do you accept the credit for it?

WILLIAMS: Well, I don't know whether I thought of it first, but I certainly promoted it, and I was in a position where we officially would recommend it. And so like Harry Truman, the buck stops there, so whether it's a credit or a responsibility I suppose I assume it. And I believe that this was the only course that we could pursue.

I think that you were talking about the U.N. decision in Portugal. I had a good relationship with Stevenson [Adlai E. Stevenson] and I think that the U.N. branch of the American government and the African bureau sometimes saw things much more alike than the secretary or sometimes the President because we were both on the firing line and much more in direct contact with the Africans and were more sensitive to them.

MOSS: What do you recall of the role of Robert Kennedy in African affairs?

WILLIAMS: Well, he had both a significant interest and a significant implant. I think I

deal with him in my book and if not -- I'm trying to locate the chapters that got edited out that I think tell a little more and I'll try and get these copies for you. The President shifted a lot of people to Bobby that he couldn't see himself. The President was very generous in seeing African diplomats and seeing the representatives of the African countries before they became independent, but there were some people that had a more revolutionary task that he couldn't very well diplomatically see. But Bobby saw them and Bobby helped him, helped us, helped them through overt and covert means and was sympathetic and helpful. And his trip to South Africa was a very significant and important affair. Let me see. I want to talk with you about his trip to the Ivory Coast, but before that let me see if there.... Oh, he was interested very much in this Portuguese-African question and I think he probably saw Eduardo Mondlane.

MOSS: How about Holden Roberto?

[-63-]

WILLIAMS: He was helpful to Holden Roberto. Whether he ever saw him or not I don't know. But in this kind of thing he was very direct, very helpful. And he not only responded, but he also took initiatives and he wanted to see what we were doing, whether we were really pushing this as hard as it should be. And sometimes, even when the State Department wasn't really fully endorsing the thing, but we were advocating it and pushing it and doing what we could without directly going against policy. And he was very aggressive in these things.

MOSS: Can you recall an anecdote that would illustrate that?

WILLIAMS: Well, he was very interested in... [Interruption] Gee, I am slightly immersed in other things and I forget some of these names, but the white South African, Duncan [Patrick Duncan]. Help was given to Duncan in a number of different ways, and Bobby was forever following it up to see whether we were following through on getting it to him through the various channels that we had to use. He was very interested in it.

MOSS: Now, you mentioned his visit to the Ivory Coast independence celebration.

WILLIAMS: Yeah. We were already in Africa when he went off in the presidential plane. It wasn't *Air Force One*, the other one. But we tied in someplace. I don't know whether.... It was probably in Wheelis [Air Force Base] or something like that. And my wife and I flew down with him -- I think I do describe this in my book, but anyway it'll be in these manuscripts. He and Ethel [Ethel Skakel Kennedy] really, I think, were the cynosure of all eyes. The Ivory Coast retains and at that time had very close relationships with France so that the French representative, you know, sort of had the major play, but I think more people were interested in seeing the President's brother than anybody else. And I know that the luncheon and the reception that was held after the parade,

well, the ambassador and I were kept awfully busy introducing him to Africans who wanted to meet him. And I was more busy than the ambassador because I knew them from all over Africa and they were from all over Africa and they all wanted to meet him. He was very good with them and so was Ethel, and they went everywhere and did everything. One small aside was that for some reason or other the ambassador, Boren Reams [Robert Borden Reams], didn't get the word right on what the dress of the day was, and Bobby didn't appear in a morning coat at the parade, whereas most of the others did. Bobby was not very happy with the ambassador because of that. But that was a minor matter.

[-64-]

MOSS: He's sometimes credited with contributing to a stronger feeling of support for both Sekou Touré and Nkrumah after his visit.

WILLIAMS: He certainly was a supporter of Nkrumah and was helpful in the Volta River operation and things of that kind. I'm having a little trouble bringing into focus the Sekou Touré relationship. I would deduce that he would have that feeling, but I can't by independent recollections substantiate that. But if he did.... I mean I'm personally quite sympathetic to Sekou Touré too; he and I got along very well together. Well, anyhow we did manage to support Guinea through many vicissitudes. I think he may have been instrumental in some of the specific aid programs that we had to evolve. Well, I'm sorry I can't add anything specific.

MOSS: Moving back to the President again, Schlesinger in his book says several things about state visits and African leaders. He says that the ceremonial aspects of state visits rather bored the President. He says also that perhaps in the conversations the President was a little more candid with African leaders than the State Department was comfortable with. Are these good assessments from your remembrance or not?

WILLIAMS: Well, I don't know what he means by State Department, whether he...

MOSS: No, I don't either.

WILLIAMS: ...refers to me or to somebody else. The only time I was uncomfortable was.... I don't know whether it was Bourguiba [Habib B. Bourguiba], but it was one of the French-speaking Africans that he was walking along -- it wasn't in the Rose Garden, I think it was in that circular drive in the back of the White House office -- and they were having a very friendly and animated conversation. Somehow or other I can't remember the interpreter being there, but he must have been because the President habitually used the interpreter with the French. But he was either inviting or accepting; he was accepting an invitation. He said, "Gee, I'm going to come and visit you in your capital." And I knew damn well he wasn't or couldn't, and so I was a little nervous about that. But that was the only occasion that I ever had any concern and that was, of course, not a concern

about policy, but I was afraid that the President was getting himself into something that he'd be embarrassed with later. I do discuss this either run the book or manuscript or both. The President was really excellent with these Africans. They were able to get together on a very informal basis and talk.

[-65-]

And I visited some of these Africans shortly after they'd been to Washington. Sometimes when they'd been to Washington in my absence in Africa, and they came back fresh and so I didn't see what had happened but just had the replay of it. One of the most extraordinary was Hastings Banda, who is quite a character. Hastings Banda and I established a warm relationship because he took particular umbrage at the fact that this crazy, white colonialist socked me in the jaw when I was in then upper, I mean Northern Rhodesia. I went from Northern Rhodesia. I went from Northern Rhodesia to Malawi, and when we got off the plane he had his whole political apparatus out there. He didn't meet me at the plane, that's reserved for heads of state. But in any event, he had all of his ladies and they were all dressed up in a particular African costume which was identical. And the first thing that happened was that they surrounded my wife and took off her coat and so on -- whatever she was wearing that they could take off with decency -- and then they wove this material around her and made her a dress right then and there, so she became a part of their group. Then they gave me a fly whisk which is sort of a badge of authority. And the whole time this is all going on they were clapping, this very slow, methodical clapping which we later learned was a mark of distinction that was reserved for the President alone. Well, in any event, they went all out in this way.

And one night while we were there we went out to what we in American might call a roadhouse, and we were set up in tables that politicians recognize, you know, on horses, long tables in a great U. The British ambassador was there, or not ambassador, high commissioner. He sat on the right side, as he should, and I sat on the left side. Well, the President got up and he twisted the British lion's tail unmercifully and then he told about his trip to Washington. And this group of people that were there were not so much a diplomatic assemblage as sort of a political convention. And in the most glowing terms he told how the President stopped everything he was doing, his cabinet meeting, and took Banda around and everything. And he said, "We have the warmest friend in Washington you could possibly imagine." Well, he always was that way. On a subsequent visit I came with a picture of Kennedy, an autographed picture, and when I gave it to him he grabbed me by the hand, and he held my hand throughout the whole meeting that I was with him there he was so moved by it.

When I was in the Sudan, General Abboud [Ferik Ibrahim Abboud], who was then President, had just come back from Washington, and I hadn't been there. The President had given him a hunting rifle, and, you know, whatever business I had, there was no use talking about it because the whole time that I was there, which was half an hour or

[-66-]

an hour or something, he talked about the President's reception of him and giving him this gun and how he was going to insist on getting the President to Africa to use the gun. He was really extraordinarily successful with these people. And whether they were, you know, sort of reactionaries, as Banda is considered by his friends, or liberals like Modibo Keita, of course, visited Washington as a representative from that Belgrade conference, and he had very fine recollections.

MOSS:                There's some indication that towards the end of the Kennedy period and certainly going into the Johnson that this kind of euphoric friendship was . beginning to fade. One ambassador characterized it as the bloom beginning to go off the rose. And I understand that Johnson [Lyndon B. Johnson], for instance, did not personally correspond with Sekou Touré in the way that John Kennedy had, that he passed it off on to you or to Harriman or somebody like this. Is this a fair characterization and, if so, how did this come about and why?

WILLIAMS:        Well, I am not familiar, of course, with all of the personal correspondence that passed between these people so that I don't know. Well, Kennedy had a very special significance to these people. In the White House, for example, this very tough Algerian rebel said that election night in 1960 they were out in the desert under the stars listening to their transistor radios praying that Kennedy would be elected because they figured that a Kennedy election would help bring independence to them. As the reactions to his funeral indicated, they all considered that somehow or other he was their friend, that he was an expression and manifestation of their independence. So it wouldn't have made too much difference whether it was Johnson or who it was, anybody that followed Kennedy would have a very difficult role to play. And as a matter of fact, I had to make the rounds of the African capitals and talk to all of the chiefs of state to try and reassure them that this wasn't, you know, a complete change, that we weren't off the track, that the thing would follow along. And you mention Sekou Touré. I remember meeting him at a reception that he had for me. When I told him I wanted to talk, he took me upstairs. And I said, "I just wanted to talk to you about the new President." And he said, "Well, I'm glad that you did because President Kennedy and you were the only people that I had real confidence in." Well, there wasn't exactly the same rapport, just because there couldn't be, and there was that difference of feeling, although Johnson wasn't bad. He followed our advice and worked with the African ambassadors. He eventually took all the ambassadors out on the Potomac, but the African ambassadors

[-67-]

went first, and things of that kind, but he didn't project as Kennedy had.

Well, I think that the realism of the situation wasn't either Kennedy or Johnson. It was the fact that the Africans had much higher hopes of expectations from us than we had any ability to deliver. On the other hand, they, you know, thought we were more powerful in changing the world than we could be, and on the other hand, just to get down to the thing that they understood, our aid programs didn't produce. I don't say they didn't produce, but there

wasn't as much as they thought -- well, there wasn't as much on the African Bureau as we thought they ought to have, and they thought they ought to have a lot more than we did. And I think that this level of attention in some measures set the stage. Probably our stance in the UN vis-a-vis South Africa had some impact too.

Well, there was a general euphoria in which they were quite unrealistic about their own possibilities and about other people's possibilities to help them. And as the cold reality began to penetrate, it affected us and inevitably would even if we'd done more than we were doing. So I think this as much as the change in.... And then, you know, the Korry plan and things of this kind, you know, all had their deteriorating and degrading impact.

MOSS:               What about the trouble you had with the press when Johnson more or less designated Harriman as the overseer for Africa? At least this was the play that got in the press and it caused you some embarrassment.

WILLIAMS:       Yeah. It was unfortunate, but it didn't change any realities -- for the time being, the appearance -- because first of all, Averell and I were good friends, we were working for the same thing, so it didn't make any difference. I wouldn't say it didn't make any difference, but it wasn't any substantial difference.

MOSS:               I'd like to go to an entirely different area and that's the experience of African diplomats in the United States. Now, this was quite an ongoing problem. And you particularly had the Route 40 problem and so on. Now, Pedro Sanjuan was working particularly on this, wasn't he?

WILLIAMS:       Yes. This I cover in part in my book, but probably not in the detail you want.

MOSS:               Now let me ask a.... The way that I have it...

[-68-]

WILLIAMS:       And also Angie Duke [Angier Biddle Duke], his boss.

MOSS:               Right. All right, now, as I see it, there were several categories of problems. One was housing, both in Washington and in New York. And it's my understanding that a member of your staff had trouble getting an apartment in Washington.

WILLIAMS:       Could be. I don't recall exactly.

MOSS:               Now, what sort of things were done? You had hearings in the State Department auditorium at one point on the housing question, didn't you, trying to get the local housing people to open up?

WILLIAMS: Well, a number of things were done, and I think that this has got to be viewed in chronological perspective because what the situation was in 1965 was quite different from 1961. I think that much of the battle had been won. In 1961 there was a problem to get an ambassador proper accommodations. In 1965 there might be a problem to get the fifth minister accommodations. In 1961 there's a problem of restaurants in Washington. This, I think, pretty largely had disappeared. Route 40, this, you know, continued on. It was through some of the note ante-bellum South, but they were ante-bellum southerners involved in gas stations and eating places, and this required quite an operation.

MOSS: Did you at any time talk to Millard Tawes, say, on this?

WILLIAMS: I don't think I talked to him. Whether I talked to any of the governors directly, I'm not sure. I may have. We talked to quite a lot of officials on it. And Angie talked to a number of people. The lead was sort of in his area because of his office of protocol, and we supported him. A lot of this was done on individual person-to-person basis in restaurants and apartments and so on. And in the State Department either Angie or Sanjuan or some of our people tried to help find people accommodations and meet problems of discrimination as it turned up. We also, of course, worked on the open housing, fair housing, ordinances and appeared before the local government and worked in those ways as well as on specific cases.

MOSS: All right. Now, another aspect of this was the question of embassy security and the question of diplomatic immunity of foreign personnel who were breaking the law here in the United States. I understand you had a number of cases, particularly a fellow from the Cameroun who was a rather bad actor.

[-69-]

WILLIAMS: Well, he had trouble; I can't recall how bad an actor he was, but his residence was broken into. There were a lot of thefts, I think, without regard to continent or race. And he finally built a hurricane fence around the whole place and was unhappy about it. Some of the residence or embassies or consulates were in fairly busy streets and there were all kinds of problems about parking. The trouble is that, and this is true not only of Africa but of Europeans and so on, they pay a lot more attention to the foreign diplomats, and of course, our Congress sometimes sides on the part of the local people rather than on the side of it being a capital. And as a consequence, zoning ordinances and things of that kind interfere. So we did have the usual series of problems that I think probably other people had, which, you know, didn't necessarily have anything to do with color. When I was governor we had a lot of problems with one of the Germans here. He didn't seem to think that American traffic laws needed to be observed. So there was an ongoing problem, part of it race, part of it....



Well, oh, I started saying, you know, in Africa they would have some of their military around most of our government buildings and the Africans didn't understand why they didn't have the same treatment here. And of course, parking wasn't generally such a problem there. And then, of course, another thing that happened, our American ambassador's problem was not to keep relationships with the minister of foreign affairs because he was dealing with the chief of state all the time, practically on a daily basis. Well, the poor African ambassador here didn't get to see the President weekly or monthly or yearly, as far as that was concerned. And so it was hard to make this transposition in the differences.

MOSS: Was there any question as to how to handle the situation of African diplomats getting a fair shake, whether it should be done quietly or whether it should be blown up for the publicity value in the whole civil rights issue or anything of this sort?

WILLIAMS: No, we by and large tried to handle it quietly, although it inevitably was blown up.

MOSS: But there was no conscious attempt, say on the Route 40 diner business, the Bonnie Brae Diner I guess it was, and no conscious attempt to exploit this for the general civil rights?

WILLIAMS: No.

MOSS: How about the role of the Justice Department and Robert Kennedy and this? Was there a significant one?

[-70-]

WILLIAMS: There may have been, but I don't recall it.

MOSS: One or two miscellaneous things that I have left down here really. They're not terribly important. But I ran into a mention of a leader grant program in which Africans were brought over here for, what, leadership training, I guess. How successful was this, and what did it consist of?

WILLIAMS: Well, this wasn't an exclusively African program. This is a general program that is used world-wide. I think it is quite successful. It was useful in any number of ways. It was used to bring high government officials over, and that gave them an understanding of the United States. And obviously it gave them some -- ninety-nine cases out of a hundred -- affection for us because, after all, they'd been to the United States, and so when they talked to their fellows they assumed some degree of protection of us and our things. Actually, I think this kind of a program could be credited with turning some really pro-Communist people toward the free world. It was used also to bring younger, coming officials, labor union people and people of that category, all of

them. This is, I think... I mean I was interested in this in the Philippines too because it's an important adjunct of mutual understanding.

MOSS: Okay. Several companies that I've run across -- you mentioned one earlier, the American Metal Climax people and Taylor Ostrander, is it?

WILLIAMS: Yes.

MOSS: Here's an outfit that has substantial holdings in Rhodesia and in South West Africa, isn't it, I believe? Or South Africa?

WILLIAMS: Yeah. I think probably in both. Their holdings are mostly in Zambia which, of course, is Northern Rhodesia.

MOSS: Now, how does a company like this fit into the political picture? Now, here's a man who's one of your citizen advisers, as it were, and yet he's representing a company that has an interest in the status quo in a way in the country in which it exists.

WILLIAMS: Well, yes and no. The previous owners, or at least principal stockholders and directors of American Metal Climax, were very liberal. And they had been helpful to Kaunda [Kenneth D. Kaunda] prior to independence. They were also liberal in the independence moves in the other areas where they were. They

[-71-]

were more liberal than Taylor Ostrander and more liberal than what Win Armstrong turned out and certainly much more liberal than the new group. But the two brothers -- [H.K. and W. Hochschild.] No. Well, anyhow, they were useful citizens for progressive American policy in Africa. The Fria [Olin Fria] operation of Olin Mathieson [Chemical Corporation], I think this was a progressive operation too. I visited the Fria operation. The African management was generally happy. They had some sort of a union that was working along. They had a fairly enlightened program of housing and normal fringe benefits. They bargained toughly but reasonably about the percentage of royalties and so on. Of course, it was to their interest to support Sekou Touré vis-a-vis the American government, but in any event they did. And I thought, at least while I was there, they played a fairly progressive role.

Now, in South Africa I don't have as much knowledge, but I don't have anything very glowing or warm to say about our industrial operation there.

[BEGIN SIDE II, TAPE II]

MOSS: Okay, we were talking about companies, and you were mentioning South Africa.

WILLIAMS: Well, I was saying, in South Africa I've opposed the policy of our bank consortium. I think that if they hadn't entered into this consortium at the particular time that they did, when South Africa was badly in need of credit, that some progress might have been effectuated. I think their continuation now is contrary to our best interests. I think that much of the industry has been, oh, too much of a follower -- when in Rome, do as the Romans. They've been cowed by the apartheid government. And in a way I'm sympathetic although I don't agree with them. I think it was Ford Motor Company tried to stay with our policy about arms. They were turning out some sort of a vehicle that was convertible into a weapons carrier or something, although it wasn't itself. And they refused to build them. Well, the South African government wasn't very kindly or wasn't kid gloves in its treatment of them; they really brought them to heel. So that it's rough. But I think that we've got to be better citizens than we are.

MOSS: What about the activities of Phillips Petroleum [Company] in the Nigeria-Cameroun-Chad area?

WILLIAMS: I'm not too acquainted with them.

MOSS: What about Harvey Aluminum [Inc.] in the....

[-72-]

WILLIAMS: Well, that's a very curious situation. Let's see, that's in Guinea. Harvey Aluminum is an intruder in a sense because there was an aluminum coalition that was in there prior to independence. They had certain rights from the French; they'd made certain investments. AND when there was the independence break where all things French or French-authorized were viewed with suspicion, as a consequence this whole aluminum thing was suspect. Well, the large American aluminum companies were in this combine and so Sekou Touré didn't want to deal with them. And he dealt with the smaller but very aggressive Harvey Aluminum company.

MOSS: Which is a.... The people in Harvey Aluminum are also Democratic Party contributors in California, I believe.

WILLIAMS: Yes. Carmen Warshaw was the national committeewoman out there whom I've known. I happen to know the Harvey Aluminum operation because they also, while I was governor and since, have made efforts to take over old industries here in Michigan. They're a very hard-hitting aggressive group.

Well, in any event, what happened was that the old companies bore the taint of relationship to France, and I think that some of the Africans tend to think that dealing with a smaller company gives them an opportunity to deal more at arm's length than dealing with a large international outfit. Well, in any event, there were all kinds of problems because, one, unless they had special financing, the Harvey people didn't have the facilities to do the job. The question was whether the Harvey people could take over some of the facilities that were

on site but which had been built by the predecessor coalition to which they claim some ownership but which a new regime or independence rather than colonialism had changed. There were an infinite variety of situations. And then I think there was a certain amount of internal politics because Harvey Aluminum, I think, took some of the officials of the host country into their operation one way and another. So it was full of complications. And it's, oh, without being currently familiar with it, it's hard to pass any kind of a judgment.

MOSS:            Shall I break it here?

WILLIAMS:      Yes. [Interruption]

MOSS:            One of the things you said you wanted to talk about while we were eating lunch was the impact of the Kennedy civil rights program on Africans and what this did for Afro-American relations.

[-73-]

WILLIAMS:      Yes, this is a very important subject because it got tied up in the sort of cold war. I know cold war is a bad term, but it wasn't quite so discredited in the Kennedy days, so if we think of it in that context. The Communists tried to imply that we were a racist country, and whenever there was any adverse publicity, whether it was about what happened in Alabama or in Little Rock, it always reverberated around. So the fact that Kennedy had a progressive civil rights policy and inter-racial operations were tremendously important. The thing that interested me was that, at least to begin with, I think the Africans were as much if not more impressed by the personal relationships between Kennedy and black as they were by substantive changes in law. And in this connection Andrew Hatcher for some reason or other because he was in the White House and in daily contact with the President seemed to be a much more impressive figure than some of the Negroes such as Carl Rowan who had higher offices but weren't in such personal contact. But all of them made a difference.

MOSS:            Well, now on this subject of personnel, was there an attempt to bring more blacks into the State Department with -- what's his name -- Fox [Richard K. Fox, Jr.] playing a role in personnel?

WILLIAMS:      Yes, there.... Dean Rusk appointed me as head of an operation to try to induce Negro personnel at officer level to come in. And I can't remember whether we doubled or tripled the number. I think we actually tripled it although the records are available. And Fox was helpful. But, well, we sort of led by example in the African bureau, which I supposed had some reason for it. But we did. I talked personally with all of the directors of the other bureaus to urge them to do likewise. I went on a few of the recruiting trips to the colleges. I went to the national meeting of the land grant colleges and things of that kind and spoke. The big problem was to convince the Negro college people that it was for real. For so long they heard of the State Department as for

whites only, and as a consequence it was difficult to get them to believe you. And of course, the most effective method we had was to send around some of our highly placed black personnel or some of the black ambassadors. We did make progress. I think the Labor Department had the best record, but we were fairly near the top -- I don't know -- about third place or something when we got through. So that despite our patrician and southern associations the State Department had a much better record than indicated.

MOSS: Now there's some disagreement in the record as to whether it was advantageous or detrimental to have a black ambassador to a black country.

[-74-]

WILLIAMS: Well, this is a very good question or statement. And I don't think you can generalize too much on it. The problem was originally, of course, that we sent black ambassadors only to Liberia and Liberia was considered as sort of an American satellite and not really independent in earlier days, although I think they're outgrowing that connotation. And generally the person who went there was either a political appointee or somebody that wasn't supposed to have a high reputation, that is a high professional reputation. As a consequence, I think, from that was projected a feeling that Africans would get the reaction that if we sent a black to Africa that we were sort of playing our own politics and second, sending them a second-rate person. And, you know, the Africans haven't always fraternized with the American Negro on an equal basis. I think there's been a mutual elevation of respect. So there was that feeling.

But, well, we had a number of, I think, quite successful operations. We sent Mercer Cook to Niger. Mercer was a little bigger than that job and he wasn't wholly satisfied, although he did an excellent job there. And after some of the administrative problems were settled, which he just happened to fall heir to, why, I think he was quite happy. But then he was moved to Senegal, and of course that was really great because Mercer Cook had gone to school in Paris with President Leopold Senghor and the mutual admiration as well as friendship between these two couldn't have been better. And of course, Senghor is sort of the high priest of negritude and this coincided with part of the American Negro ideology at least of a previous period. It was a happy connection.

I can't remember his name at the moment unfortunately, but we had a career diplomat, a Negro, who we sent to Dahomey. He or his wife wasn't altogether happy when they got there because she didn't think the embassy, that is the residence, was very commodious and comfortable. It wasn't particularly, but we'd had white ambassadors there before, people who did a good job as did this ambassador. And he himself, I think, was fairly happy there.

Well, I think the most significant step we took was when I urged and the idea was accepted to send Frank Williams to Ghana because Nkrumah was one who said he did not want a black ambassador. And it turned out that Frank was just what the doctor ordered because he is a strong, aggressive person, but yet was able to ingratiate himself with the African leadership, including Nkrumah, and gain their respect at of course a very critical time

when Nkrumah was nearing his end. And so I think we proved that the American black can go into even slightly unfriendly situations in Africa and can do the job.

[-75-]

Now, further down the line in the AID program we had many American Negroes who just did outstanding jobs and who gained the respect and friendship in a very special way. SO that I think overall the program was successful. Now, of course, we insisted that we should not have a policy of just sending black to Africa, but they should be elsewhere. And I do want to this for Dean Rusk, that he agreed with this wholeheartedly and he agreed with the bringing blacks into the State Department. He sort of was antagonistic to the sort of reverse racism where all the chauffeurs were Negroes; he said he thought we ought to have some white chauffeurs as well as black chauffeurs. So we were able to get some Negroes in the important posts like Carl Rowan, Pat Harris [Patricia R. Harris], Wharton [Clifton R. Wharton] and so on. So I think progress was made.

But coming back to your.... Oh, I just wanted to add one more thing. A Negro in Africa isn't necessarily a sure-fire success, I mean, and some American Negroes have gone there and have been disappointed and some have written books about it. But I found that in the Foreign Service it depended, like everything else, upon the individual. One brilliant officer in one of our posts -- had a high office -- performed his job well, but had no rapport at all with the host country people. And I think this would have been true whether he was in a white country or a black country. He just happened to be an aesthete and he preferred to listen to his phonograph, hear his stereo, than to be with people. And the Africans are friendly, outgoing people and so he just didn't get along. But that had nothing to do with color. It just happened to be his personality.

Well, one other situation. Some of the non-governmental American Negroes who were over there, they said that in some parts of Africa the indigenous Africans called them white because white happened to be the word that they use for all foreigners. And so the fact that these people were from overseas was more important than their color and just through the fact that the word for foreigner happened to be white, they got it that way. And in the Peace Corps there were lots of Negro Americans who did outstanding jobs. So I know there were cases where there was eventual disappointment or disappointment on one side. But I think by and large it is good and as the United States gives the Negro a better position in life, I think they will be exceedingly good. I think the only trouble now when the Negro goes to Africa is that he may not be thought to be of the top power structure. When he achieves that or those who do, they probably are more successful than a white, although there's.... Africa's a strange country when it comes to toleration because in some of the African countries that are largely Moslem they have Christian chiefs of state. And in some of the countries the black presidents have white wives. So there are kinds of

[-76-]

acceptances and non-acceptances that are not general and may be difficult to explain.

MOSS: Anything more on the impact of what we were doing over here...

WILLIAMS: Oh, yes.

MOSS: ... in the way of civil rights, getting back onto the original subject.

WILLIAMS: Yeah, the original question. Well, when I went into the somewhat more radical countries like Ghana, I could just about tell what was going on in civil rights in the United States because if we had a Meredith [James H. Meredith] case where they turned the army out to have one black go to school, why this was pretty impressive to the Africans and even those who would otherwise chivy us a little, they were pretty silent. But when Bull Connor [Eugene Connor] was going or the firehouses were going, then I was in for a tough time. And I think you could make a barometric chart of how civil rights were going through the relationship you had with many Africans. At the very end, of course, when we had our cataclysmic problems and President Kennedy made his outstanding address to the nation on television on civil rights, because of their respect for Kennedy and for their supposition that in America, as there, the President with the aid of the party was all powerful, they felt that, you know, everything had been taken care of in the United States and this gave us credibility in the civil rights field such as we'd never had before.

MOSS: In a somewhat lighter, perhaps more sentimental vein, what was the Congo club? Who constituted the Congo club? How did it originate?

WILLIAMS: Well, the Congo club turned out to be a group of Foreign Service officers to whom I gave a little gold watch pendant, a map of Africa with a raised Congo on it and on the back the symbols of the central government and the copper cross of Katanga. I think this is rather interesting as to at least what I conceived our relationship because the Congo club included not only people like Ambassador Guillion and other people who were in the Congo, people in the African bureau, people in African affairs in other departments, but people in the European division. I think I gave one to Doug MacArthur [Douglas MacArthur, II], who was in Brussels, and Dean Rusk and so on.

MOSS: How about the U.N. people?

[-77-]

WILLIAMS: Yes, I think some of them had it.

MOSS: Now, in his book, *To Katanga and Back*, Conor Cruise O'Brien makes mention of a Congo club. Is this a different outfit or a different group of people?

WILLIAMS: It's so long since I read Conor Cruise O'Brien's book that I don't know the

reference.

MOSS: My impression is that that's a U.N. group.

WILLIAMS: But I suspect it's entirely different, yes. Entirely different.

MOSS: Well, let's see. I only had one or two little things left over. Now, I wanted to ask about the business of what you might call CIA-phobia in Africa, particularly as it related to labor union work in, say, East Africa and Kenya and so on. Do you recall anything of this sort, the fact that if the U.S. labor unions would go into East Africa to work with Kenyan labor people in organizing and training and this kind of thing, that it had to be very, very clean to keep CIA official stigma off it?

WILLIAMS: Well, I relate less to East Africa than to some other areas, but I'll try and tackle it from East Africa first, but as I relate it to CIA. The inference is probably true, but I think it was possible for politicians and others to lose some caste by being too American, whether it was CIA or not. For example, Tom Mboya was in eclipse for a certain period because he was too pro and too associated with the United States. I remember the first time I went over there, the embassy and I were particularly careful not to embarrass any of the Africans by enveloping them or showing too great signs of association. But Tom was sort of incorrigible in his own self-esteem and, well, when CIA people came to town, he went to the airport and, you know, met them. And when there were pictures being taken at the consulate -- this was, of course, before independence -- we tried to group them so that there wouldn't be any special preference, but Tom had no compunction about this at all, and occasionally it backfired on him. Now, this really doesn't speak to the CIA specifically, but I just don't relate to it very well.

The fellow that really played CIA for a fare-the-well was Nkrumah, and was always shouting about it and making trouble. And there were a couple of false accusations. I know one poor American happened to come into town on a plane where the guy next to him was afraid of the customs who came in and who slipped a gun into his seat or something. And the CIA had a great.... I mean the story about

[-78-]

the CIA really went all around. Well, and of course, the CIA had a big role to play in the Dongo, but I think that the Congolese had no particular compunctions about it. But obviously CIA in many if not most places was not an endearing term.

MOSS: Ever have any trouble with the ambassador not being able to take completely charge of the whole country team operation?

WILLIAMS: Well, there had been trouble about that before I got there, and at our first chief of missions conference Chet Bowles and I had in Lagos there were



complaints about this, particularly in some of the north African countries, as I remember it. And of course, there was discussion about the Kennedy letter and the fact that the director of the country team was the ambassador and that everybody reported to him. But I think the majority of the ambassadors had established a rapport with the CIA as such so that they felt that they were on top of the situation. And I think as time went on such problems as there had been were smoothed out because they did take over. Of course, the truth of the matter is that the CIA was able to get larger appropriations proportionately than the State Department, and they took over communications in some places. As a consequence, if they didn't take it over, we wouldn't have had the officers to go around, if we couldn't use the CIA. So that the State Department was disadvantaged in terms of priorities sometimes because naturally the guys took care of their boss before they took care of other people. But I don't really think there were too many problems. The policy, of course, was that anybody who was in the country was subject to the ambassador. In theory, the CIA out of Washington could come in and act apart from the ambassador and this was a source of theoretical contention. I don't know of any particular occasions where it operated, but this was a technical problem that might come up.

MOSS:           Okay. Well, I think we've come to the end of my preparation for this. If there's anything more that you think ought to go onto the tape at this time.

WILLIAMS:       Well, I think that you may want to put on the tape the fact that I have a rather extensive file -- rather it's over on your side at the moment -- which presently is in a large, red manila folder with Anne Frederick's name on it which is relating to the death of Kennedy and its impact in Africa. Some of these things you may have copies of where I have the original or otherwise, but at some later occasion somebody may want to look for that in the University of Michigan historical collections if copies don't get out.

[-79-]

MOSS:           Good.

WILLIAMS:       I think I might tell you one story for the record which relates more to Secretary Rusk than it does to Kennedy, but since Rusk's position and his character relate directly to the Kennedy choice, I think it's important. One of the things that we kept trying to do in our African policy development was to strengthen our embassies and our representation in those countries which were directly in contact with the bastion of southern white supremacy or in the tiers further back, so that we could help those countries be stronger in their political and economic independence, so that they would be in a position to deal with this white supremacy force. And one of the things that we did was to set up a vice consulate system in the so-called British crown colonies, as they then were, or protectorates: Basutoland, Bechaunaland and Swaziland. When we started out, we had one young officer and actually his wife for his secretary to cover all three of them. But then we wanted to symbolize and emphasize this by a similar setup in our organization in the

bureau in Washington, and we put in a very competent young Negro, Ulrich Haynes. And he is the man I spoke of previously about being stolen from me to go into the White House. Well, if he was to be competent in the area, he had to go visit it. And the only way you can get into these enclaves is to either fly over South Africa or to go through South Africa. Well, when I visited these areas, I had a military plane and I could over fly South Africa, and so I was able to get around the problem that they didn't want to give me a visa. But we either couldn't or didn't want to do that with Haynes because normally you wouldn't send a man of that rank in a military plane. So we applied for a visa, and the South Africans didn't come up with a visa. And finally the secretary called the South African ambassador whether it was true that Rick Haynes was being denied a visa to pass through South Africa to go to these enclaves because he was black because he said, "There isn't any other reason that we can discover." And he said, "This is a matter of high importance to the State Department whether you're meaning to tell us that this person isn't competent on the one hand or that because he's black and you're not going to let him in." And the South African ambassador was very embarrassed, and so he said he would check with his country. So when he came back again he said, "Well, we will offer him a visa, but under certain conditions that he can come in but he'll have to fly out in a military plane," or something of that kind, I forget exactly. Well, Dean Rusk made short work of this. He said, "This is absolutely unacceptable to us. This is insulting to the department in the way you're treating one of our officers." And he said, "We want this fellow to go in, and we're very much displeased." Well, he called me back or held me back when

[-80-]

the ambassador left and had the ambassador wait outside. And he said, "Did I really give it to him tough enough?" He said because if he didn't, "I want you to take him downstairs and finish the job." And I think this is, you know, a picture of Rusk which, of course, antedates his daughter's interracial marriage, that puts this Georgia gentleman in a slightly different light from what some people would see him. Now Rusk may have considered this, you know, an insult to a Foreign Service officer rather than an interracial thing, but in any event, he was just as tough with this South African ambassador as I imagine he's ever been with any kind of ambassador. And this position was made clear beyond peradventure. And I was quite proud of him and quite pleased. Well, to end this story, Rick Haynes went to these countries through Johannesburg, and he laughingly said he had the best treatment in customs that any citizens visiting South Africa ever had.

MOSS: That's a good story. Have you anything else at this point?

WILLIAMS: No, I think that covers just about everything I had in mind except inconsequential anecdotes that might or might not come to mind.

MOSS: All right. Thank you very much indeed, Governor Williams.

[END OF INTERVIEW]

