

Edith Green Oral History Interview – RFK#1, 02/27/1974
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Green, United States Representative, Oregon, 1955 – 1975, discusses Robert F. Kennedy's 1968 Presidential campaign in Oregon, Green's role, campaign staff, strategies, finances, advertising, and media, among other issues.

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Edith Green – RFK#1

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Oral History Interview

with

EDITH GREEN

February 27, 1974
Washington, D.C.

By Roberta W. Greene

For the Robert F. Kennedy Oral History
Program of the Kennedy Library

GREENE: Why don't we begin by you telling me when you first talked to Robert Kennedy [Robert F. Kennedy] about the possibility of running in '68 and perhaps describe what each of your positions was at that point.

GREEN: I really have forgotten the month. It was after the New Hampshire primary because he didn't get into it at that time. I remember Ted Kennedy [Edward M. Kennedy] came over to my office to ask me if I would chair Bob Kennedy's campaign in Oregon. Bob first approached me and I was very busy—really intending to stay out of the 1968 primary. In 1965 I had come out against Vietnam and was not an LBJ [Lyndon B. Johnson] supporter.

GREENE: Well, the New Hampshire primary was March 12, so.

GREEN: I've forgotten when Bob announced.

GREENE: The sixteenth...

GREEN: of March.

GREENE: ... of March.

GREEN: It was shortly before he announced.

GREENE: Okay. But the first contact was when

GREEN: Bob?

GREENE: ... Bob, rather than Ted Kennedy?

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GREEN: Well, we talked about it several times. There were problems in Oregon on which we had to reach some agreement.

GREENE: What do you mean?

GREEN: The Terry Shrunck [Terry D. Shrunck] affair—those problems. Well, there were a couple of people who, I thought, lost John Kennedy [John F. Kennedy] votes whenever they came into the state. One of the agreements that Bob and I reached was that Jerry Bruno [Gerald T. Bruno] and Dave Hackett [David L. Hackett] would not come into the state of Oregon at any time during the campaign.

GREENE: I know Bruno stems from the '66 incident.

GREEN: From '60—the John Kennedy campaign in Oregon. He had very few, if any friends in Oregon.

GREENE: Oh, from '60? Dave Hackett was from '60?

GREEN: Dave Hackett, as a result of his administration of that juvenile delinquency law [President's Commission on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime, 1961]. I thought he used it as a political vehicle. I thought he had no competence to administer that program at all, and I didn't like the political gimmickry in which he engaged.

GREENE: What was the senator's reaction?

GREEN: He agreed to it. One time, I remember, later, we were on the plane together. We were up in the small compartment, I don't know whether he was kidding me or I was kidding him, but I remember it came up. I said, "What do you do when you fly over Oregon—hide both Jerry Bruno and Dave Hackett in the john?"

GREENE: Were those the only two people that you felt that strongly about?

GREEN: Yes.

GREENE: And did you mention to anybody that you would like to have come in?

GREEN: It was not from my standpoint. As I saw it, it was politically in Bob Kennedy's best interests. If we were going to win the primary I thought it was essential that they not come in to the state because I felt they lost votes for Kennedy—not for me. I thought they were very abrasive in terms of Oregon voters. In fact, I know some people I could not even get to work in the primary because of Jerry Bruno's abrasive way in the previous campaign—in 1960.

GREENE: Are they people that we should talk about, or just...

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GREEN: No, I don't see any particular point.

GREENE: Would you say that at this point Robert Kennedy had more or less made up his mind and he was actually in the planning stages, or he was still undecided?

GREEN: When he came to me he had made up his mind. And when Ted Kennedy came to me it was definite that Bob was going to be in it. But the time till the Oregon May primary was very short.

GREENE: And once these stipulations were made and agreed to, did you say right off that you would...

GREEN: No.

GREENE: No. Well how did that come about?

GREEN: Well, I said to Bob. let me think about it. I really was not enthusiastic. I liked John much better than Bob. I talked to Oregon people, because in any campaign I think you have to...You can't do it alone. You have to know what the attitude is of a lot of people with whom you're working.

We had one major problem with Bob in Oregon, his work on the McClellan [John L. McClellan] Committee [Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field]. And Mayor Terry Schruck is a very popular political figure in the state and was at that time. There was a great deal of reaction against Bob because they felt that he had unjustly singled out Terry Schruck, and most of the people felt that Terry Schruck was innocent of the allegations that were made.

The second thing; was an unfortunate slip made by Bob. He was asked to testify at a trial in Portland in regard to this whole business of corruption, and as he left the witness stand, he went over and shook hands with the judge. You know, a very minor thing, and yet it created quite a lot of adverse criticism.

GREENE: Was he understanding of this problem? Did he acknowledge it or...?

GREEN: Yes, he knew the problem because when we first talked about his running in the Oregon primary I said, you have, you know, major problems out there in terms of the whole Terry Schruck affair.

GREENE: And he wasn't defensive about it?

GREEN: No. No, he accepted it as a, fact of political life.

GREENE: It's interesting. In the book--you probably haven't had a chance to read it—but vanden Heuvel [William J. vanden Heuvel] and

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Gwartzman [Milton Gwartzman] did a book [*On His Own, Robert F. Kennedy. 1964-1968*, New York, Doubleday, 1970] on Robert Kennedy last year. In the chapter on Oregon they talk about you, and they say that Robert Kennedy asked you on March 16, which is the day he announced, and that you immediately agreed to come in, and that certainly doesn't seem to fit with what you're saying.

GREEN: No, and when I think about it now, Barrett Prettyman [E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr.] was in on that campaign, and I remember talking with him at some length out in Portland because he was up in my apartment. I still had not made up my mind.

GREENE: Okay. And he didn't even come out until the nineteenth, I think.

GREEN: Bob had talked to me, as I recall, before he announced, and Ted had too. But I remember talks with Barrett Prettyman in Oregon, and I had not made a commitment even at that time, as far as taking the chairmanship was concerned.

GREENE: Well that's interesting because that fits with all the local clippings that I've read which differed with vanden Heuvel. Well, at what point and why did you finally decide to go in? Wasn't there a poll involved, for one thing? You waited to see the results of...

GREEN: No, we had a poll, but it was some time after I took over the chairmanship. Ted's request was probably the decision factor. In the John Kennedy campaign my association with Bob and Ted, Ted especially in Oregon. I remember in the John Kennedy campaign one of the painful assignments that Hy Raskin [Hyman E. Raskin] and I had, they had their headquarters for the John Kennedy campaign down in the Esso building on Constitution Avenue [Washington, D.C.], a painful assignment in 1959 or '60 Hy and I had was to go over there and talk with Bob Kennedy and ask him not to come into Oregon at all in the John Kennedy campaign because of the antagonism to him over the Terry

Schrunk affair. He never came into the state. Ted campaigned in the state a great deal in 1959 and '60. I had not given Bob an answer in '68 and Ted came to my office.

GREENE: Would you say he was more welcome in '68 too, he would have been?

GREEN: Ted?

GREENE: Ted Kennedy, yes.

GREEN: That's debatable, I suppose. But in 1960, in John Kennedy's campaign—and this simply points up the problem that Bob had with the people who had been offended because of the Terry Schrunk incident—we said, you know, we love you but we're, I presume, all interested in the same thing and that's getting as many votes as we can for your brother, and it's our judgment that if you come into the state it will make the problem more difficult and lose us votes. So, you know, twice I was faced with that

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problem. One time telling the future president's brother not to come into the state, and the next time telling Bob Kennedy that if a couple other people came in I thought they would lose votes. But it simply points up political problems I suppose everyone has.

GREENE: It seems like you must have had some pressures from both sides on you, too, because some of your closest associates were working for McCarthy [Eugene J. McCarthy] or Johnson [Lyndon B. Johnson].

GREEN: That's right.

GREENE: Howard Morgan, of course, I guess is the most outstanding. How important was that?

GREEN: Well, Howard Morgan, by that time was not the closest friend. He had not worked for John Kennedy. However, I had a great deal of respect for Howard Morgan's intelligence and I had recommended him for a position on the FPC [Federal Power Commission] to which he was appointed. After he had served on that he was not going to be reappointed. There were problems within the FPC, and I thought the way he left that, with a blast at the president and a blast at the FPC, was uncalled for. It caused me a great deal of personal and political embarrassment. When he did that I think our friendship wasn't fractured, but it certainly cooled.

GREENE: So that wasn't the big problem?

GREEN: No, Howard Morgan was not. There were other much closer friends of mine who refused to go in on the Bob Kennedy campaign. As a matter of fact, three or four of

my very closest friends, politically and personally, we simply never saw each other during the whole campaign. We agreed that we disagreed and would not see each other till the election was over. These were people who had worked night and day for John Kennedy in '59 and '60.

GREENE: Other than the specific people that you thought should be kept out, what other stipulations were there in terms of authority and the way this thing would be organized? In that, was there anything along those lines that you talked about with them?

GREEN: No, I tried to, you know, outline the problems in the state, and I, of course, was in the Congress. It was understood that I could not personally spend a great deal of time on it, but I would take over the chairmanship in name and do whatever I could in terms of persuading others to become actively involved, and would be involved as much as I could. But there was no chance of my doing the day-to-day work on it, and, therefore, they would have to get other people.

We went up to New York at some point and looked at films, in terms of ones that would be best for Oregon. It was at that time that Bob and I talked.

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He mentioned Bill vanden Heuvel to come out, to work on it full time; I did not know him. In fact, I guess I had not met him before. I said to ask whomever he had the greatest confidence in and felt he could depend on...

GREENE: At what point did vanden Heuvel come out, do you remember? Was it after Robert Kennedy's first visit? I tried to find that today and I just couldn't really pin it down.

GREEN: You mean, was it after Bob's first visit to the state?

GREENE: Yes.

GREEN: Oh, I'm sure it was.

GREENE: It was.

GREEN: I had hoped that they would send somebody, you know, pretty fast, but they were involved. Because his own decision was made so late and they had the Indiana primary and others. Lots of decisions were not made as rapidly as they should have been made. There wasn't anywhere near the planning of the John Kennedy campaign because I got in the John Kennedy campaign in, oh, I think I made a commitment to him in July of '59, and then took it over later publicly at some future date.

GREENE: Right.

GREEN: So, it was chaos in the Bob Kennedy campaign because they had so much to do in such a very short period of time.

GREENE: When Barrett Prettyman was out there, I get the impression that he was just about the only one in those very early days, is that right?

GREEN: Barrett Prettyman, and there was another fellow with him.

GREENE: From Washington?

GREEN: From New York—the Mobil oil man.

GREENE: Not Chuck Paulson [Charles Paulson] was it? No.

GREEN: No, Chuck Paulson came into the campaign very soon after Bob announced. He was my choice in terms of the Oregon person to run the campaign on a day-to-day basis. A very competent person.

GREENE: Does Feeney [Richard Feeney]...

GREEN: Dick Feeney took a leave of absence from my office. He was on my staff and took a leave of absence. He said, "Could I spend my vacation on it?" But there was somebody with Barrett Prettyman

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from either New York or Washington.

GREENE: It wasn't Herb Schmertz [Herbert Schmertz], 'cause he...

GREEN: Yes, Herb Schmertz. He and Barrett Prettyman were trying to persuade me to be chairman and organize an Oregon Committee.

GREENE: Okay, I didn't realize he came in that early. I thought he'd come out later on.

GREEN: ...I liked both of them.

GREENE: Was Prettyman effective, do you think?

GREEN: Yes, I think he and Schmertz were effective. Both of them were received well in Oregon.

GREENE: Go ahead. [Interruption] What did you do in those initial days with Prettyman? I imagine you must have been seeing contributors and leaders and that kind of thing. What do you remember about your feel for the whole thing at that point?

GREEN: I had not yet promised to be the chairman for Oregon. I remember one meeting where I invited my closest personal and political friends, and we had probably one of the sharpest arguments we've ever had, the ones who just absolutely would not come in to support Bobby.

GREENE: Was it the same thing, the Terry Schruck...Hoffa [James R. Hoffa] business and....

GREEN: Partly. Some just did not like or trust Bob. I think, perhaps, there was some feeling of going in on the name of Kennedy. Some had not liked some of his actions as attorney general. They felt he was ruthless.

GREENE: Was some of it a sympathy for McCarthy, or wasn't it necessarily people supporting him?

GREEN: I think that in regard to the people who were supporting McCarthy, in fact several of them had said, if Bob Kennedy had made up his mind earlier they would have been very glad to work for him, and they felt that McCarthy had more courage because he had taken LBJ on early, and they had made their commitment. And McCarthy, there isn't any question, he had come in and organized the state by the time Bob Kennedy first thought about it.

GREENE: Yes. In fact, I was wondering, because he seems to have gotten such a head start, and yet in reading the clippings all the initial feeling was that Kennedy would probably win, and certainly after Johnson dropped out the idea seemed to be...

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GREEN: Well, I think that Oregon, as I see it, is very difficult for many people to understand politically. It's quite different than New York or Massachusetts politics, and it's very different from California politics. I will always believe that one of the things that hurt Bob Kennedy the most was the big demonstrations in California that they saw every night on TV. [Interruption]

GREENE: You were talking about the meeting with your own supporters and then about McCarthy. What about some of the local leaders and political figures that you might have seen? I'm sure the names are more familiar to you than to me. Some of the office holders, Democrats. Do you remember?

GREEN: Well, there was great division by that time. There were those who were committed to McCarthy, those who were committed to Hubert Humphrey after LBJ announced he would not run for reelection, and those who had ties with the Kennedy campaign of 1960 and were in favor of Bob.

GREENE: When you were going around with Prettyman, though, would you approach those people who, let's say, were already leaning towards McCarthy, or did you just consider them committed? Did you go to some of them and see if...

GREEN: I only really recall one time when Prettyman and I went to a person together and that was to Mon Orloff [Monford A. Orloff] who is a very heavy Democratic contributor. By that time we did have a poll, and we tried to persuade him. He was already committed to McCarthy and would not support Bob Kennedy. I do not remember Prettyman and myself jointly going to others. It was usually, you know, on just a personal basis. Also, I was—had to be—in Washington most of the time for congressional business. I'm not sure of the time that I had this group of close, personal, political friends in, whether Prettyman was in that group or not. It seems to me that he was, but I'm not sure.

GREENE: Did you, go to see Bob Duncan [Robert B. Duncan]? It seems like somebody must have approached him at some point, because pretty quickly the troika was formed with you and his two people—Leiken [Sidney Leiken] (is that the way it's pronounced?)...

GREEN: Sid Leiken.

GREENE: . . . Leiken and Jack Beatty [John C. Beatty, Jr.]

GREEN: Jack Beatty.

GREENE: Beatty, yes. I would assume...

GREEN: Jack Beatty was my friend. There's no connection there with Bob Duncan.

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GREENE: Oh, the information I had was that he was Duncan's southern coordinator. That's not right?

GREEN: No. Sid Leiken is also a lumberman who was a very strong John Kennedy supporter. This had nothing to do with Bob Duncan. Jack Beatty was my own personal attorney and long-time friend and also a good lawyer, so the three of us acting as cochairmen had nothing to do with Bob Duncan.

GREENE: Okay, I had them listed as both being coordinators for Duncan. That's why I...

GREEN: No, I don't think Jack Beatty was ever involved in Duncan's campaign. Now Sid Leiken was because...

GREENE: He was the state coordinator.

GREEN: ...he was from that part of the state. Bob Duncan, you know, felt very strongly on Vietnam and had been an LBJ supporter, so he was not particularly sympathetic to Bob Kennedy.

GREENE: Did you see Leiken as somebody who was going to really be an active coordinator, or did you see him more as a figurehead?

GREEN: No, not as active as Jack Beatty and Chuck Paulson.

GREENE: No, because I saw complaints from people working for Kennedy that he just didn't have the time to put in...

GREEN: That's right, that's right. It was his position within the Democratic party and his influence. Jack Beatty was very active.

GREENE: Well, who else came in from Washington that you remember besides Schmertz and then eventually vanden Heuvel? I mean in the early period, before they started bringing in the troops. Is there anyone else that comes to mind? Did you put this group together, by the way, these three people? Of course, yourself and Leiken and Beatty, this was your own selection, and you didn't have to consult with Washington at all? Do you think that worked out fairly well?

GREEN: I think so. Again, I think probably Jack Beatty gave up more in terms of time and in terms of his law practice and everything else than either Leiken or myself, because I had to be here in the Congress and Sid had other things which required his time. So I think that in terms of the names and the people that they could draw in.

GREENE: What about some of the local people like James Redden [James A. Redden]?

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GREEN: Jim Redden refused. He was very much...No, wait a minute, Jim Redden returned in '72, trying to get my...Jim Redden in '72 was a McGovern [George S. McGovern] supporter.

GREENE: You know what? I am sorry but that's who I meant was Duncan's southern chairman. I'm sorry, I confused that with Beatty, right? But he was also helping Kennedy, isn't that right?

GREEN: Yes, it was in '72 that he was....

GREENE: Was he fairly active and helpful?

GREEN: Yes.

GREENE: And Ed Fadeley [Edward N. Fadeley] is another.

GREEN: Ed Fadeley...

GREENE: Fadeley.

GREEN: ...was a catastrophe. I mean he was desperately running for office himself and really used the occasion to....

GREENE: That was his major interest. Wasn't there a guy like that in the beginning, even before you came on, who was setting himself up as the Kennedy....Bob...

GREEN: Oh yes, there was some....Who was....

GREENE: Biggs [Robert F. Biggs], an interior decorator I think he was?

GREEN: Oh, who was that?

GREENE: Bob Biggs, Biggs or Briggs? Biggs. Does that ring a bell?

GREEN: Well, there was some guy, whose name I do not recall, who had set himself up and was pretending to everybody that he was a great friend of the Kennedys.

GREENE: And he was also running for office himself?

GREEN: As I recall, yes. This is always true in every campaign, though. You have to sort out the ones who...

GREENE: Self-appoint themselves?

GREEN: Sure, or use it as a vehicle for their own promotion.

GREENE: How did you get rid of this guy? Was he just eased out when other people came in?

GREEN: I don't recall that it.... When the announcement came out in the paper it was quite apparent that he....

GREENE: Got caught. Do you remember preparations for Robert Kennedy's first visit, which would have been the twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth of March? Did you help in scheduling events for him and that kind of thing, or make suggestions?

GREEN: I suppose so. My recollection of his first visit was out at the airport, and we tried to arrange a group out there to meet him. It was a very windy, storm day as I recall.

GREENE: Was it difficult at that point to get people interested?

GREEN: I think everything's a matter of relativity. I remember the first visits of John Kennedy to Oregon. There are even pictures of a very, very lonely arrival where there'd be myself and three or four other people. You know, no press, no TV, nobody because they didn't figure that he had a chance. So in those terms I would say it was probably easier in the early stages to get more people out for Bob Kennedy, and I think this was true probably throughout the primary. Although we did have polls, continuous polls; I think I still have them somewhere around. And I'm just absolutely convinced that the demonstrations over TV at night from California appearances, stirring up frenzy, pulling off cuff buttons and ties!....This just does not go over with Oregonians.

GREENE: Did they make an effort, do you think, to reduce that after a while?

GREEN: In Oregon? We did not do that at all in Oregon. But you can't stop a television at the state line. The ones especially in the Los Angeles area.... You see, by the time it got close to the Oregon primary he had to be spending time in California because that primary was a week after Oregon.

GREENE: Right, one week away.

GREEN: I remember that at night I'd watch the L.A. [Los Angeles] crowds where there was this frenzy sort of thing going on. It was just killing us up here.

GREENE: What about this first visit? Do you remember anything about the advancing of it, and the preparations, and if you had problems getting things organized at that point when you had only Barrett Prettyman and possibly Schmertz?

GREEN: I don't even remember whether I was in the state to.... I do not remember getting it organized. I remember being at the airport. I did not come out with Bob, whether I came out a few hours ahead or a day ahead, I just don't remember.

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GREENE: You don't remember setting up any political meetings for him?

GREEN: Over the two months from March to May we set up lots of political meetings.

GREENE: On that occasion? A long time.

GREEN: I just, I really don't remember. During the course of the months, I know that we were in touch. Chuck Paulson and Jack Beatty were there and we and others were in touch all the time. Chuck Paulson was the one running the campaign office.

GREENE: Did you find him cooperative, if you gave him a list of people that you felt really ought to be called, that he would get to it?

GREEN: Yes.

GREENE: There was no problem with that?

GREEN: No.

GREENE: Were you using Ted Kennedy that way, too?

GREEN: Ted Kennedy came in and I know he made some calls. My memory really... You know, I just have for some reason, rejected doing this for the Kennedy Library. I really have forgotten. After the second assassination I just wanted to put it all out of my mind. I didn't want to think about it. It was just too much. The first time that I agreed to do anything was last November when two Oregon papers asked me to write memories of John Kennedy in Oregon. It was the first time since 1960 that I had ever gone through my...

GREENE: Notes and things.

GREEN: ... notes or calendar, or anything. So there's—just a conscious rejection of thinking about John Kennedy's years or Bob Kennedy's campaign and assassination. I just didn't want to remember. The time of Bob Kennedy's campaign in Oregon is so much shorter than John's that even today there are more memories of John Kennedy's campaign than there are of Bob's. I really cannot remember how much Ted was in the state in 1968. I remember that the sisters and Rose Kennedy [Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy]... We tried to keep them out. I think their appearances reacted unfavorably. They just did not want them.

GREENE: The whole glamour show?

GREEN: Oregonians couldn't care less about sisters and in-laws. I think Rose Kennedy probably was a plus, but the others were not. You know, I can remember lots of things that Ted Kennedy did in John

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Kennedy's campaign, and I can only at this moment really remember one thing of Ted Kennedy's in terms of a person I wanted him to call.

GREENE: But your overall impression of Robert Kennedy was that, if you gave him a list of people that you felt...

GREEN: Oh yes.

GREENE: ... he ought to get to, he did it.

GREEN: Yuh, he was great.

GREENE: He was good about that.

GREEN: And Bob Kennedy, something that I had learned about him, and not until '68, was he was a very, very shy person, that he gives quite a different impression in public. I think it hit me the strongest on one plane trip when the two of us were talking about the various things (in the cabin of his plane), this shyness.

GREENE: Did you notice that particularly when he was with political people, that....

GREEN: No.

GREENE: No, it wasn't.... More of it, then, on one-to-one level? What about the difficulties on that occasion, if you remember them or others during the '68 campaign, of getting labor leaders even to meet with him?

GREEN: Roy Hill, who is the international representative of the painters' union [Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators, and Paperhangers of America], has been my chairman in Oregon in every campaign I've been in, a very close friend, a great guy. He was one who immediately went on the Bob Kennedy campaign and became active in it, and he probably got more of the labor people. The Teamsters [International Brotherhood of Teamsters], of course, were violently opposed, and there was the sympathetic opposition from other labor union people; but that was also, as you know, a problem we had in the John Kennedy campaign.

GREENE: Right.

GREEN: Again, I have more, you know, recollections of the John Kennedy labor people than I do of Bob Kennedy.

GREENE: Do you have any clear impression of impact from the March 31 speech when Johnson steps down? Does that seem like it made a big mark on the campaign and what you were doing?

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GREEN: The impact, of course.... It was very, very great. The chronological order there, I just really do not recall, you know, in terms of Bob Kennedy's first visit with me and....

GREENE: Well, his first visit into the state was the twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth and this speech is the thirty-first, so it's all in that very short span of time, ten days from when he announces. But did that seem to alter the picture in terms of where you could expect support and where your support might be going?

GREEN: No, it probably complicated it because Humphrey then became an active candidate, and there were lots of Oregonians who perhaps were disillusioned with Johnson but who could accept Humphrey. So there's no question it was a political bombshell on everyone's mind and on all of the political activities. But in terms of the campaign I'm sure that it did create more problems. Humphrey had many loyal supporters from previous years.

GREENE: Do you remember doing a lot of telephoning and that kind of thing around the state in the first couple days?

GREEN: All during the time we made lots of calls.

GREENE: Were you asking people to stay neutral, or actually trying to persuade them towards Kennedy?

GREEN: I was trying to persuade them to support Bob.

GREENE: Do you remember anybody that you were successful with or people who you thought might...?

GREEN: Yes, of course, many. One, Mary Kelly [Mrs. Edward Kelly] of Medford who has been extremely active in the party for a long time, a very close friend, a very strong John Kennedy supporter, and a Catholic who loves Ted Kennedy. For weeks I could not get a commitment from her that she would support Bob. Ted, yes. Bob, well, maybe.

GREENE: And the Johnson withdrawal didn't make any difference?

GREEN: No.

GREENE : No.

GREEN: It was that she was simply not sure of.... In fact, I never got a commitment from her until we had a meeting at the Medford airport; and she was one of the people I said to Bob because she was influential in the Truman Day Dinners? and a delightful, wonderful person, I said, "We do not have her on our side yet. I'm sure you'll talk to her." But he was great and any time that I singled out people who....

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GREENE: Were you finally successful in bringing her over?

GREEN: Yes. This happened quite a few times, and then there were others that we never did get.

GREENE: Who were some of the people that were real disappointments, that you kind of expected to bet and didn't?

GREEN: Well, three of my closest friends: Edna Scales, who has been a friend thirty years and very active in John Kennedy's campaign, in 1972, worked with me very closely on Scoop Jackson's [Henry M. Jackson] campaign; Elaine Burnham, again Edna and Elaine are both...

GREENE: She was the committeewoman, wasn't she?

GREEN: ...both of them had been state vice-chairmen of the Democratic party, but two of my closest friends; Ken Rinke [Kenneth Rinke], who I think is one of the smartest, most astute politicians that I have ever encountered anywhere in the country—all three of them, very close political friends and who absolutely would not under any circumstances support Bob.

GREENE: Were they all working for McCarthy?

GREEN: No, they weren't McCarthy supporters, but they would not support Bob and they were three—well we just agreed we would not see each other during the whole campaign. We're, again, very, very good friends but we even to this day, if it comes up, won't discuss it.

GREENE: That would be hard.

GREEN: And there were others, too, but the closest political and personal friends who just absolutely would not....

GREENE: Did you feel that Johnson's withdrawal made it more difficult in terms of the issues, especially for Robert Kennedy, because he came in on the war which he already was sharing with McCarthy and then Johnson kind of defused it? Did you feel that presented problems for him?

GREEN: Well; I think the problem was for the people who were vehemently against the war, that if Bob Kennedy had come out and announced first, they probably would have supported him. But they felt that McCarthy had the courage to come out at a difficult time, and they had made the commitment to him; so it was that factor that had more to do with the Oregon political situation, plus that he had made all these inroads in terms of Oregon. Then the second one I mentioned a moment ago, when Humphrey became an active candidate which he obviously could not do while LBJ was still in, that that compounded the problems. Humphrey is loved in Oregon.

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GREENE: Well, the next thing, unless you have something before that, would be the King [Martin Luther King Jr.] assassination on April 4. I'm sure it didn't have the impact there that it did in Indiana and some other places, but do you remember?

GREEN: Well, I think that it had a great impact, and the speech that Bob made which, as I recall, we had circulated rather widely, which I thought was one of his really best speeches. I think it had I'm sure not as great an impact as it did in other places, but it still had a very strong impact in Oregon.

GREENE: Did it do anything, do you think, to attract people to Robert Kennedy because he was the one who more than anyone else represented those problems, problems of the minorities and the cities? Could you get anywhere with that?

GREEN: I don't know whether.... I guess I've always kind of rejected dividing your campaign and trying to appeal to certain ethnic groups. I'd have to check back on the record. I'm under the impression that Bob Kennedy carried far more of the precincts that were predominantly black than McCarthy did. My recollection, too, is that the McCarthy people placed some one—I don't know who it was—but a real phony out in the black districts. We had meetings in the Albina area, which is the black area, but we had them all over the city. One of the pictures that I—I think I still have it somewhere, but really a great picture—we visited a preschool...

GREENE: Yeah, I know what you mean.

GREEN: ... that shows Kennedy reaching through the fence to this little black boy. I thought there was a genuineness that really came through.

GREENE: Do you remember a black fellow from Kennedy's New York office that went into the Albino area named Earl Graves [Earl G. Graves]? Does that ring a bell?

GREEN: That name's vaguely familiar so I must...But I was in Washington most of the time. We had one girl who was quite irrational at times that we had problems with.

GREENE: I guess every campaign has people like that. The next trip that he made out there was on the eighteenth and nineteenth of April. Is that any easier to remember?

GREEN: I don't remember the dates, really.

GREENE: These are the only two dates before he came into the state, you know, just before. He went through the Willamette Valley on the Beaver State.

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GREEN: The train?

GREENE: The train

GREEN: Willanette Valley, uh huh.

GREENE: Were you along on that trip?

GREEN: Yes.

GREENE: Was there anything

GREEN: Well, I thought that was a very successful trip—I did not go with him the full length of the train trip, because I remember Jack Beatty did and then Sid Leiken met them further down south. My recollection is that I went only to Salem and then had to return early, whether I had to get back to Washington or what. But I was very pleased with the reception which was given to him.

GREENE: Did you have a good feeling at this point about the way things were going when you....

GREEN: If this is the very early part of the campaign, yes, we felt he was doing well.

GREENE: Right.

GREEN: ... yes.

GREENE: Do you remember as appearance at Oregon State [Oregon State University] with a...

GREEN: Oh yes.

GREENE: Were you there at that?

GREEN: Yes.

GREENE: What were your reactions to that?

GREEN: Well, I remember when we drove up in front of the university they had.... What was it? Something about pennies. It was very anti-Bob Kennedy slogan.

GREENE: The signs, you mean?

GREEN: There were signs, and there was something that had to do with pennies. It was a hostile group. Then we went into the coliseum [Sill Coliseum]. I thought he gave an excellent speech, one of his best. I remember some hostile questions which were asked from some people

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up in the gallery. I can't even remember whet they were now, but he answered them superbly.

GREENE: One of the things he apparently got into a debate on was draft deferments. Do you remember that part where he asked....

GREEN: Right, and he came out very strongly on it which I thought won over the college crowd, even though it was, you know, not what they expected. But there was some other question from the audience that was a very hostile question and intended that way, and I thought he was forthright... [Interruption]

[TAPE II SIDE I]

GREEN: ... came away having won friends and supporters. But there was something.... It was a horrible experience, as we drove up in front...

GREENE: Were these kids largely for McCarthy?

GREEN: Yes.

GREENE: Did he seem to be very frustrated by that?

GREEN: No.

GREENE: No.

GREEN: He did not show it, if he was.

GREENE: It didn't seem to disturb him particularly?

GREEN: Well, I'm sure that it bothered him, as it did, you know, me and everybody else. But you obviously couldn't show any....

GREENE: No, I meant to you. Would he have expressed that?

GREEN: Yes, we talked about it.

GREENE: Do you remember anything about contacts with political people on this occasion...

GREEN: At Oregon State?

GREENE: ... well, or that day, that period—how the situation might have changed from the earlier visit? Does that spark any memories?

GREEN: No. I must say that I cannot remember the chronological order. It's kind of blurred together.

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GREENE: Okay. What about the trip to the logging areas? Did you go along on that? Or was that something you suggested?

GREEN: No. That was a part of the plan. Sid Leiken's in the timber business, and so that was under his wing.

GREENE: Do you know anything about how it went?

GREEN: I can't remember how it went. My recollection was that it was favorable. I don't have any adverse recollections.

GREENE: In the whole question of students, I understand there was a debate and disagreement about whether or not students could and should be brought in from other states to work for Kennedy, especially since so many of the Oregonian kids were tied up with McCarthy. What do you remember about that issue?

GREEN: In terms of the kids doing it, I know my preference was that we get Oregon ones, and I felt that we could, you know, get enough Oregon students. The McCarthy headquarters were not very far away from the Kennedy headquarters. My recollection was that after the Indiana primary there were quite a few that then just came on.

One of the unpleasant legacies of that campaign is the clearing up of the debts. There were a lot of kids that were given airline credit cards and, as I recall, telephone credit cards who ran up bills at hotels and motels. I know Jack Beatty, after the assassination and everything was over, spent months trying to negotiate those. They insisted on paying only so much of every dollar.

GREENE: Who was coordinating the students and should have been in charge of this? Do you know?

GREEN: I suppose, Bill vanden Heuvel. They had a fellow who was in charge of transportation. An ex-priest?

GREENE: I'm not sure.

GREEN: There was somebody who came in about the time that Bill vanden Heuvel did, who I know was in charge of transportation, getting cars.

GREENE: I'm not sure who that might have been. There was a fellow named John Reilly [John R. Reilly], I think, who was doing a lot of work with students. Does that name sound familiar?

GREEN: That name rings a bell, but I...

GREENE: Could that be who you're thinking of? Although I think he was from the state.

GREEN; He could, but I don't remember.

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GREENE: I think he was an attorney, as a matter of fact.

GREEN: The only other primary was not very long before the Oregon one. There was Nebraska, too, in there?

GREENE: Indiana was the seventh, Nebraska the fourteenth, and Oregon the twenty-eighth, and then South Dakota and Washington between. How did you feel generally about outsiders coming in, not only students but the whole entourage that automatically came with the Kennedys? Do you think that hurt him?

GREEN: Well, as I said, I think Rose Kennedy was an asset. There were lots of adverse comments about the teas that the sisters had, and there was some other person who was an ex-Oregonian who was arranging those teas. And there was an awful lot of feeling among the people that were on the strategy group that that was taking time, and money, and effort away from what really ought to be done. All states have their own way, idiosyncrasies, if you want to call it that, or political traditions, what-ever you want to call it, and I do not know of any other campaign that's ever been held by anybody where the family, you know, moved in by the dozens and had teas and, you know, receptions, etc., etc., etc.

GREENE: Didn't they do that in 1960 in Oregon?

GREEN: The sister from California was the only one.

GREENE: Lawford [Patricia Kennedy Lawford].

GREEN: Pat Lawford. We did not have these teas and receptions.

GREENE: So it was more that they saw it as useless and...

GREEN: Useless. Oregonians wanted to tales to the candidate—not his sisters and cousins.

GREENE: ... unconstructive, not necessarily offensive?

GREEN: Well, it took money and time and effort, and it was, we felt, counterproductive. And I think also to bring in, in terms of a few individuals, we had those certainly in John Kennedy's campaign. Hy Raskin, for instance. I think Hy Raskin....That does remind....

At this meeting in New York I was talking with Bob about somebody who could spend fulltime since I could not. He asked me who I would have, and I said, well, my first choice would be Hy Raskin because he knows the state and he has lots of political friends—for instance, Ken Rinke. And I even thought that if Hy came in that he might win Ken over. They speak the same language.

GREENE: Did he come in at all?

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GREEN: No, no. They did not have him in, and Bob suggested Bill vanden Heuvel as...

GREENE: What about Wes Barthelmas [A. Wesley Barthelmas, Jr.]? Was he discussed at all as somebody that could come in and help?

GREEN: I don't remember that Wes was ever discussed there. I'm very fond of Wes. Of course, Wes was on my staff. I don't ever recall that he was discussed as a person to come into the state.

GREENE: You know, there's always a lot of things in the black book and other sources...

GREEN: I don't think that was ever discussed at any time.

GREENE: I know that they consulted him for information on the state and that sort of thing, early on. Some people had said he was one they considered bringing in, but he was in Maryland.

GREEN: I do remember that Hy Raskin, now that I think about it, was my first choice, because he knew his way around the state. He knew all the leaders, and of course he...

GREENE: He never came in at all, even to speak? How much contact did you have with the Washington office? Did you act pretty independently of them, or was there someone back here that you would talk to with some regularity?

GREEN: Again, my recollection is that most of my talking was with Jack Beatty, Chuck Paulson, and either with Bob or Ted.

GREENE: What about in terms of money? Would you deal directly with them for that, too, or would you go to Helen Keyes [Helen M. Keyes], or Steve Smith [Stephen C. Smith]?

GREEN: Steve Smith handled the money. I left the money part of the campaign to Bill vanden Heuvel. In fact, one of the things I told Bob to begin with, that I was not a money raiser, and that they'd have to make those arrangements.

GREENE: I was thinking even in terms of distribution of money, or decisions on there it should go, and how much, and control. That kind of thing. Did you not know about that?

GREEN: I simply was not there for the real day-to-day....And my recollection is that Chuck Paulson and Bill vanden Heuvel...

GREENE: How did you feel vanden Heuvel did?

GREEN: I liked Bill vanden Heuvel, and I felt that—for a complete stranger to the state, and a New Yorker—he did very well. Again, in terms

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of comparison, Hy Raskin who had had over a year's experience... Well, he'd had more than that, because I first met Hy Raskin in Stevenson's [Adlai E. Stevenson] campaign; so Hy had been introduced to Oregon politics in the Adlai Stevenson campaign in 1952, so he had had all that knowledge and background, knowledge of the state, knowledge of individuals, contact with the press.

Then, in the John Kennedy campaign he was out there on a day-to-day basis, and was just really great. In my judgment, both at the time, as well as in retrospect, I think it would have served Bob Kennedy's interests far better if Hy had come.

GREENE: It would be interesting to find out if they actually asked him, and why he might have turned it down.

GREEN: He was not asked. He and Bob had not always agreed through the years.

GREENE: You've blocked it.

GREEN: ... no, at the time I think I did not want to know. I liked Hy and if there was some problem, I just didn't want to know about it. But I know that that was rejected immediately.

GREENE: But generally vanden Heuvel was acceptable to you and worked out reasonably well on the day-to-day operation?

GREEN: As much as I was there, it did.

GREENE: What about the media and advertising thing? I know what happened is that your man, Harry Turtledove [Harry Leonard Turtledove], ended up taking over the advertising and media. How did that happen, and why?

GREEN: Harry Turtledove and Earl Heims handled John Kennedy's. It seems to me that Harry Turtledove was in on the preview of those films that were made by...

GREENE: Guggenheim [Charles E. Guggenheim].

GREEN: Right. When we saw them in New York, we felt some of them were not good for Oregon politics. They might well have been good for New York or Indiana or California, but they just, were not the best for Oregon.

GREENE: And he worked with Papert [Fred Papert], with the agency? [Papert, Koenig and Lois,]

GREEN: Right.

GREENE: Do you know how that worked out?

GREEN: No, I really don't.

GREENE: It wasn't, then, a question of not really wanting anyone from New York to come in to do that?

GREEN: Oh, no, no. It was a question of the content and the reaction that we felt that would occur. That it would be better if we could have films that had an Oregon locale, had Oregon people in it. Heims and Turtledove were first rate in 1959-60.

GREENE: How did you feel about the final product? Do you remember the...

GREEN: I don't remember. It seems to me that they finally used part of Guggenheim, and then dubbed some of the Oregon in, but I...

GREENE: Probably. There probably wasn't time for very much other than than. What about the use of radio versus television? You know, McCarthy used so much radio, probably for economic reasons, and very little TV, and Kennedy just the opposite. Do you have a feeling about that, or don't you remember any discussions about any....

GREEN: I don't remember even any discussions.

GREENE: The other thing, of course, was that McCarthy got as much free time as he could on television, and Kennedy wasn't doing that. Do you remember any advice along those lines?

GREEN: No.

GREENE: What was the impact of the Indiana primary, and later, the next week, Nebraska, on the Oregon situation? It was supposed to start the momentum but....

GREEN: When was the Indiana primary?

GREENE: The seventh of May.

GREEN: The seventh of May? And then...

GREENE: Nebraska was the fourteenth.

GREEN: Oregon was then the...

GREENE: Twenty-eighth.

GREEN: ...twenty-eighth, and California was June 5 or...

GREENE: Fourth.

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GREEN: ...fourth. I really do not recall. That was six years ago. I think the impression—and I say this as of today (1974) —that, you know, a win you'd think would give it momentum and would help. I don't know the McCarthy strategy, but he was determined to take Oregon.

GREENE: It's interesting that there's a black book, which was kept by the "boiler room" girls—I think you know what that is—there's a May 3 note from Herb Schmertz saying that a private poll that had not yet been, and maybe never was, made public showed Johnson ahead, then Kennedy and then McCarthy. It doesn't give percentages, but that would have been just before the Indiana primary, and, of course, that was different from the earlier polls showing Kennedy ahead. Do you remember that that was a period when you felt the campaign was in trouble and they were losing?

GREEN: I remember watching the polls. They were going down. I'm sure I still have those somewhere.

GREENE: Do you feel that was largely because of what you said before, the reaction in the state to what they were seeing from other places?

GREEN: I know this was having an impact. Oregon does not like...

GREENE: Polls probably just confirmed your feelings. Okay. When do you remember getting together with Steve Smith and the other higher-ups and discussing the fact that you were in trouble and what were you going to do about it?

GREEN: I don't remember the time on it. I remember talking to Steve Smith, but I don't remember....

GREENE: Do you remember what your advice to them was and what their reaction was?

GREEN: Well, I think their reaction was that, you know, just to bring in everybody under the sun.

GREENE: Did you advise against that?

GREEN: At that point I don't know that I did, but I know that I was pretty lukewarm to the idea, because I don't... Carpetbaggers, strangers are just..

GREENE: Not welcome. What would you have advised them to do at that point to try to retrieve the situation?

GREEN: Well, there wasn't much you could do in terms of what was happening in California. And Bob from March to June 4th had to divide his time between Indiana, Nebraska, Oregon and California, as well as mend fences in other states—anticipating the convention. Then we obviously had no control over the TV coming in from California.

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GREENE: And beyond that there was very little?

GREEN: The Terry Schruck people were doing the best they could to make life difficult. There was also a great deal of discussion over—and whether it ever happened—this Ken Rinke, I'd never have asked him—but ganging up, you know, to the feeling that Bob Kennedy was the one to knock out.

GREENE: I was going to ask you about that, particularly in the Humphrey camp, whether you had evidence that that was Humphrey's strategy.

GREEN: Yes. I had the very strong feeling that this was the thing that they were going to do. They were going to knock Bob out because they felt that he would be the greater threat at the convention. They would join forces to support McCarthy, not because they liked him, but to knock Bob out of the running.

GREENE: Sure. Do you know any specifics of how they were doing it?

GREEN: Well, there were just a lot of little things, and people that I, you know, associated with for a long time. I think you kind of feel those things, or you read something that somebody says and it doesn't make sense in terms of logic, and the only thing it does make sense is in terms of combining forces to knock out the guy that would be the threat at the convention.

GREENE: That's interesting in light of that statement that McCarthy made—I don't know if you remember it—I believe it was on television, in which he said that if he lost before the convention that he would probably support Humphrey rather than Kennedy and that created quite a stir among his supporters, and he tried to get out of it.

GREEN: Tried to back out. Also, again, I do not know why but I recall at the '60 convention, McCarthy was walking down in front of me in the aisle, and I said something. I

was trying to kid him to get him to support John Kennedy, and I've never had anybody turn on me with such fury. There was really just a hatred of Kennedy.

GREENE: What did he say?

GREEN: Well, it was just, you know, it was the tone, just in effect, "It's the last thing I'd ever do to support Kennedy."

GREENE: And this was in '56?

GREEN: No, this was in '60.

GREENE : Oh, '60.

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GREEN: At the convention. If you remember, he gave the...

GREENE: Nominating.

GREEN : ...the Stevenson. He, as I recall, was originally an LBJ supporter. And then when it was apparent that LBJ was not going to be a real contender, and the Adlai Stevenson bandwagon started to roll, and it was at that point when I thought that since LBJ was really out of the picture that maybe McCarthy would swing over and support Kennedy, and it was obviously.... [Interruption]

GREENE: I was wondering, too, in this session that one of the books mentions that the Kennedy people were grumbling that Oregon's problem was that it didn't have any problems and therefore was unsuited to a Kennedy, and that you took umbrage with that remark.

GREEN: I didn't take umbrage, but I think there were not the problems of New York—there aren't today—arid there weren't the problems of the Los Angeles area, and therefore your style of campaign had to be different.

GREENE: But their grumbling about it didn't really, you didn't find it offense to Oregon, necessarily?

GREEN: No, I take great pride that Oregon can solve its problems and that it doesn't have as many. But it meant that the kind of campaigning...

 You know, we've never had political machines in Oregon, which I think is very hard for people from the eastern seabord to understand, and it's a calm kind of a campaign where people discuss the issues in a calm way rather than in a hysterical, emotional fashion with big

crowds. I remember (this was not in '68) Jerry Bruno one time—Bob Kennedy was coming out for some kind of meeting (this was way before he announced he was a candidate)...

GREENE: This was in '66, do you think?

GREEN: Probably.... and Jerry Bruno was out there. I was so irritated. In fact, that was one of the things that really cooled me on being the co-chairman for Bob Kennedy's campaign because, we felt we could have really filled up the Coliseum [Portland, Oregon] and they had dividers so that if you did not fill up the whole place you wouldn't give the impression of vacant seats...

GREENE: This is the labor, this was the time at the Labor Temple [Portland, Oregon], isn't it?

GREEN: Some others and I thought the rally should have been at the coliseum, but Jerry Bruno insisted on a small auditorium. And then Jerry Bruno went out and just worked at the high schools, you know, to get high

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school kids. I remember having the argument about that, but it didn't make any particular difference to me except I thought it was very bad judgment. It wasn't even my campaign, it wasn't even Bob's.

Anyhow, they wound up by having it at the Labor Temple, and there were about four thousand outside that never got in, and they were madder'n hell. I know I said at the time, "What you want is to have your meeting in a telephone booth and have ten thousand people outside clamoring to get in, and that just ain't the way to do it in Oregon." And I think people were mad.

And I remember going in with Bob, and I felt my clothes were half off by the crowds pressing in. I know I made my exit by a window at the back. We got in the car, and the idea was that we would get out there, you see, before the crowd would, with Bob, and get in the car and get away. Well, that wasn't what we did. I got in the car, then he took his time with Jerry Bruno, really to tease the crowd to get more and more high school kids excited. Then this business of being on top of the car and shaking hands. I can still remember Jerry Bruno standing in front of the car and saying (just to the driver, motioning to him), "Come up a little further, then, stop, so the crowd can get up and give the impression over TV that you have a mob scene."

GREENE: Did you discuss that with Kennedy on that occasion, or thereafter?

GREEN: I think that at that time—in 1966 or '67—there was no point in discussing it. There was no campaign; there was no political reason for discussing it or anything else. I don't remember that I did. I remember that I was pretty disgusted because I dislike that myself, and I really felt most Oregonians would reject that kind of nonsense.

GREENE: Do you think something like the Pacific dip, which became a legendary campaign event—remember when he stripped down and swam in the Pacific?—is that something that would really hurt as much as people have said?

GREEN: They just do not like political gimmickry. And this really is one thing that John Kennedy absolutely rejected. There were times when proposals were made to John Kennedy that I thought were good in terms of, you know, the political reaction, and he said, "Oh no." He said, "It sounds too much like a gimmick to me," and he absolutely would have nothing to do with it.

GREENE: if you remember, on May 24, which is right close the primary four days before it, the Drew Pearson column came out with the story Robert Kennedy tapping Martin Luther King's phone. Do you remember that and the impact and the discussions of how to handle it?

GREEN: I remember discussions on that. I don't remember whether we discussed it that day, but I remember that various people that I talked with, this was a reservation that they had, over his conduct of his office both when he was with the McClellan Committee and as attorney general.

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GREENE: But you don't remember talking about what you might do to counter that at the time?

GREEN: No, I just—I do remember it was something I was concerned about, the adverse impact that it would have in terms of a person who was a great civil libertarian. It created questions; a lack of confidence in terms of his real belief in civil rights; his real feelings about invasion of privacy.

GREENE: Did you ever talk to Kennedy himself about that?

GREEN: I do not recall. I do not think so.

GREENE: Do you remember the incident at the Portland Zoo, which was only two days before the primary on a Sunday? Were you with him at that time, by the way?

GREEN: No.

GREENE: What's your understanding of what happened? Does it differ at all from the public account?

GREEN: Bob Kennedy tried to avoid that and did not want the confrontation.

GREENE: Sort of didn't....It's always been a kind of strange incident. Was that another incident that you think had a significant impact?

GREEN: Well, I think it had some impact.

GREENE: Coming that close.

GREEN: It received a great deal of—far more press attention than it deserved.

GREENE: Well, sort of related to that, of course, is the whole question of whether or not to debate McCarthy. I know you were deeply involved in that. What are your recollections of....

GREEN: My recollections were that I was urging the debate, that I think....

GREENE: The books say otherwise. That doesn't mean anything, but....

GREEN: He did debate in California, didn't he?

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GREENE: Right.

GREEN: That was...

GREENE: That decision was made right after the Oregon results were clear.

GREEN: My recollection was that, since it became an issue, it was far better to debate than to pretend that.... I thought you were leading from weakness if you refused to debate.

GREENE: Well, that's interesting and important to get down, because the books say that Kennedy, of course, himself did not want to debate and that he was looking for support for his position wherever he could get it, and one of the people that he called a couple of times was you, and in each case you said not to, but if...

GREEN: That's not my recollection.

GREENE : ...that's not accurate we should know that.

GREEN: My recollection was that I thought it would be a sign of weakness not to.

GREENE: Do you think that was a big factor that...

GREEN: I think it was a factor.

GREENE : ...the fact that it was cowardly and....

GREEN: I think all these things contributed.

GREENE: Well, what other things can you think of before election, before the primary day itself, I mean? There were quite a few appearances with him, although I can't—I can give you general dates but they won't help; in terms of just where you were I'm not sure.

GREEN: I don't remember. I remember we had several. I remember flatbed trucks, you know, introducing 'him.

GREENE: How did he do, generally, in...?

GREEN: I remember one time a reception that some of us arranged. I had gone to a great deal of pain to send out invitations to my mailing list, the people who had been close to me politically and personally—and we held it in one of the large rooms at the Coliseum, (not the coliseum proper). He was late,

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which was, I think, a great weakness, of his—not keeping on schedule. But I remember how irritated I was that a couple of his sisters and he wanted to leave and they didn't want to stay, and there were literally hundreds of people that had come, and it was.... I don't remember which sisters were there, but I know I was madder than hell. It was just, you know, get out of here. It was a typical Oregon political reception—but not the kind his sisters thought worthwhile. And as we left...

GREENE: The sisters felt that way, are you saying, or the crowd?

GREEN: The sisters. He left while there were people there that had not shaken hands with him.

GREENE: Because he was disappointed in the crowd?

GREEN: No, there were several hundred there to see him. I think he just felt that he had been there long enough, however long it was, and I know that as we left there were people coming in because we had written the hours on it. And I remember one whom I've known for years, really angry. "You mean you're leaving?" And I felt that, you know, he should have stayed—to this day, I've regretted I didn't stay without them.

GREENE: Did you tell him that at the time?

GREEN: Yes. I said, "I think that you ought to stay here. These people want to shake your hand. That's important."

GREENE: But he left. Are there other occasions you can think of where you offered advice and it wasn't accepted?

GREEN: Well, I remember that one, because that was at the beginning of the campaign when I was trying desperately to get as many people on his side as we could, and I...

GREENE: It sounds kind of uncharacteristic, though. Is it?

GREEN: Well, this was.... I can't remember—my recollection is that Ethel [Ethel Skakel Kennedy] was there, and she, I thought, was a joy to work with. But there was one of the sisters—I think it was Eunice Shriver [Eunice Kennedy Shriver]—I think it was she, I'm not sure, but anyhow.... And Pat Lawford did not make a good impression in this state.

GREENE: No. Why is that?

GREEN: I don't know. Just...

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GREENE: What about Joan Kennedy [Joan Bennett Kennedy]? I know she came out early in the campaign. That was one of the things Barrett Prettyman came out and prepared for, her visit and Warren Beatty's.

GREEN: Joan and Ted had been there in 1960 and were very well liked. They were both great—touring the state. Again, I did not go myself to a single one of the teas, you know, that were just the women's affairs. I never went to a one of them, but I got lots of feedback from them.

But I remember at this reception—I can't remember the sister, but I remember her saying, "Let's leave, let's leave." You know. And it was just shoving the people through the line, you know, and lots of people would have enjoyed talking to him, for one minute even, and it was just [clap, clap, clap] which left a very bad impression.

GREENE: Did you get involved at all in the organization for primary day in terms of how it was going to work and Matt Reese's [Matthew A. Reese, Jr.] people and that aspect of it?

GREEN: No.

GREENE: What was your feeling, going into the primary?

GREEN: Well, I had watched the polls.

GREENE: They were awfully close; but he was still ahead, I think, wasn't he, in your final polls?

GREEN: It was the trend which worried me more. I think that I've always been more concerned about a trend than I have about the percentage points.

GREENE: Plus, I believe, there was a very big unknown, like about 11 percent.

GREEN: I've forgotten.

GREENE: Do you remember that being a factor?

GREEN: I just remember the trend was down, instead of.... With John Kennedy, we started out with empty airports and no support and Wayne Morse [Wayne L. Morse] running against him and then with the strong labor opposition. It constantly went up.

GREENE: You know, Wayne Morse is something we haven't talked about. How much contact was there with him that you know of?

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GREEN: Well, Wayne never loved the Kennedys.

GREENE: Was there any real effort made to...

GREEN: I'm sure he did.

GREENE: Did you do any of that?

GREEN: No, when I say I'm sure—Wayne worked against him.

GREENE: Oh, against him. Oh. I'm sorry. I didn't understand.

GREEN: Oh, yes.

GREENE: For Humphrey?

GREEN: It would be hard to figure out what Wayne was doing, you know, in terms of the specific things, whether he was a part of the business of combining forces to knock Bob out, or whether he.... What he says and what he does are not always the same.

GREENE: What about election night after the results were in?

GREEN: He flew in, of course, got the message; he flew up from California, and, uh, very, very sad. Sad occasion.

GREENE: How did you feel he reacted?

GREEN: He was really great. It was, I thought, probably one of his finest moments. His efforts were really in cheering other people. I know that Pierre Salinger [Pierre E. Salinger] and Bob and Steve Smith, Bill vanden Heuvel and I, we went off into a bedroom at the hotel to figure out what he was going to say, and the people were waiting downstairs. I'm sure he must have been terribly disappointed and had hoped, coming up, to, be there for a celebration, and had gotten word on the plane; so when he walked into the hotel, he knew it. He was really fine.

GREENE: Do you remember the discussion about whether or not to send a telegram to McCarthy? How to handle that, since McCarthy had never sent him one?

GREEN: I do remember the discussion. I remember a discussion, now that you mention it.

GREENE: Did it all seem to be, that that's what: should be done?

GREEN: Yes. There's no sense in being a bum sport because somebody else is.

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GREENE: Well, if there's nothing else, can you think of other things on Oregon in '68, or anything else even generally on the '68 presidential effort? Did you stay involved in some way, or was that it?

GREEN: In the California?

GREENE: Yes, it would have been, I guess.

GREEN: No, I was not involved in California at all.

GREENE: Was there any continuing activity in Oregon that you were aware of?

GREEN: There were some of the—I don't know how many—some of the strong Bob Kennedy supporters who went to California.

GREENE: Then they were the outsiders.

GREEN: And I will always have reservations, you know, as to how much value that really is. I think it's far better to concentrate your money and energy and time on getting people within the state if you can. I certainly think it's advantageous to have a person who has lots of political savvy and experience, as a Hy Raskin, to come in, and somebody in whom the candidate has great confidence. I think it's essential. In fact, that was, when we had the discussion of vanden Heuvel, I thought the most important thing was for him to select somebody in whom he had the greatest confidence. But that all was such a short period of time. It was just very difficult, I think, to get a thing organized.

GREENE: Yes. Particularly when your opponents have such a tremendous time advantage.

GREEN: That's right.

GREENE: Been in there since December.

GREEN: That's right.

[END OF INTERVIEW]

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